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California Supreme Court Survey
September 1993 - October 1994
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof
the issues that have been addressedby the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importanceof the court's holding and the extent to
which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline and judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.

I.

ArrORNEYS AT LAW

An attorney's status as "in-house" counsel does not
bar the pursuit of retaliatory discharge and implied-in-fact contract claims as long as it does not
jeopardize attorney-clientprivilege; the client's unilateral and unrestricted right to sever the attorneyclient relationship does not apply to corporate inhouse counsel:
General Dynamics Corporation v. Superior Court. . 1180
II.

CONSTITIrONAL LAW

A.

Under the Fourth Amendment, it is constitutionally
permissible to operate highway sobriety checkpoints
without providing advance notice of the checkpoint
to the public:
People v. Banks ............................
1185

B.

An injunction does not violate the FirstAmendment
rights of anti-abortionprotestors when it prohibits
them from demonstrating,picketing, and counseling
on a public sidewalk in front of an abortion clinic
and requires them to conduct all such activities on
the public sidewalk directly across the street:
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams. 1190

1175

III.

CRIMINAL LAW

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

1176

The doctrine of "imperfect" se(f-defense provides that
a criminal defendant charged with murder, acting
with an actual, but unreasonable, belief of imminent harm of death or great bodily injury lacks the
requisite mental statefor malice and, therefore, cannot be found guilty of murder:
In re Christian S .......................... 1199
The state may impose sentence enhancements on
juveniles who commit crimes while released from
custody pending trial, thereby extending the maximum period of physical confinement of the juvenile
ward:
In re Jovan B .............................. 1205
While section 1101 of the CaliforniaEvidence Code
remains applicable in criminal proceedings, evidence of a defendant's uncharged criminal conduct
is admissible when the uncharged criminal conduct
and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to
support an inference that they are manifestations of
a common design or plan, unless the prejudicial
effect of such evidence substantially outweighs its
probative value:
People v. Ewoldt ............................ 1211
CaliforniaPenal Code section 667(b) mandates that
when a defendant is exposed to multiple statutory
enhancementsfor the same underlying priorfelony
conviction, one of which is available under section
667, the longer enhancement, but not both, must be
imposed, except where a statute explicitly specifies
that the enhancements are to be applied cumulatively:
People v. Jones............................. 1218
One may be found liable on a theory of aiding and
abetting if he or she forms the intention to commit,
encourage, or facilitate the commission of a burglary prior to the time the perpetratordeparts the
building; therefore CALJIC No. 14.54 as drafted is
an incorrect statement of the law:
People v. Montoya ........................... 1227
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F.

IV.

Sellers of alcoholic beverages cannot rely on the
California constitutional provision that prohibits
minorsfrom buying alcoholic beverages as a defense
to selling alcoholic beverages to underagedecoys:
Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
1233
Board ....................................

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement is not entitled to relief from a trial
court's failure to advise the defendant of the full
consequences of his plea, if he fails to make a timely
objection; the imposition of a statutorily mandated
registrationrequirement, even when the court fails
to advise the defendant of the requirement, does not
constitute a violation of the plea agreement:
1238
People v. McClellan .........................

V.

DEATH PENALTY

A.

B.

California'sdeath penalty selection factors are not
subject to the Eighth Amendment vagueness standard despite the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Stringer v. Black, the correct standardfor
the penalty selection-phase is specificity of terms
used and their relevance to sentence determination:
1246
People v. Bacigalupo ........................
A witness'psychiatricrecords not obtained or created as part of the prosecution's investigation, but
derived from previous psychotherapy, might not be
deemed in the government's possessionfor purposes
of applying the Pennsylvania v. Ritchie exception to
privileged therapist-patientcommunications. When
a laboratory evidentiary procedure provides a directly identifiable image that is clear to a lay jury,
it is not subject to the People v. Kelly scientific evidence standard:
1258
People v. Webb.............................

1177

VI.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Under section 21160 of the CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act, the Departmentof Forestry is authorized to require that timber harvesting plans include information not specified within the Board of
Forestry rules; the Board of Forestry's approval of a
plan, absent such information, is subject to judicial
review under the abuse of discretionstandard:
Sierra Club v. State Board of Forestry...........
1266
VII.

EVIDENCE

The Kelly-Frye "general acceptance" standard remains the rule for admissibility of novel scientific
evidence:
People v. Leahy ............................
1274
VIII.

HEALING ARTS AND INSTITUTIONS

The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), limiting recovery of noneconomic damages
against a health care providerfor professional negligence to $250,000, applies to an actionfor partial
equitable indemnification by a concurrent
tortfeasor;furthermore, an indemnitee's reasonable
settlement in good faith, without notice or opportunity to defend, cannot bind an indemnitor:
Western S.S. Lines v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital 1308
IX.

JUVENILE LAW

When a juvenile is arrested without a warrant, the
Constitution requires a prompt hearing to determine probable cause; however, such a hearing need
not be held within forty-eight hours:
Afredo A. v. Superior Court...................
1315
X.

LIBEL AND SLANDER

Deposition testimony and other statements taken in
connection with private, contractual arbitration
proceedings are protected from tort liability by the
absolute immunity granted under California's litigation privilege embodied in Civil Code section
47(b):
Moore v. Conliffe ...........................
1322
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XI.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

In the context of a medical malpractice action, a
third-partyphysician does not violate the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act by disclosing the
patient-plaintiffs medical records to the insurer
responsible for defending the case as long as the
third-party physician runs the risk of being sued
himsef; further, there was no claim stated for invasion of privacy under the California Constitution:
Heller v. Norcal Mutual Insurance Co ............
1331
XII.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A manufacturermay not be held liableforfailing to
label a nonprescription drug with warnings in a
language other than English:
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc .......................
1344
XIII.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS

A public entity does not have absolute immunity
against damage caused to downstream riparian
property, but is subject to a test of reasonableness
for both tort and inverse condemnation actions:
Locklin v. City of Lafayette ....................
1352
XUV.

WORKERS COMPENSATION

Labor Code sections 3600 and 3602 of the Worker's
Compensation Act do not bar an employee from
maintaininga civil action againsthis employerfor
false imprisonment when the employer's intentional
misconduct exceeds the proper role of the employment relationship:
Fermino v. Fedco ...........................
1358
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I. ATrORNEYS AT LAW
An attorney's status as "in-house" counsel does not
bar the pursuit of retaliatory discharge and implied-in-fact contract claims as long as it does not
jeopardize attorney-clientprivilege; the client's unilateral and unrestricted right to sever the attorneyclient relationship does not apply to corporate inhouse counsel:
General Dynamics Corporation v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court considered whether a corporate client possesses an unrestricted right to terminate an in-house counsel with or without cause.'
The court distinguished the corporate client-corporate counsel relationship from the traditional attorney-client relationship.! The court found
that the unilateral right to sever the professional relationship in the traditional attorney-client setting does not extend to the termination of inhouse counsel.3
The defendant relied upon Fracassev. Brent4 to support its contention that a client holds an unrestricted right to terminate in-house counsel at any time and for any reason.5 The trial court overruled the
defendant's demurrer.6 The court of appeal denied General Dynamic's

1. 7 Cal. 4th 1164, 876 P.2d 487, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (1994). Justice Arabian
authored the unanimous opinion of the court, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, George, and Turner concurring. Id. at 1192, 876 P.2d at 505,
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
2. Id. at 1174-75, 876 P.2d at 493, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
3. Id. The defendant, General Dynamics, fired Andrew Rose in 1991 after 14 years
of employment. Id. at 1170, 876 P.2d at 490, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4. Rose filed a complaint alleging that General Dynamics wrongfully terminated his employment for the
following reasons:
(1) General Dynamics wished to cover up evidence uncovered by Rose of
widespread drg use among the members of its workforce.
(2) Rose protested the company's refusal to investigate the electronic bugging of
the office of the chief of security.
(3) Rose informed General Dynamics that its salary policy might violate the Fair
Labor Standard Act.
Id. at 1170-71, 876 P.2d at 490-91, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4-5. General Dynamics demurred on the grounds that the complaint failed to properly state a claim for relief.
Id. at 1171, 876 P.2d at 491, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
4. 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972). For a discussion of this
case, see infra note 10 and accompanying text.
5. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1173, 876 P.2d at 492, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6.
6. Id. at 1171, 876 P.2d at 491, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
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petition for a writ of mandate on the ground that the complaint adequately stated a claim for relief.7
II.

TREATMENT

The California Supreme Court initially distinguished the duties of inhouse counsel with those of attorneys employed in law firms. The court
found that the economic dependence of in-house counsel on a single
employer made them much more similar to corporate employees than an
attorney working independently for numerous clients.' In this regard, the
0
court rejected the defendant's reliance upon Fracasse
by limiting the
client's unrestricted right to discharge an attorney to cases handled on a
contingency fee basis." The court recognized that although a corporate
client does indeed possess a unilateral right to discharge its corporate
counsel, such a right may not be absolute and may not always be exercised with legal impunity.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 1172, 876 P.2d at 491, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5; see Grace M. Giesel, The
Ethics of Employment Dilemma of In-House Counsel, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535
(1992).
9. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1172, 876 P.2d at 491, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
The court also pointed out pressures that are unique to the position of in-house
counsel. The economic dependence upon a single client dictates that the attorney
must endeavor to further the objectives of his or her company, yet the ethical regulations imposed by the Rules of Professional Responsibility may conflict with this effort. Id. This may force an attorney to choose between adhering to the ethical standards of the legal profession and an employer's economic needs. Id. The court reasoned that without judicial redress for wrongful termination, corporate counsel would
be less likely to fulfill their ethical obligation of protesting activities which violate
public policy. Id.
10. Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972), involved an attorney-client relationship based on a contingent fee contract. The
Fracasse court established a client's unilateral right to sever the attorney-client relationship at any time. Id. However, in so doing, the client must compensate the
attorney for the reasonable value of the services rendered upon recovery. See General
Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1175, 876 P.2d at 493, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7.
11. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1176, 876 P.2d at 494, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8.
See generally 1 B.E. WTMN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys §§ 82-83 (3d ed. 1985
& Supp. 1994) (discussing a client's absolute right to discharge an attorney); 7 CAL
JuR. 3D Attorneys at Law §§ 77-187 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the attorneyclient relationship and the various methods for its termination).
12. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1177, 876 P.2d at 495, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
The corporate client may be liable for lost wages and other relevant damages. Id.
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The court examined the appropriate classification of the contract at
issue and determined that General Dynamics' course of conduct created
an implied-in-fact contract which permitted termination only for good

cause. 3 In verifying the presence of all the elements necessary to establish an implied-in-fact contract, the court found that the claim should
withstand a general demurrer.1" The court reasoned that nothing inher-

ent in the duties of an in-house counsel position should hinder the right
of an attorney-employee to bring such an action since other corporate
employees are free to do so. 5
The court next considered the merits of the plaintiffs retaliatory
discharge claim.'6 The majority noted that although forty-three jurisdictions have adopted this cause of action, California case law sets forth
two prominent requirements for bringing such claims.'7 The first requirement is that "the public policy at issue must be one that is not only
'fundamental' but is clearly established in the Constitution and positive
law of the state."'8 The second requirement dictates that the policy implicated by the employee's conduct must truly be one that benefits the
public at large rather than the interests of a particular class of persons. 9
Additionally, the court noted a third characteristic of cases involving
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.' The court emphasized

13. Id. at 1178, 876 P.2d at 496, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9-10 (stating "these
pleadings . . . adequately allege that a 'course of conduct, including various oral representations, created a reasonable expectation' that the plaintiff would not be terminated without good cause").
14. Id. at 1178, 876 P.2d at 495, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9-10. The court identified the
elements of an implied-in-fact contract as "a 'course of conduct, including various
oral representations, creat[ing] a reasonable expectation' that plaintiff would not be
terminated without good cause." Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.
3d 654, 675, 765 P.2d 373, 383, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 221 (1988)).
15. Id. at 1178, 876 P.2d at 496, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10. The court relied upon it's
earlier determination that an in-house attorney works in a position similar to that of
any corporate employee. Id.
16. Id. at 1180, 876 P.2d at 496, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11. The court pointed out that
this tort is separate and distinct from an action based in contract because it arises
out of the employers obligation to comply with public policy. Id.

17. Id. See generally 2 B.E.

WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA

LAW, Agency and

Employment §§ 163-170 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1994) (discussing wrongful termination
in violation of law or public policy); 29 CAL. JuR. 3D Employer and Employee §§ 6267 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the grounds for discharge of an employee and
the employee's remedies for wrongful discharge).
18. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1178, 876 P.2d at 497, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11;
see also Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal. 4th 1083, 824 P.2d 680, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874
(1992) (outlining the elements required for a claim alleging wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy).
19. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1180, 876 P.2d at 497, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11.
20. Id. at 1180-81, 876 P.2d at 497, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11 (stating that this third
characteristic may be of "surpassing significance" in the context of in-house counsel
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that the greater goal of protecting the public at large is facilitated by
shielding individual employees from retaliation.2 Citing Foley, the court
noted that such tort actions protect the public interest be protecting
employees who refuse to commit criminal acts or attempt to report criminal conduct and other unethical or illegal practices. 2
The court recognized that the policy underlying wrongful discharge
claims originates from the public's desire to prevent an employer from
coercively subverting another person's constitutional and legal interests.' Thus, the purpose of the cause of action lies in safeguarding the
public good rather than protecting a particular person's interest in employment.u Accordingly, the court recognized that the Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to act in such a was as to promote
the public interest at large.' The court found that the dual interest between serving the employer's interests and upholding the ethical standards of the profession place in-house counsel in a precarious position
which justifies greater legal protection.'
The court next evaluated the potential problems created by allowing
in-counsel to pursue retaliatory discharge claims.27 However, the court's
greatest concern centered on the possibility that the attorney-client privilege might be jeopardized.' Once again, the court found no reason to

cases).
21. Id.

22. Id. (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 670, 765 P.2d 373,
380, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 218 (1988)).
23. Id. at 1180-81, 876 P.2d at 497, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11; see also Foley, 47 Cal.
3d 654, 670, 765 P.2d 373, 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 218 (recognizing the public policy
served by encouraging claims alleging wrongful termination).
24. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1181, 876 P.2d at 497, 32 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 11.
25. Id. at 1181-82, 876 P.2d at 498, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12. The court again referred
to the financial dependence of an in-house attorney on his or her corporate employer. Id.
26. Id. at 1182, 876 P.2d at 498, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12. The court stated: "(Ilnhouse counsel, forced to choose between the demands of the employer and the requirements of a professional code of ethics have, if anything, an even more powerful
claim to judicial protection than their nonprofessional colleagues." Id.; see Sara A.
Corelio, Note, In-House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92 COLuM.
L REv. 389 (1992).

27. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1182, 876 P.2d at 498, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12.
28. Id. Such actions which implicate privileged information might damage the attorney-client relationship by discouraging corporate employers from candidly sharing
information for fear that it might ultimately be used against them. Id.; see also Balla
v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (IlM.1991) (holding that the wrongfully discharged inhouse counsel cannot maintain a retaliatory discharge action partly because it would

1183

treat the corporate attorney differently from the non-attorney corporate
employee.' However, the court expressly rejected any dilution of the
attorney-client privilege between the in-house counsel and the corporate
client.' The court decided that while the in-house counsel may pursue a
retaliatory discharge action where a non-attorney in the same situation
may do so, "where the elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of
fundamental public policy claim cannot... be fully established without
breaching the attorney-client privilege, the suit must be dismissed in the
interest of preserving the privilege."'"

II.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court recognized the prevalence of in-house
counsel in today's corporate society and the need to offer legal protection to such employees who may be torn between the competing interests of their professional code of ethics and the demands of their employer.' The court determined that corporate counsel working in-house
more closely resembles non-attorney corporate employees than traditional attorneys.' As such, corporate in-house counsel require access to the
judicial remedies afforded to their non-attorney corporate counterparts in
wrongful termination claims.
The court, however, required the dismissal of such suits when they
present a likelihood of breaching the attorney-client privilege. This safeguard should serve to protect the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship.' Thus, this decision should function as an effective compromise
which protects a variety of interests, including those of the general public, the corporate in-house counsel employee and the attorney-client privilege.

CHRISTOPHER DALLAS

adversely affect the attorney-client relationship).
29. General Dynamics, 7 Cal. 4th at 1185-86, 876 P.2d at 500-02, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 14-15.
30. Id. at 1190, 876 P.2d at 503-04, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18.
31. Id. at 1190, 876 P.2d at 503-04, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18. The court stated that
judges should take "an aggressive managerial role" in handling these cases so as to
"minimize the dangers to the legitimate privilege interests." Id. at 1191, 876 P.2d at
504, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18. Further, the court noted that an attorney who brings
such a suit and ultimately loses may be subject to disciplinary proceedings by the
state bar for any disclosure of privileged material. Id.
32. Id. at 1171, 876 P.2d at 491, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
33. Id. at 1172, 876 P.2d at 491, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
34. Id. at 1190, 876 P.2d at 503, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

Under the Fourth Amendment, it is constitutionally
permissible to operate highway sobriety checkpoints
without providing advance notice of the checkpoint
to the public: People v. Banks.

I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Banks,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether it is constitutionally permissible, under the Fourth Amendment,2
to conduct highway sobriety checkpoints without providing advance notice of the operation of the checkpoint to the public.3
The defendant in this case was convicted for driving while under
the influence of alcohol after the police arrested her at a sobriety checkpoint.4 The defendant contended that her arrest was unlawful pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment because the sobriety checkpoint did not adhere to previously established guidelines regulating the operation of sobriety checkpoints.5 The court held that the police were not constitutionally required to give advance notice.6 In deciding this issue, the court
considered whether, in light of Michigan State Police Department v.
Sitz,7 advance notice was constitutionally required to operate such a
checkpoint.'

1. 6 Cal. 4th 926, 863 P.2d 769, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524 (1993). Justice George wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Arabian, and
Baxter concurred. Id. at 931-49, 836 P.2d at 769-82, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 524-37. Justice
Panelli wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Mosk concurred. Id. at 949-51,
863 P.2d at 782-84, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537-39 (Panelli, J., dissenting).

2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment states
that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Id.
3. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th at 931, 863 P.2d at 769, 25 Cal. Rtpr. 2d at 524.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 932, 863 P.2d at 770, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525.
6. Id. at 948-49, 863 P.2d at 781-82, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536-37.
7. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
8. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th at 934-35, 863 P.2d at 772, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527.
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I.

A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion

The majority prefaced its opinion by explicitly rejecting the
defendant's interpretation of Ingersoll v. Palmeri as holding that advance notice is required in order to operate sobriety checkpoints."0 The
court noted that the checkpoint in Ingersoll satisfied all of the minimum
intrusiveness factors." Therefore, the issue of whether the absence of
the advance publicity factor would negate the constitutionality of the3
checkpoint was neither at issue nor examined at length in the analysis.

9. 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987). In Ingersoll, a group
of California taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint program implemented by a local police department. Id. at 1325-27, 743 P.2d at 1302-03,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46. The court laid out several factors necessary to evaluate the
intrusiveness of sobriety checkpoints. Id. at 1341-47, 743 P.2d at 1313-17, 241 Cal.
Rptr. at 56-60. One such factor was whether the authorities gave sufficient advance
publicity of the checkpoint. Id. at 1346-47, 743 P.2d at 1316-17, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
The court held that the steps taken by the police department, including giving advance notice of the checkpoint, adequately minimized the intrusiveness of the search.
Id. at 1347, 743 P.2d at 1317, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
10. Id. at 1346-47, 743 P.2d at 1316-17, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60. The defendant argued
that the Ingersoll court, in concluding that the sobriety checkpoint was preceded by
advance notice, resumed that "[advance publicity is important to the maintenance of
a constitutionally permissible sobriety checkpoint. Publicity [without disclosure of the
precise location of the checkpoint) both reduces the intrusiveness of the stop and
increases the deterrent effect of the roadblock." Id. at 1346, 743 P.2d at 1316, 241
Cal. Rptr. at 60.
11. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th at 938, 836 P.2d at 774, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529. The
Ingersoll court listed eight factors to be evaluated in determining whether a sobriety
checkpoint adequately minimizes the intrusiveness toward motorists. Ingersoll, 43 Cal.
3d at 1341-47, 743 P.2d at 1313-17, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 56-60. The factors are as follows:
(1) The decision, selection, and procedures for establishing a sobriety check
point are made by supervisory personnel.
(2) The procedure in which motorists are stopped is neutrally computed.
(3) Adequate safety procedures are implemented, such as signals warning oncoming motorists of the checkpoint.
(4) The location of the checkpoint is reasonable and determined by policy making personnel.
(5) The time and length of the operation of the checkpoint are indicative that
the law enforcement personnel exercised good judgment.
(6) The checkpoint adequately conveys to motorists that the nature of the stop
is on the part of law enforcement officials.
(7) The duration and characterization of the stop is kept to a minimum.
(8) The public is given advance notice of the checkpoint.
Id.
12. However, the defendant argued that checkpoints which operate without providing advance notice are unconstitutional. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th at 935, 863 P.2d at 772,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527; see People v. Morgan, 221 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 270 Cal.
Rptr. 597 (1990) (holding that sobriety checkpoints conducted in the absence of ad-
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The cotfrt reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Sitz determined that advance publicity was not required in order to operate a sobriety checkpoint.' The court expounded that the rationale behind the
advance publicity factor was both to minimize the intrusiveness of the
checkpoint and to discourage motorists from driving while intoxicated
because the checkpoint would serve as a deterrent, neither of which are
5
constitutional requirements under Sitz."
The court further reasoned that Sitz considered both subjective and
objective criteria in evaluating whether the checkpoint violated the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights'6 and concluded that both criteria
had been satisfied. The court noted that the objective intrusion of requiring the defendant to stop at the checkpoint would be the same as
requiring the defendant to stop at a border crossing, which has been
upheld as constitutionally permissible."8
Additionally, the court explained that the subjective intrusion, characterized by creating surprise and apprehension in the defendant, was
also within constitutional bounds because the defendant motorist may
perceive the officer's authority and realize that other people are being
stopped, thus serving to reduce the fear and discomfort of the intru9
sion."
The court concluded that the intrusion analysis in Sitz clearly
advocates that, while advance notice may serve to lessen the surprise
and delay, such notice is not constitutionally required in order to justify
a sobriety checkpoint.'
The court further rationalized that, in some circumstances, such as
during holiday weekends and after sporting events, the general policy

vance notice are unconstitutional), overrded by Banks, 6 Cal. 4th 926, 863 P.2d 763,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524 (1993). See generally Clark H. Cameron, Note, Ingersoll v. Palmer: Have Sobriety Checkpoints Driven the Fourth Amendment Too Far?, 17 Sw. U. L
REv. 261 (1987) (analyzing the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints).
13. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th at 938, 863 P.2d at 774, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529. The court
stated that, "[allthough our decision in IngersoU did not determine explicitly whether
each of the safeguards discussed in that opinion was essential to the constitutional
validity of a sobriety checkpoint, the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Sitz demonstrates that advance publicity is not a constitutionally required prerequisite." Id. at 935, 863 P.2d at 772, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 527.
14. Id. at 943, 863 P.2d at 778, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533.
15. Id. at 942, 863 P.2d at 777, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532.
16. Id. (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-52).
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 943, 836 P.2d at 778, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533.
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goal of deterring people from driving under the influence of alcohol is
often better served by not providing advance notice because motorists
would not know where the checkpoints would be located and thus could
not easily avoid them.2 Furthermore, financial constraints may limit the
ability of law enforcement agencies to publicize sobriety checkpoints.'
The court noted that even before the Supreme Court's decision in
Sitz, the great weight of authority held that advance publicity is not
necessary to operate a sobriety checkpoint.' Thus, the court concluded
that maintaining a sobriety checkpoint without advance notice in itself
was not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.'
B.

Justice PaneUi'sDissentingOpinion

In support of his dissenting opinion, Justice Panelli argued that
there are circumstances where the absence of advance publicity, in conjunction with other factors, could lead to a conclusion that a checkpoint
is unconstitutional.' Justice Panelli reasoned that the majority minimized the importance of advance publicity by stating that the absence of
such publicity is not per se unconstitutional.' Justice Panelli warned
that the majority interpretation would dissuade law enforcement officials
from engaging in advance publicity when they erect sobriety checkpoints
because advance notice is no longer a factor which needs to be considered.'
Justice Paneili noted that the majority's reliance on Sitz is nisplaced because Sitz dealt with the constitutionality of a Michigan checkpoint system, and is consequently not applicable to California's checkpoint system.' In this manner, Justice Panelli concluded that the majority opinion sends an ambiguous message, neither confirming that the ad-

21. Id. at 943-44, 863 P.2d at 778, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 533.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 945-46, 863 P.2d at 779-80, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 534-35; see State v.
DeCamera, 237 N.J. 380, 568 A.2d 86, 88 (1989) (reasoning that lack of advance publicity would deter motorists from driving because they would not know the location
2d 273 (1985) (noting that lack of pubof the checkpoints); People v. Bartley, 109 IMl.
licity preceding a sobriety roadblock did not render the checkpoint unconstitutional).
24. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th at 948-49, 863 P.2d at 782, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 537.
25. Id. at 950, 863 P.2d at 783, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (Panelli, J., dissenting). See
generally People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1984); Elena A. Rodney, Constitutional Lawv--Roadside Sobriety Tests May Not Be Administered by Law Enforcement
Officials Without Probable Cause to Believe the Defendant Was Driving While Intoxicated, 14 U. BALI. L REV. 581, 586 (1985) (analyzing the historic development of so-

briety tests and checkpoints and the various challenges to their constitutionality).
26. Banks, 6 Cal. 4th at 950, 863 P.2d at 783, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (Panelli, J.,
dissenting).
27. Id. at 950-51, 863 P.2d at 783, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 951, 863 P.2d at 783, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
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vance publicity requirement is still a factor to be considered under
Ingersoll, nor expressly removing it as a balancing factor from due process analysis.'
Ill.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the California Supreme Court's decision that advance
publicity of sobriety checkpoints is not a constitutional prerequisite may
be interpreted in two different manners.
On one hand, the court has clearly resolved the troublesome issue
regarding the propriety of arrests made at sobriety checkpoints where no
advance publicity is given in that such arrests are not per se unconstitutional for lack of advance notice.
However, the dissent notes that the decision may also be perceived
as a tacit removal of the advance notice requirement altogether.' The
court, in making explicit references to the favored policy of deterring
motorists from driving while under the influence of alcohol, commented
that the success of general deterrence is best achieved when drivers are
unaware of sobriety checkpoints because motorists are less inclined to
drive when they are aware of the possibility of random sobriety check31
points.

Nevertheless, it is certain that law enforcement authorities will be
buoyed by the announced decision. Under either interpretation, law enforcement officials will be able to conduct more sobriety checkpoints
without advance publicity. Police may either compensate for lack of
advance notice with a strong showing of the other seven Ingersoll factors, or, if the majority opinion is to be construed as no longer requiring
advance publicity as a consideration, they need only balance the remaining seven factors in order to lawfully operate sobriety checkpoints.

JOSHUA MARK FRIED

29. Id. at 951, 863 P.2d at 783-84, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 538-39 (Panelli, J., dissent-

ing).
30. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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B.

An injunction does not violate the FirstAmendment
rights of anti-abortionprotestors when it prohibits
them from demonstrating,picketing and counseling
on a public sidewalk in front of an abortion clinic
and requires them to conduct all such activities on
the public sidewalk directly across the street:
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams,' the California Supreme Court considered whether an injunction violates the First
Amendment rights of anti-abortion protesters when it effectively bars the
protesters from demonstrating, picketing and counseling on a public
sidewalk in front of an abortion clinic and requires them to conduct all
such activities on the public sidewalk directly across the street! The

1. 7 Cal. 4th 860, 873 P.2d 1224, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
413 (1994). Justice Arabian wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas
and Justices Mosk, Baxter, and George concurred. Id. at 864-81, 873 P.2d at 1226-37,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631-42. The Honorable Gary E. Strankman, presiding justice of the
First District Court of Appeal, was assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial
Council, and also concurred in the opinion. Justice Baxter wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice George concurred. Id. at 881-93, 873 P.2d at 1237-38, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43. Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at
883-91, 873 P.2d at 1238-45, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-50.
Following the decision, the United States Supreme Court granted the defendant's
petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated the California Supreme Court's decision.
See Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994). The
Court also remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994)." Id.
2. Planned ParenthoodShasta-Diablo, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th at 868, 873 P.2d at 1228, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633. In Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., .a family health care
clinic that provides abortion services brought suit against Solano Citizens For Life, an
organization that opposes abortion. Id. at 865, 873 P.2d at 1226, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
631. The defendants picketed, demonstrated and provided "counseling" services on the
public sidewalk directly in front of the plaintiff's clinic, as well as in the clinic's
parking lot located immediately in front of the clinic. Id. at 865-66, 873 P.2d at 1226,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.
The defendants' activities included delaying the entry of cars through the clinic's
driveway while "attempting to pass literature through the windows even as they were
being rolled up," recording the license numbers of the entering cars, and "pressing
anti-abortion literature and plastic replicas of fetuses" on patients as they entered and
left the clinic. Id. at 865-66, 873 P.2d at 1226-27, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631-32.
The defendants also advised patients "to reconsider their decision to have an
abortion," yelled at the clinic's staff, and photographed the staff and the patients. Id.
The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order, which restricted picketing to
the sidewalk in front of the clinic and prohibited the defendants "from harassing any
person entering or leaving the clinic." Id. at 866, 873 P.2d at 1227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 632. Subsequently, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction, which limited the
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court found that the injunction: (1) was content neutral, (2) was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) left open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.3 Thus,
the court held that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment
rights of the protesters.4
II.

A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion

1. Demonstrating, Picketing and Counseling on a Public Sidewalk
Constitutes Public Forum Speech and Is Given Heightened First
Amendment Protection
The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit state action that abridges the freedom of speech.5 State
action includes judicial injunctions,' and protected speech includes

number of pickets on the sidewalk to four and required that at least two of the pickets remain "a minimum of ten feet away from the other two." Id.
Ultimately, the plaintiff obtained a permanent injunction, which prohibited the
defendants from the following activities:
(1) blocking any entrance or exit to the clinic building; (2) recording the
license numbers of cars entering or leaving the clinic; (3) photographing any
person entering or leaving the clinic building; (4) referring, in oral statements
while at the clinic site, to physicians, staff or clients as "murdering" or "murderers," "killing" or "killers," or to children or babies being "killed" or "murdered" by anyone in the clinic building in the presence of children under 12;
and (5) shouting at or touching physicians, staff or patients entering or leaving the clinic or making noise that could be heard inside the premises.
Id. at 867, 873 P.2d at 1227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632. Moreover, the permanent injunction required the defendants to conduct all their activities on the public sidewalk
across the street from the clinic. Id. at 867, 873 P.2d at 1227-28, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
632-33. This final requirement was the only issue on appeal to the California Supreme
Court. Id. at 868, 873 P.2d at 1228, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
3. Id. at 869-81, 873 P.2d at 1229-36, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634-41.
4. Id. at 864, 873 P.2d at 1226, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.
5. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in pertinent part that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person . . . the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See
generally Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L REv.
883 (1991) (providing a general overview of the First Amendment -freedom of speech).
6. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th at 868, 873 P.2d at 1228, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633. The court stated that "when... the judicial process is invoked

1191

peaceful "picketing and leafletting." The California Supreme Court held
that the injunction in the instant case constituted state action which
implicated First Amendment protection because the injunction restricted
the picketing activities of the antiabortion protesters.'
The court then stated that courts give greater protection to speech
that occurs in a public forum, such as the public sidewalk in the instant
case.' Nevertheless, the court ruled that the state may restrict the time,
place or manner of protected speech if- (1) the restrictions are content
neutral; (2) the restrictions are "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest;" and (3) the restrictions "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." °

2.

The Injunction Is Content Neutral

Restrictions on protected speech are content neutral if they do not
refer to the content of the regulated speech." In the instant case, the
court observed that the injunction did not focus on the anti-abortion
message of the defendants' speech. 2 Instead, it "merely provide[d] that
all picketing, demonstrating, or counseling shall take place on the sidewalk across the street from the clinic." 3 The court rejected the
defendants' argument that the injunction was content based because it

to restrict expressive activities on public property, 'state action' is implicated." Id.
(citing Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942)).
7. Id. at 869, 873 P.2d at 1228, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633 (citing Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474 (1988) (holding that an ordinance "operates at the core of the First
Amendment" when it prohibits anti-abortion protesters from picketing)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 869-70, 873 P.2d at 1228-29, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633-34. (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1983)). See generally
13 CAL. JuR. 3D Constitutional Law § 255 (1992 & Supp. 1994) ("Streets, sidewalks,
parks . . .are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights
that access to them for the purpose of exercising those rights cannot be denied
broadly and absolutely.").
10. Planned ParenthoodShasta-Diablo, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th at 869-70, 873 P.2d at 122829, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633-34; see also 13 CAL JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 260
(1992 & Supp. 1994) ("To be valid, time, place, or manner regulations must serve a
significant governmental interest and must leave ample alternative channels for communication, must be narrowly tailored to further the state's legitimate interest, and
may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.").
11. Planned Parenthood Shasta-DiabloInc., 7 Cal. 4th at 869, 873 P.2d at 1229, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (ruling that time, place and manner restrictions must be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech")).
12. Id,
13. Id. The court noted that "a similar injunction might just as readily apply to
pro-choice demonstrations or to any other disruptive protest in close physical proximity to the clinic." Id. at 871, 873 P.2d at 1230, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
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had been issued specifically for and applied only to antiabortion activities. 4 The court reasoned that injunctions are content neutral, even if
they incidentally affect only particular types of speech, because they are
properly confined to activities that warrant their issuance."
3.

The Injunction Is Narrowly Tailored to Achieve the Significant
Governmental Interest of Protecting the Health and Safety of
the Abortion Clinic's Patients

The court recognized a significant governmental interest in protecting the health and safety of abortion patients.'" The court noted that a
woman's constitutional right to an abortion encompasses the right to a
safe abortion procedure that is performed according to proper medical
standards. 7 Thus, the state may restrict the time, place, or manner of
speech or conduct that is "'incompatible' with the health and safety of
patients in a medical facility.""
The court found that the activities of the defendants were incompatible with the physical and emotional health and safety of the abortion
clinic's patients. The court referred to the trial court's findings that the
defendants implemented "confrontational tactics" and "physical intimidation" that caused the patients emotional trauma, which "could result in

14. Id. at 869-71, 873 P.2d at 1229-30, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634-35.
15. Id. at 870, 873 P.2d at 1229, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634 (citing Northeast Women's
Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 63 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that an injunction
properly applied only to antiabortion activists because they alone created a threat of
violence and intimidation to a women's health clinic)).
16. Id. at 872, 873 P.2d at 1230, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635. The court noted that the
state's interest in safeguarding the health and safety of medical patients is "particularly acute in the context of family planning clinics that perform the most intimate of
medical services, including abortions." Id. at 873, 873 P.2d at 1231, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 636.
17. Id. at 873, 873 P.2d at 1231-32, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636-37 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("[A] state may properly assert important interests in
safeguarding health, [and] in maintaining medical standards [in the performance of
abortions].")).
18. Id. at 872-73, 873 P.2d at 1230-31, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-36 (quoting Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("The crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.")); see also 13 CAL JuR. 3D Constitutional Law § 260
(1992 & Supp. 1994) ("ITIhe crucial question in determining the validity of. .. a
time, place, and manner restriction is whether the restricted activity is basically incompatible with the normal activity in the area.").
19. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th at 875-76, 873 P.2d at 123233, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637-38.
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serious medical problems."" Therefore, the court held that the state
may implement narrowly tailored restrictions on the defendants' activities.2
The court concluded that the injunction was narrowly tailored to
achieve the interest of safeguarding the health and safety of the abortion
patients.' The court held that a time, place, or manner restriction is
"narrowly tailored" as long as the restriction "'promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
[restriction]. '" ' The court explained that the injunction in the instant
case was the most effective response to the defendants' "threatening and
intimidating behavior," which was incompatible with the medical activities at an abortion clinic.?

20. Id. at 875, 873 P.2d at 1232-33, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637-38; see also American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Pennsylvania Section v. Thornburgh, 613 F.
Supp. 656, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that anxiety levels and emotional problems of
abortion patients are exacerbated when picketers verbally harass them); Pro-Choice
Network of W. New York v. Project Rescue W. New York, 799 F. Supp. 1417, 1427
(W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that "{i]ncreased stress and anxiety can . . . cause [abortion]
patients to ... have elevated blood pressure,... hyperventilate, .
tion, or . . . require special counseling and attention").

.

. require seda-

The defendants' tactics included forcing plastic fetuses and literature through car
windows that were being rolled up, and pursuing and encircling patients on their way
to their cars, including patients who expressed the desire to be left alone. See supra
note 2.
21. Id. at 876, 873 P.2d at 1233, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at .638. The court noted that the
means used by the state to protect the health and safety of clinic patients must be
"narrowly tailored" and cannot "unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment freedoms." Id. (quoting Schaumburg v. Citizens For Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980)).
22. Id. at 878, 873 P.2d at 1235, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.
23. Id. at 876, 873 P.2d at 1233, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (citation omitted). The court distinguished a
"narrowly tailored" standard, which is applicable to the instant case, from a "least restrictive means" standard, which requires that there be no other alternative restriction
that is less burdensome on speech. Id. Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants'
claim that the injunction was not narrowly tailored because "a narrower zone or a
limit on the number of protesters" would have been less burdensome on their First
Amendment rights. Id. at 879-80, 873 P.2d at 1235-36, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640-41.
24. Id. at 877, 873 P.2d at 1234, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639. The court noted that the
defendants' behavior was "plainly inappropriate in the context of a health care facility
treating women who are already undergoing the stress normally associated with abortions and other obstetrical or gynecological treatment." Id. Additionally, the court
noted that several federal courts have held that "clear zones" around a health facility
are narrowly tailored to achieve the significant government interest of protecting the
health and safety of abortion patients. Id. at 877, 873 P.2d at 1234, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 639 (citing Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates For Life, 859 F.2d
681, 686 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding an injunction that prohibited demonstrators from
picketing within a 12-foot "free zone" around a clinic)); Pro-Choice Network of W.
New York, 799 F. Supp. at 1440-41 (granting a preliminary injunction that established
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4.

The Injunction Leaves Open Adequate Alternatives of
Communication

Finally, the court held that the injunction did not foreclose other
adequate avenues through which the defendants could communicate
their message.' The court reasoned that the clinic's staff and patients
could still see the defendants and their signs and that the presence and
views of the defendants could "readily be perceived by persons entering
and leaving the clinic," even if the defendants were across the street.2
Moreover, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the injunction did not provide adequate alternatives because it prevented them
from physically confronting the clinic's staff and patients.' The court
explained that the First Amendment gives "'the opportunity to win the
attention'" of willing listeners, but does not give the right to a captive
audience.'
In sum, the court found that the injunction was constitutional because it was content neutral, it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and it left open adequate alternative channels
for communication.'
B.

JusticeBaxter's Concurring Opinion

Justice Baxter agreed with the majority that the injunction was constitutional. 3 He wrote separately, however, to emphasize that the First

a 15-foot clear zone around clinic entrances); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of San Mateo
County v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617, 626-27 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(imposing a 25-foot no-protest zone).
25. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th at 881, 873 P.2d at 1236, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641; see also 7 B.E. WITIaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 286 (9th ed. Supp. 1994) (discussing California cases involving "picketing of abortion clinics").
26. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th at 880-81, 873 P.2d at 1236,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641. The court stated that "[tihe alternative site across the
street . . . affords [the defendants] . . . a vantage . . . that is reasonably close to the
within plain view of their target audience." Id.
clinic and ....
27. Id. at 880, 873 P.2d at 1236, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641.
28. Id. (quoting Bering v. Share, 721 P.2d 918, 930 (Wash. 1986) (explaining that
the First Amendment gives only "the opportunity to win the attention of passersby
and engage them in conversation if the latter so desire") (emphasis added), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987)). The court noted that willing listeners could easily take
the "short walk across the street." Id. at 881, 873 P.2d at 1236, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
641.
29. Id. at 871-72, 881, 873 P.2d at 1230, 1236, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635, 642.
30. Id. at 881, 873 P.2d at 1237, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642 (Baxter, J., concurring).
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Amendment does not protect highly confrontational activities even if the
activities have speech aspects.3 According to Justice Baxter, the court
did not need to subject the injunction to rigorous constitutional scrutiny,
in so far as the injunction responded to the defendants' highly confrontational activities, which "crossed the line from protected expression to
unprotected interference with the lawful activities of other citizens. " '
C.

Justice Kennard's DissentingOpinion

In dissent, Justice Kennard attacked the majority's conclusion,
which she claimed was based on an incomplete picture of the facts.'
According to Justice Kennard, the injunction was not entirely content
neutral, was not narrowly tailored to achieve the significant government
interest, and did not leave open adequate alternative channels of communication. 4 Therefore, Justice Kennard would support a "buffer zone"
around the abortion clinic, but not a complete ban of speech within the
zone.3

Justice Kennard asserted that not all of the majority's proposed
justifications for the injunction satisfied the content neutrality requirement.' Specifically, the justification that the injunction "(prevents] emotional or psychological distress to women seeking abortion" could be
content based because the women's distress may be due in part to the
defendants' anti-abortion message.'

31. Id. at 882-83, 873 P.2d at 1237-38, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43 (Baxter, J., concuring). Justice Baxter explained that vicious personal attacks, fighting words, and
disruptive conduct 'do not necessarily fall within the aegis of the First Amendment"
Id. at 882, 873 P.2d at 1237, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642 (Baxter, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 883, 873 P.2d at 1237-38, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43 (Baxter, J., concurring); see 13 CAL JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 261 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (describing
types of speech that the First Amendment does not protect).
33. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th at 883, 873 P.2d at 1238, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard explained that the appropriate standard of review for a First Amendment constitutional claim is 'an independent examination of the whole record . . . to make sure that the judgment does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." Id. at 883-84,
873 P.2d at 1238, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)) (citation omitted).
Justice Kennard criticized the majority for not giving the "trial evidence the careful
scrutiny that the standard requires." Id. at 884, 873 P.2d at 1238, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
643 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 889-94, 873 P.2d at 1242-45, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647-50 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 883, 873 P.2d at 1238, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 890, 873 P.2d at 1242, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard pointed out that "[tihe justification
for the restriction must take no account of the content of the restricted speech" to
be content-neutral. Id. at 889-90, 873 P.2d at 1242, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (Kennard,
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Next, Justice Kennard disagreed that picketing on the public sidewalk across the street was an adequate alternative means of communication.3 Justice Kennard pointed out the difficulty of noticing people who
are standing on the other side of a "busy, four-lane avenue. "'
Moreover, Justice Kennard suggested the danger that the
defendants' message "will be grossly misinterpreted by casual viewers." 4°
According to Justice Kennard, the injunction's effect is to make the defendants, who are abortion protesters, stand right in front of an antiabortion organization's office, which is located directly across the street from
the clinic.4' Thus, passersby might think that "the protest is directed
against that organization, which opposes abortions, rather than against
the medical clinic, which provides them.""
Finally, Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that the government had a significant interest in protecting the health and safety of the
clinic's patients but disagreed that the injunction was narrowly tailored
to achieve this interest. 3 Justice Kennard reasoned that the less restrictive preliminary injunction already effectively protected the health and
safety of the patients.' Justice Kennard noted that there was no evidence that the defendants rendered the preliminary injunction ineffective
by resorting to physical violence or by repeatedly and seriously violating
the preliminary injunction."

J., dissenting) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
38. Id. at 890-91, 873 P.2d at 1242, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (Kennard, J., dissent-

ing).
39. Id. at 890, 873 P.2d at 1242, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennard added that the defendants will neither be able to speak to their target audience "in a normal tone of voice" nor hand literature to them unless "[the
target audience] takelsi the effort to cross that roadway." Id.
40. Id. at 891, 873 P.2d at 1242, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 891-94, 873 P.2d at 1243-45, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648-50 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 891, 873 P.2d at 1243, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
The preliminary inunction merely limited to four the number of pickets on the sidewalk directly in front of the clinic. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 891-92, 873 P.2d 1243, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648 (Kennard, J., dissenting)
(citing Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128, 19 Cal. 2d 676, 123 P.2d 20 (1942)).
Steiner held that a court may constitutionally ban all picketing only "where past
picketing has become so irrevocably blended with acts of violence, physical intimidation, or other unlawful conduct as to give rise to a justifiable belief that future picketing is likely to result in a continuance of the illegal acts." Steiner, 19 Cal. 2d at
683, 123 P.2d at 24.
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III.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court's decision impacts the countless armies of protesters who engage in the controversial and perpetual abortion debate. Specifically, the decision limits the protest activities that are
permissible in front of abortion clinics.' The courts can, and will, constitutionally eroin overzealous conduct, by either pro-life or pro-choice
protesters, that causes physical or emotional trauma to abortion clinics'
patients.
The California Supreme Court's decision also recognized a substantial "governmental interest in safeguarding the health and safety" of abortion clinics' patients." However, parties seeking an injunction against
protesters located in front of abortion clinics must still make sure that
the injunction does not refer to the content of the protesters' message,
that the injunction restricts only the overzealous activities that are "incompatible" with the health and safety of abortion patients, and that the
injunction does not preclude other reasonable methods for the protesters
to convey their message.'
As a whole, the California Supreme Court's decision in Planned
ParenthoodShasta-Diablo,Inc. attempts to strike a balance between the
sensitive and competing interests of the protesters' freedom of speech
and the woman's right to undergo a safe abortion.49

ROBERT E. SABIDO

46. See generally Neil Bernstein, Sidewalk Wars: The Ideological Battle Over Abortion Is Over. Now It's a Turf Fight, With Victories Measured By Inches, 13 CAL
LAW 48 (Sept. 1993) (discussing the general status of and recent events relating to
abortion protesting in the state of California).
47. Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, 7 Cal. 4th at 872, 873 P.2d at 1230, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 635.
48. Id. at 869-81, 873 P.2d at 1229-36, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634-41.
49. See also Note, Too Close For CoWfort: Protesting Outside Medical Facilities,
101 HARv. L REV. 1856 (1988) (arguing that the establishment of buffer zones around
abortion clinics is an appropriate compromise between First Amendment and privacy

rights).
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Il.

CRIMINAL LAW
A. The doctrine of "imperfect"self-defense provides that
a criminal defendant charged with murder, acting
with an actual, but unreasonable, belief of imminent harm of death or great bodily injury lacks the
requisitemental statefor malice and, therefore, cannot be found guilty of murder: In re Christian S.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re ChristianS.,' the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the California Legislature eliminated the doctrine of
"imperfect self-defense"2 in 1981 when it abolished the diminished capacity defense.' Since neither the plain language nor the legislative history

1. 7 Cal. 4th 768, 872 P.2d 574, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (1994). Justice Baxter
authored the majority opinion, in which Justices Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, and George
concurred. Id. at 771-84, 872 P.2d at 575-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34-43. Justice Mosk
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 784-86, 872 P.2d at 584-85, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 43-44 (Mosk, J., concurring). Chief Justice Lucas filed a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 786-96, 872 P.2d at 585-91, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-50 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting). Justice Puglia, presiding justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, serving by assignment from the acting chairperson of the Judicial Council, dissented with the Chief Justice. Id. at 796, 872 P.2d at 591, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50.
2. The court explained:
Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds that
a defendant killed another person because the defendant actualy but unreasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury,
the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.
Id. at 771, 872 P.2d at 575, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34.
Under the doctrine of "perfect" self-defense, the defendant must have killed another under circumstances that were "sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person,
and the . . . [defendant] must have acted under the influence of such fears alone."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 1988). If the defendant is found by the trier of fact to
have acted reasonably, the killing is considered a justifiable homicide. See id. § 197(1)
(West 1988). See generally 1 B.E. WrrKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAW, Defenses §§ 239, 241 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (discussing self-defense and the
doctrine of imperfect self-defense); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in
Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-defense, 33 UCLA
L REV. 1679 (1986) (discussing the application of the doctrine of imperfect self-defense
to "battered" women who kill their abusers).
3. Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th at 771, 872 P.2d at 575, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34. "The
defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished." CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West
1988). "As a matter of public policy there shall be no defense of diminished capaci-
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of the statutory amendments to the California Penal Code reflect an
intent to abolish the doctrine," the court held that the legislature did not
eliminate the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.' Therefore, the court
remanded the case to the trial court in order to determine whether the
6
defendant acted with "an actual belief of imminent harm."
II.

A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion

The court began its opinion by explaining that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense was "firmly established" when the California Legislature abolished the diminished capacity defense.7 The court determined
that the language of the statutory amendments to the California Penal
8
Code did not specifically refer to the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.

ty .. in a criminal action . . . ." Id. at § 28(b). The California Legislature abolished
the diminished capacity defense as a "direct response to the public outcry against the
diminished capacity defense successfully used in the infamous trial of a San Francisco City and County supervisor who had killed the city's mayor and another supervisor." Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th at 771, 872 P.2d at 575, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34. See
generally 1 B.E. WITIGN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses
§§ 208-211 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (discussing diminished capacity defense and
its abolition); 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2303 (1985) (discussing the abolition
of the diminished capacity defense); Frederic R. Krausz, Comment, The Relevance of
Innocence: Proposition8 and the Diminished Capacity Defense, 71 CAL L. REV. 1197
(1983) (discussing the abolition of the diminished capacity defense).
4. ChristianS., 7 Cal. 4th at 774-82, 872 P.2d at 577-83, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36-42.
5. Id. at 783, 872 P.2d at 583, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
6. Id. at 783-84, 872 P.2d at 583-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42-43. The defendant, a
minor, was charged with second degree murder for killing Robert Elliott, "a so-called
skinhead and a possible gang member." Id. at 772, 872 P.2d at 575, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 34. The defendant had been "physically and verbally harassed and threatened by
Elliott's friends" for approximately one year. Id. Additionally, Elliott had accused the
defendant of damaging his truck. Id. On the day of the killing, Elliott threatened and
taunted the defendant on several occasions while chasing him down the beach. Id.
The defendant, who was carrying a handgun, "shot and killed Elliott from a range of
at least 20 feet" after Elliott taunted and challenged the defendant to shoot. Id.
Defendant was made a ward of the juvenile court after the trial court sustained
a petition charging him with second degree murder. Id. The trial court rejected
defendant's claims of imperfect self-defense, self-defense, and voluntary manslaughter.
Id. The court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision holding that "applying the
doctrine, . . . defendant's state of mind-that is, his honest belief-negated any finding that defendant acted with malice." Id. at 772, 872 P.2d at 576, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
35.
7. Id. at 774, 872 P.2d at 577, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36. The court declared that by
1981, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense was deemed "to be so well-established a
doctrine that it 'should be considered a general principle for purposes of jury instruction.'" Id. (quoting People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 682, 603 P.2d 1, 9, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 92 (1979)).
8. Id. at 774-75, 872 P.2d at 577-78, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36-37. The court assumed
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The court rejected the State's argument that the doctrine of imperfect
self-defense and the diminished capacity defense were "so closely related" that the legislature eliminated both when it abolished the diminished
capacity defense.' The court reasoned that the two doctrines were mutually exclusive and, therefore, the legislature's intent to eliminate one did
not necessarily reflect an intent to eliminate the other.

Next, the court examined the 1981 penal code amendments and
found nothing in the legislative history indicating an intent to discard the
imperfect self-defense doctrine." The court contended that the legislature clearly intended to eliminate only the diminished capacity defense.
Therefore, the court held that the California Legislature did not eliminate
the doctrine of imperfect self-defense when it abolished the diminished

capacity defense. 3
The court concluded that when a defendant charged with murder is
found to have acted with an actual, but unreasonable, belief that "he was
in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant is
deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder." 4 Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court in

that "the Legislature was aware of both doctrines and would have made clear any
intent to abolish either doctrine." Id. at 774, 872 P.2d at 577, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 36.
9. Id. at 776-78, 872 P.2d at 578-80, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37-39.
10. Id. at 777-78, 872 P.2d at 579, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38.
Unlike diminished capacity, imperfect self-defense is not rooted in any notion
of mental capacity or awareness of the need to act lawfully ....

A defen-

dant could assert one doctrine even though the facts did not support the
other. The diminished-capacity defense could be-and often has been-asserted when self-defense was not an issue; and, conversely, imperfect self-defense
could be raised when there was no claim of diminished capacity.
Id.

11. Id. at 781-82, 872 P.2d at 581-82, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40-41. The court did not
find a "single reference to eliminating imperfect self-defense" in the legislative history.
Id. at 781, 872 P.2d at 581, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40.
12. Id. at 781-82, 872 P.2d at 581-82, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40-41. This is consistent
with the position of the Legislature's Joint Committee for the Revision of the Penal
Code and the Governor's staff during the time changes to the penal code were being
contemplated. Id. at 781, 872 P.2d at 581-82, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40-41.
13. Id. at 783, 872 P.2d at 583, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
14. Id.; see, e.g., People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 682, 603 P.2d 1, 9, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 84, 92 (1979) (explaining that the "legal doctrine" of imperfect self-defense "negates the mental state of malice aforethought that is necessary for a murder conviction").
Murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought." CAL PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1988). "Such malice may be express
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order to determine whether the defendant acted with "an actual belief of
imminent harm."'5
B.

Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion

Justice Mosk concurred with the majority opinion, but wrote separately to emphasize to the California Legislature "that the law of homicide is in need of revision." 6 Justice Mosk pointed out the difficulties
with the law of implied malice, the "multiple anomalies.., for the law of
unlawful homicide and intoxication," and the difficulties with the seconddegree felony murder rule. Additionally, Justice Mosk expressed concern that the definition of "reasonable doubt" used in state criminal trials
was confusing and would likely "result in future reversals by the United
States Supreme Court." 8
C.

Chief Justice Lucas's DissentingOpinion

Chief Justice Lucas disagreed with the majority and concluded that
the California Legislature eliminated the doctrine of imperfect self-de-

or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to
take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned or
malignant heart" Id. at § 188. See generally 1 B.E. WITIUN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Crimes Against the Person §§ 487-489 (2d ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1994) (discussing the definition of malice and absence of malice as "evidence
to negative mental state"); 17 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 203-205 (1984 & Supp.
1994) (discussing malice and implied malice).
15. Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th at 784, 872 P.2d at 583-84, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42-43.
The court was "unable to determine with certainty the precise basis of the trial
court's determination that the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the imperfect self-defense doctrine." Id. at 783, 872 P.2d at 583, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42. The
record was not clear whether the trial court rejected application of the doctrine because it believed that the doctrine was abolished or "on the fact-based ground that
defendant had no actual belief in the need for self-defense." Id. at 772, 872 P.2d at
576, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35. The defendant would be entitled to the doctrine only if
"he had an actual but unreasonable belief." Id. at 784, 872 P.2d at 583, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 42.
16. Id. at 784, 872 P.2d at 584, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43 (Mosk, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 785, 872 P.2d at 584, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43 (Mosk, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 785-86, 872 P.2d at 585, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Reasonable doubt is defined as "'that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they can not say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of
the truth of the charge.'" CAL PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1985). Justice Mosk stated
that at least three justices on the United States Supreme Court expressed concern
with the use of the phrase "moral certainty" in jury instructions for determining "reasonable doubt." Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th at 785-86, 872 P.2d at 585, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 44 (Mosk, J., concurring) (citing Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994)).
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fense by redefining "the legal concept of 'malice' in 1981 by amendment
to Penal Code section 188."'" Chief Justice Lucas observed that "the doctrine of imperfect self-defense... was derived from an expansive definition of malice that included an awareness of one's legal and societal
obligations. "

°

Chief Justice Lucas stressed that since Penal Code section 188 currently provides that "malice" can be established by merely showing that a
defendant acted with an intention to unlawfully kill another,2 the doctrine of imperfect self-defense "is no longer available to negate the element of malice arising from an unlawful intentional killing, and thereby
to reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter. " ' Therefore, Chief Justice Lucas concluded that the court should not resurrect the imperfect
self-defense doctrine because it was purposefully eliminated by the legislature.'
Ill.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

While the court's opinion makes it clear that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense is still available to criminal defendants charged with
murder,' the court cautioned that "the doctrine is narrow. " ' s "It requires without exception that the defendant must have had an actual
belief in the need for self-defense. "' Additionally, the defendant's "actual belief' must relate to the fear of imminent, not future, harm.27 Furthermore, the defendant must present "substantial evidence" in order to
warrant an instruction to the jury on the doctrine of imperfect seif-de-

19. Id. at 787, 872 P.2d at 585-86, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting);
see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. Christian S., 7 Cal 4th at 792, 872 P.2d at 589, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48 (Lucas,
CJ., dissenting).
21. Id. at 793, 872 P.2d at 589, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48-49 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting);
see CAL PENAL CODE § 188 (West 1988).
22. ChristianS., 7 Cal. 4th at 793, 872 P.2d at 589, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 48 (Lucas,
CJ., dissenting); see People v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
364 (1992) (holding that voluntary intoxication does not reduce what would otherwise
be a murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter).
23. ChristianS., 7 Cal. 4th at 795, 872 P.2d at 591, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50 (Lucas,
C.J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 783, 872 P.2d at 583, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
25. Id.
26. Id.

27. Id. "'An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt
with.'" Id. (quoting People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1187, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167,
173 (1989)).
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fense.' Moreover, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense will only serve
to reduce a second degree murder conviction down to voluntary manslaughter.' Finally, the court observed that the California Legislature
can eliminate the doctrine if it desires to do so.'

MICHAEL WILLIAMS

28. Id. (quoting Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1192, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 176) The court
stated that the trial court is "not required to accept the defendant's bare assertion of
such a fear." Id. An additional restriction is that the defendant cannot create the situation which gives rise to the need to defend himself "through his own wrongful
conduct." Id. at 773 n.1, 872 P.2d at 576 n.1, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35 n.1.
29. Id. at 773, 872 P.2d at 576, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35; see CAL PENAL CODE § 192
(West 1988) (defining manslaughter).
30. Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th at 782, 872 P.2d at 582, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41. Whether the legislature should do so "is a public policy issue properly left to the Legislature." Id.
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B.

The state may impose sentence enhancements on

juveniles who commit crimes while released from
custody pending trial, thereby extending the maximum period of physical confinement of the juvenile
ward: In re Jovan B.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Jovan B.,' the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether juveniles who commit crimes while released from custody pending trial are subject to the sentence enhancements their adult
counterparts receive under Penal Code section 1170.2 The supreme court
held that the enhancement provisions apply to juvenile court proceedings
and thereby extended the maximum period of physical confinement of
juvenile wards? The supreme court's decision effectively overruled the
lower court's opinion which prohibited the application of section 1170 to
juveniles because the Penal Code was written in terms used exclusively

when referring to adults.
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Determinate Sentencing Act (DSA) of Penal Code section
12022.1 provides that adult offenders who commit felonies while released
on bail or on their own recognizance, pending final resolution of the
prior felony charge, shall serve an additional two years with any prison
term imposed for either offense.' In Jovan, the juvenile court sentenced
the minor in accordance with this statute.5 The minor argued that sec-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 801, 863 P.2d 673, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428 (1993). Justice Baxter
authored the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian, and George concurred. Id. at 807-20, 863 P.2d
at 674-83, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429-38.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
3. Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 820, 863 P.2d at 683, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438.
4. CAt. PENAL CODE § 12022.1 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). See generally 22 CAL
JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3367-3368 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing violent felonies
and felonies committed while released from custody pending trial).
5. Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 807, 863 P.2d at 674, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429. On July 1,
1991, the Madera County District Attorney filed a juvenile court petition alleging that
the minor, having committed a felony of residential burglary, came within Welfare
and Institutions Code § 602. Id. On August 9, 1991, a contested jurisdictional hearing
was held. Id. The court sustained the petition. Id. Later that day, the district
attorney's office filed another petition alleging the minor violated § 140 of the Penal
Code by threatening a witness. Id. at 807, 863 P.2d at 675, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430.
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tion 12022.1's sentence enhancement scheme did not apply to juvenile
proceedings because the provision used terms such as "conviction", "arraignment", and "bail" which are used exclusively in adult sentencing.'
The minor appealed both the jurisdictional order and the dispositional
order.7 The court of appeal agreed with the minor and remanded the
proceeding for modification of the dispositional order.'
III.

TREATMENT

In determining whether the Penal Code controls the sentence enhancement of juveniles, the court examined how the Penal Code applies
to the juvenile setting.' The language and purpose of Welfare and Institutions Code section 72610 plainly states that a minor's maximum confinement may equal the maximum term which could be imposed on an adult
in accordance with Penal Code section 1170." The court reasoned that

On August 26, the court amended the latter petition "to assert under Penal Code
§ 12022.1 that the threats against Benjamin occurred while the minor was out of
custody pending trial on the burglary." Id. at 808, 863 P.2d at 675, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 430. The court found both allegations to be true, made the minor a ward of the
court, and placed him on probation. Id. On September 19, the court classified the
minor's witness-threatening as a felony and entered a dispositional order. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 808-14, 862 P.2d at 675-79, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-34. See generally 3
B.E. WITKGN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Punishment for Crime
§ 1509 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing statutory enhancements and applications to adult and juvenile settings); 22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3380 (1985 &
Supp. 1990) (discussing the enhancement of punishment in other jurisdictions); 21 AM.
JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 630 (1989) (addressing issues pertaining to sentences of life
without possibility of parole for juveniles); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1526-1528
(1989) (addressing the issue of sentence enhancement); John C. Williams, Annotation,
Authority of Court to Order Juvenile Delinquent Incarcerated in Adult Penal Institution, 95 A.LR. 3d 568 (1993).
10. Section 726 reads in pertinent part "As used in this section and in Section
731, 'maximum term of imprisonment' means the longest of the three time periods
set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code . . .
plus enhancements which must be proven if pled" CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c)
(West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
11. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994).
The 'aggregate term of imprisonment' . . . [is] the sum of the 'principal
term' (the greatest term imposed for any of the offenses, plus specified enhancements applicable to the principal offense), the 'subordinate term' (the
sum of one-third the middle terms for each other offense on which the court
is sentencing consecutively, plus one-third of specified enchancements applicable to each such subordinate offense which is a 'violent felony', and 'any
additional term[s] imposed pursuant to [Penal Code] Islection[s] 667, 667.5,
667.6 or 12022.1.
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the Welfare and Institutions Act expressly adopts the aggregate sentencing computations in the Penal Code.12 With such purposeful reference to
the Penal Code, the DSA's sentencing scheme would necessarily apply to
dispositions of minors in juvenile court.
Having established that the DSA provisions of the Penal Code govern juvenile sentencing, the supreme court then examined whether the
practice of enhancing sentences complies with the juvenile court's rehabilitative aims. 3 The court held that the enhancement scheme in the
DSA should always be applied unless the enhancement is "manifestly at
odds with the principles of juvenile law."4 Rather than enumerating
such principles, the court examined the purpose of sentence enhancements. The court explained that in either the adult or juvenile context,
the enhancement system is designed to meet public concern over those
committing offenses while released on bail.'" The enhancements must
apply to both systems because they serve the same purposes of deterring
criminal activity and boosting public confidence in law enforcement. 8
Although the Welfare and Institutions Code unequivocally defers to
the DSA provisions in governing juvenile sentencing, the supreme court
considered whether the language employed in the DSA prohibited its
application to the juvenile setting. 7 The court examined the import of
the terminology and the legislative intent. 8 It found that the word "con09
viction" as used in the DSA is not a term of art.'
Instead, the drafters of
Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 812, 863 P.2d at 678, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433. See generally 27
CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children § 183 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (discussing commitments to the Youth Authority); 10 B.E. WrriaN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW,
Parent and Child § 823 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994) (discussing maximum sentences
for minors).
12. Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 811, 863 P.2d at 677, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432.
13. Id. at 813, 863 P.2d at 678, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 813, 863 P.2d at 679, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434. Furthermore, the enhancements seek to deter persons from committing offenses while "'released from custody
on an earlier felony' and to recognize such offender's 'breach of the terms of his
special custodial status.'" Id. (quoting People v. McClanahan, 3 Cal. 4th 860, 868-71,
838 P.2d 241, 247-49, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719, 725-27 (1992)); see People v. Jackson, 129
Cal. App. 3d 209, 237 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1987) (stating that the purpose is to deter offenders arrested for a crime and then allowed back on the streets a short time later
only to commit more crimes). See generally 22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3368
(1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing felonies committed while individual released from
custody pending trial),
16. Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 813, 863 P.2d at 679, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 812, 863 P.2d at 678, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433.
19. Id. at 814, 863 P.2d at 679, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434. The court of appeal deter-
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the Code denoted a nontechnical meaning which demonstrated their
attempt to make judicially certain those instances in which enhancements would apply.' Likewise, the statute's use of the words "bail" and
"own recognizance" requires a more liberal interpretation.2 Although the
juvenile court releases a minor to the custody of his/her parent or guardian and not on bail, the supreme court reasoned that the minor's commission of a new felony while in this special custody, like an offense
committed by an adult while released on bail, is a breach of the court's
trust.' The court reasoned that the difference in terminology would ne-

gate not only the legislature's intent to apply the DSA to juveniles, but
would also serve to automatically preclude any changes intended by the
legislature and invalidate the Welfare and Institutions Act as a whole.'
The Welfare and Institutions Act was amended prior to .the inclusion
of bail enhancements in the DSA."4 With this in mind, the minor contended that the statutory construction of Palermo v. Stockton Theaters'
governed, thus allowing enhancements in juvenile court only as they
existed in 1977. The California Supreme Court held that when a statute

makes general references to another statute's provisions as a "body of
laws," the reference incorporates the statute as it existed at that time as
well as any subsequent modifications to the adopted statute. The court
reasoned that the statute references the DSA as a "system or body of
law" that states the "central fundamental principles by which all DSA
sentences are to be computed."' The Welfare Code's references to enhancements are general, necessarily implying that the code would incorporate subsequent modification of the DSA provisions when adopted.'
The court held that the legislative intent of such provisions permits
the juvenile court to adopt the DSA as it currently exists.n The legislamined that the order adjudging the minor to be a ward of the state was not a conviction and thus sentence enhancement could not be applied. Id. at 811, 863 P.2d at
677, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432.
20. Id. at 814, 863 P.2d at 679, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434. Both the "bailed" and
"while-on-bail" charges must be found true for enhancements to apply to juveniles. Id.
21. Id. at 814-15, 863 P.2d at 680, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435.
22. Id. at 815, 863 P.2d at 680, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435.
23. Id. at 815-20, 863 P.2d at 680-83, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435-38.
24. Id. at 815, 863 P.2d at 680, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435; see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022.1 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE. § '726 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1994).
25. 32 Cal. 2d 53, 58-59, 195 P.2d 1, 5 (1948) (holding that a statute which adopts
by specific reference the provisions of another statute incorporates the adopted
statute's provisions in the form in which they exist at the time of the references and
does not include any subsequent modifications).
26. Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 816, 863 P.2d at 680, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435.
27. Palermo, 32 Cal. 2d at 59, 195 P.2d at 5.
28. Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 819, 863 P.2d at 682, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
29. Id. at 819, 863 P.2d at 682, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
30. Id. at 816, 863 P.2d at 680, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435 (quoting People v.
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ture intended to put the sentences of adults and juveniles on equal footing to prevent constitutional inequality. 3 The minor's view of statutory
construction would require amending section 726 of the Welfare Code
each time the legislature amended the DSA.' Furthermore, the minor
would expect the legislature to amend the Welfare Code to grant the
benefit of more lenient sentences to juveniles if the DSA adopted a more
liberal sentencing scheme, which is contrary to the purpose of the statute.' Therefore, the legislature's intent is best fulfilled by considering
the statute to make a specific reference to the adopted statute and merely incorporating the statute as it exists at the time it is adopted.
IV.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The supreme court's groundbreaking decision to extend enhancements to juvenile court impacts the constitutional rights of minors and
challenges the mission of the juvenile court system. Critics of the juvenile system question whether the court has protected the interests of the
juvenile. In the past, the court system has afforded juveniles many constitutional protections through the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.' Nevertheless, courts have refrained from giving juveniles blanket constitutional
protection, due to the juvenile court's rehabilitative nature. 5 The California Supreme Court lays the foundation for longer punishment without
the due process protections guaranteed to adults.'
Enhancing juvenile sentences in this manner creates an apparent
conflict of interest between the purpose of enhancements and the juvenile court's purported mission to "rehabilitate, not punish."37 Courts impose enhancements to deter new crimes and punish those who violate

Domagalski, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1380, 1386, 263 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253 (1989) (stating that
the legislative intent is the determining factor when the words of the incorporating
statute do not clearly indicate whether it is a general or specific reference).
31. David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1779 (1991).
32. Jovan, 6 Cal. 4th at 819, 863 P.2d at 683, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438.
33. Id. at 820, 863 P.2d at 683, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438.
34. See U.S. CONSTr. amends. V, VI. Such rights include adequate notice of charges,
right to counsel, the right to be protected from self-incrimination and the right to
cross-examine witnesses. Jan Costello, Rejuvenation: How to Reform Juvenile Court,
DAILY J. CORP., October 1993, at 3 (1993).
35. Dormont, supra note 31, at 1777.
36. Dormont, supra note 31, at 1796-99.
37. Costello, supra note 34, at 2.
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conditions of bail. In essence, the court enhances treatment-oriented
sentences with punitive sentences, thus criminalizing the minor's sentence.' The court's decision to enhance sentences of juveniles adopts
not only provisions of the Penal Code, but also the adult system's purpose to punish.
In an effort to appear tough on crime and increase public confidence in law enforcement, the California Supreme Court may have sacrificed the minor's constitutional rights as well as the therapeutic nature of
the juvenile system.

STEVEN HORNBERGER

38. Dormont, supra note 31, at 1796.
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C.

While section 1101 of the CaliforniaEvidence Code
remains applicable in criminal proceedings, evidence of a defendant's uncharged criminal conduct
is admissible when the uncharged criminal conduct
and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to
support an inference that they are manifestations of
a common design or plan, unless the prejudicial
effect of such evidence substantially outweighs its
probative value: People v. Ewoldt.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Ewoldt,1 the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether California Evidence Code section 1101,2 which bars the
use of character evidence to prove conduct on a specific occasion,3 remains applicable in crininal proceedings after the adoption of article I,
section 28(d) of the California Constitution.' The court held that even if

1. 7 Cal. 4th 380, 867 P.2d 757, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (1994). Justice George
authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Arabian, Baxter, and Panelli concurred. Justice Mosk filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at

408-13, 867 P.2d at 774-77, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663-66 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. Section 1101 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102 and 1103,
evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether
in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or
her conduct on a specified occasion.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a
person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove
some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake of accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not
reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than
his or her disposition to commit such an act.
.CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994).
3. CAL EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 1966 & Supp. 1994). See generally 1 B.E.
WrrKIN, CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Circumstantial Evidence §§ 325-326, 356 (3d ed. 1986
& Supp. 1994) (recognizing that character evidence is inadmissible); 31 CAL JuR. 3D
Evidence § 203 (1976 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the inadmissibility of character evidence to prove conduct on a specific occasion).
4. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 386, 867 P.2d at 759, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648. Article I,
§ 28(d) of the California Constitution states in pertinent part:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the
membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be
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section 1101 was abrogated by the adoption of section 28(d), the California Legislature "reenacted section 1101 when it amended that statute in
1986 by more than a two-thirds vote." '
The court then considered whether evidence of the defendant's uncharged misconduct was admissible under section 1101. The court held

excluded in any criminal proceeding ....
Nothing in this section shall affect
any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or
Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103.

§ 28(d). See generally 13 CAL JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 10
(1989) (discussing proposals for amendment or revision of state constitution); 1 B.E.
WITKIN, CAUFORNA EVIDENCE, Introduction §§ 7-9 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing Proposition 8).
5. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 390, 867 P.2d at 762, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651. "A section
of a statute may not be amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended." CAL
CONST. art. IV, § 9. See generally 7 B.E. WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 102 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing amendment and reenactment provisions).
6. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 393, 867 P.2d at 763, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. The defendant was charged with four counts of violating California Penal Code § 288(a) (lewd
act upon a child under the age of fourteen years) and one count of violating Penal
Code § 647.6 (molesting a child under the age of eighteen years). Id. at 387, 867
P.2d at 760, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648-49. The defendant's stepdaughter, Jennifer, was
the alleged victim. Id. at 387, 867 P.2d at 760, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649.
The first trial was declared a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Id. One of the four counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under the
age of fourteen years was dismissed prior to the second trial. Id. At the second trial,
Jennifer testified that the defendant had "touched" her "'in a way [she] didn't like'"
from the time she was six or seven until she was fourteen years old. Id. at 387-88,
867 P.2d at 760, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649.
Jennifer was allowed to testify about the first incident, for which the defendant
was not charged, where the defendant touched "either her breasts or her vaginal
area" while she was watching television with him. Id. at 388, 867 P.2d at 760, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 649. Jennifer also testified regarding the incidents for which the defendant
had been charged. Id. at 388-89, 867 P.2d at 760-61, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649-50. The
fast two charged incidents involved the defendant fondling Jennifer on the
defendant's bed. Id. at 388, 867 P.2d at 760, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649. The third
charged incident occurred in Jennifer's bedroom and involved the defendant forcing
Jennifer to touch his penis. Id. The last charged incident occurred when the defendant touched Jennifer's breasts while she was asleep. Id. at 389, 867 P.2d at 761, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650. During this incident, Jennifer asked the defendant what he was
doing and "he
replied he was covering her with a blanket." Id.
Additionally, Jennifer's older sister, Natalie, testified that, when she was ten or
eleven years old, she awoke on three different occasions to find the defendant
"touching her breasts and vaginal area." Id. "On the third occasion, when she asked
the defendant what he was doing, he said he was 'straightening up the covers.'" Id.
Natalie also testified that the defendant peeked into her bedroom window while she
and her older sister, Teresa, were dressing. Id. The defendant testified that none of
the incidents described by Jennifer had occurred, and he also denied looking into
Natalie's window. Id.
CAL CONST. art. I,
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that "evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct is relevant where
the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common
design or plan."7 The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the
evidence of defendant's uncharged criminal conduct did not substantially
outweigh its probative value and was, therefore, admissible.' Finally, the
court concluded that the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining
witness regarding the defendant's uncharged criminal conduct was also
admissible.'
II. TREATMENT
A.

Majority Opinion

Writing for the majority, Justice George first concluded that California Evidence Code section 1101 remains applicable in criminal proceedings."0 The court reasoned that because the Legislature amended section
The defendant was found guilty of two counts of committing lewd acts upon a
child under the age of fourteen years and one count of molesting a child under the
age of eighteen years, for which he received an eight-year prison sentence. Id. at 390,
867 P.2d at 761, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650. The court of appeal reversed the conviction
on the grounds that "the trial court erred in admitting Natalie's testimony" and also
erred in admitting Jennifer's uncorroborated testimony concerning the defendant's uncharged misconduct. Id.
7. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658; see CAL
EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1966 & Supp. 1994). See generally 1 B.E. WrrKIN, CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Circumstantial Evidence §§ 374-375 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing the admissibility of character evidence to prove common plan or scheme);
31 CAL. JuR. 3D Evidence § 204 (1976 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the inadmissibility of
character evidence to prove common plan); 21 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3169
(1985) (discussing the admissibility of character evidence to show common scheme or
plan); William Roth, UnderstandingAdmissibility of PriorBad Acts: A Diagrammatic Approach, 9 PEPP. L. REV. 297 (1982) (discussing admissibility of prior misconduct).
8. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 405, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661. "The court
in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will ...
create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." CAL EVtD. CODE
§ 352 (West 1966). See generally 1 B.E. WITKIN, CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Circumstantial
Evidence §§ 298-308 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing Evidence Code § 352);
Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code
Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L REV. 1003
(1984) (discussing the replacement of common law rules of character evidence with
judicial discretion).
9. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 408, 867 P.2d at 773-74, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662-63.
10. Id. at 393, 867 P.2d at 763, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. The People argued that
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1101(b) in 1986," "the Legislature thus reenacted, in its entirety, section
1101 as amended."'2
Justice George then considered whether the disputed evidence concerning the defendant's uncharged misconduct was admissible under
Evidence Code section 1101.'" The court recognized that while section
1101(a) prohibits the admission of evidence of specific instances of uncharged misconduct to prove conduct on a specific occasion, section
1101(b) allows such evidence if it is relevant to prove "some fact other
than the person's character or disposition."" The court held that "evidence of a defendant's uncharged misconduct is relevant where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to
support the inference that they are manifestations of a common design
or plan.""
The court reasoned that since: (1) both victims of the charged and
uncharged offenses were the defendant's stepdaughters of similar ages
and living with the defendant at the time of the acts; (2) the defendant
molested each stepdaughter on different occasions while they slept and
offered similar excuses when discovered; and (3) the defendant molested
Jennifer on one occasion prior to the charged offenses, evidence of the
uncharged misconduct was relevant to establish that defendant acted in
accordance with a plan.' Therefore, the court concluded that there

§ 1101 was no longer in effect after the adoption of article I, § 28(d) of the California Constitution. Id. at 390, 867 P.2d at 761, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650; see CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 28(d).
11. CAL EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1966 & Supp. 1994).
12. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 391, 867 P.2d at 762, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651; see CAL
CONST. art. IV, § 9.

13. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 393, 867 P.2d at 763, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652; see supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
14. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 393, 867 P.2d at 763, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652; see CAL
EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994).
15. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658; see also
People v. Thomas, 20 Cal. 3d 457, 573 P.2d 433, .143 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978) (holding
evidence of prior misconduct admissible to prove common design or plan); People v.
Archerd, 3 Cal. 3d 615, 477 P.2d 421, 91 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1970) (holding prior misconduct admissible to show common design or plan); People v. Ing, 65 Cal. 2d 603, 422
P.2d 590, 55 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1968) (holding evidence of prior misconduct relevant to
prove common scheme or plan by defendant); People v. Lisenba, 14 Cal. 2d 403, 94
P.2d 569 (1939) (holding evidence of prior misconduct by defendant admissible to
prove common design or plan). The Ewoldt court overruled People v. Tassell, 36 Cal.
3d 77, 679 P.2d 1, 201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984), and People v. Ogunmola, 39 Cal. 3d 120,
701 P.2d 1173, 215 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1985), to the extent that they held "that evidence
of a defendant's uncharged similar misconduct is admissible to establish a common
design or plan only where the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single, continuing conception or plot." Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 658.
16. Id. at 403, 867 P.2d at 770-71, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659-60. "To establish the
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were sufficient similar features between the charged offenses and the uncharged misconduct to support an
inference that both were manifesta17
tions of a common design or plan.
Next, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's prior misconduct.'8 The
court reasoned that the evidence strongly. demonstrated the existence of
a plan by the defendant 9 and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence
"was no stronger and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses."'
Lastly, the court concluded that Jennifer's uncorroborated testimony
regarding the defendant's uncharged misconduct was admissible." Although uncorroborated testimony may have less probative value than
corroborated testimony, the court stated that such evidence will be admissible unless its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative
value.' The court reasoned that Jennifer's testimony concerning the uncharged conduct outweighed the minimal prejudicial effect to the defen-

existence of a common design or plan, the common features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus
revealed need not be distinctive or unusual." Id. at 403, 867 P.2d at 770, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 659.
17. Id. at 403, 867 P.2d at 771, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660. Evidence of a common
design or plan is used to prove that a defendant engaged "in the conduct alleged to
constitute the charged offense," not, however, to prove the defendant's intent or identity. Id. at 394, 867 P.2d at 764, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
18. Id. at 405, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661; see CAL EVID. CODE § 352.
19. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 404, 867 P.2d at 771, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660. The probative value of such evidence is also affected to the extent that "its source is independent of the evidence of the charged offense." Id. The court recognized that Natalie's
testimony was not "independent" because she did not make her accusation until after
she learned of Jennifer's experience. Id. at 405, 867 P.2d at 771, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
660.
20. Id. at 405, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661. The court recognized the
danger of admitting evidence of uncharged misconduct not resulting in conviction because juries are likely to want to punish the defendant for the alleged misconduct.
Id. at 405, 867 P.2d at 771, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660.
21. Id. at 407-08, 867 P.2d at 773, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662.
22. Id. The defendant argued that Jennifer's uncorroborated testimony concerning
the uncharged offense was inadmissible accordihg to the rule in People v. Stanley, 67
Cal. 2d 812, 433 P.2d 913, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1967) (prohibiting the admission of the
complaining witness' uncorroborated testimony regarding the uncharged offenses).
Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 407, 867 P.2d at 773, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662. The court, however, ruled that "evidence of uncharged misconduct properly may be admitted to prove
any fact material to the prosecution's case" (limited by Evidence Code § 352). Id. at
407-08, 867 P.2d at 773, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662.
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dant because it was relevant to establish defendant's "recurring pattern"
of abuse.'
B.

JusticeMosk's Dissenting Opinion

Although Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that California Evidence Code section 1101 was applicable in criminal proceedings,' he
disagreed with the majority's decision to overrule TasseU.2 Justice Mosk
stated that evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is admissible only if
relevant to prove some ultimate disputed fact such as identity or intent,
or to show that the plan was part of a "conspiracy of which the charged
offense formed a part."'
Justice Mosk reasoned that, in the present case, there was no issue
of intent or identity and that the uncharged offenses were not part of an
"overarching plan. "' Justice Mosk concluded that the evidence of the
defendant's uncharged misconduct was used merely to prove criminal
disposition and was, therefore, barred by Evidence Code section
1101(a).III.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The court's holding in Ewoldt makes it clear that evidence of a
defendant's uncharged misconduct is relevant if offered to establish the
existence of a common design or plan.' However, admissibility will be
determined on a case-by-case basis with the trial court weighing the
prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value.' Furthermore, the court recognized that evidence of a defendant's similar uncharged misconduct will not be admissible in many criminal prosecutions
because either the prejudicial effect of the evidence will outweigh its

23. Id. at 408, 867 P.2d at 773, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662. The court noted that
Jennifer's testimony regarding the uncharged offense was no more inflammatory than
the testimony regarding the charged offenses, and additionally, "it was unlikely the
jury would return a guilty verdict based upon the uncharged misconduct rather than
the charged offenses." Id.
24. Id. at 408, 867 P.2d at 774, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting); see supra note 15 and accompanying text. Justice
Mosk would have adhered to the decision in TasseU "as a matter of stare decisis."
Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 408, 867 P.2d at 774, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 (Mosk, J., dissent-

ing).
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 410, 867 P.2d at 775, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 411, 867 P.2d at 776, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting); see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a).
See Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 401, 867 P.2d at 769, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658.
30. See id. at 404, 867 P.2d at 771, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660; see also CAL Evi).

CODE § 352.
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probative value or the evidence will be offered concerning an issue not
in dispute. 3'

MICHAEL WILLIAMS

31. Ewoldt, 7 Cal. 4th at 405-06, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661. -This is
so because evidence of a common design or plan is admissible only to establish that
the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged to constitute the charged offense, not
to prove other matters, such as the defendant's intent or identity as to the charged
offense." Id. at 406, 867 P.2d at 772, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
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D.

CaliforniaPenal Code section 667(b) mandates that
when a defendant is exposed to multiple statutory
enhancementsfor the same underlying priorfelony
conviction, one of which is available under section
667, the longer enhancement, but not both, must be
imposed, except where a statute explicitly specifies
that the enhancements are to be applied cumulatively: People v. Jones.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Jones,' the California Supreme Court considered whether multiple statutory sentence enhancement provisions apply cumulatively under California Penal Code section 667(b), and if not, which provi-

sion would prevail.2 The court analyzed the language of the California
Constitution, the meaning of section 667 in conjunction with section
667.5, and the intent of the voters who supported Proposition 8. The

court further examined its previous ruling in People v. Prather.' The
court ultimately held that both enhancements could not apply to the
same prior offense under section 667(b)." However, the court concluded
that the most reasonable reading of section 667(b) required the imposition of the greater enhancement.'
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

The defendant was convicted of three counts of forcible sodomy'
and one count of sexual penetration with his finger8 against a fellow
inmate.' The trial court found the defendant's sentence" should be en-

1. 5 Cal. 4th 1142, 857 P.2d 1163, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753 (1993). Justice Mosk wrote
the majority opinion, in which Justices Kennard, Arabian, and George joined. Id. at
1144, 857 P.2d at 1163, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Baxter and Panelli joined. Id. at 1153, 857 P.2d at
1169, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1144-45, 857 P.2d at 1163, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753.
3. 50 Cal. 3d 428, 787 P.2d 1012, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990).
4. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1152-53, 857 P.2d at 1169, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
5. Id. at 1149-50, 857 P.2d at 1166-67, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756-57.
6. The defendant was serving time in the San Francisco County Jail for three
prior felonies, one of which was an aggravated form of kidnapping under § 209 of
the California Penal Code. Id. at 1145, 857 P.2d at 1163-64, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 75354.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
8. Id. § 289(a).
9. The victim was 18 years old and had only been in San Francisco for 12 days
before he was arrested for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Prior to
this he had resided in Marrimack, New Hampshire. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1145, 857
P.2d at 1163, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753. The victim testified that the defendant thought
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hanced by three consecutive one-year terms under section 667.5(b)"
because the defendant had committed a felony after having served a
prison sentence for three prior felonies. 2 The trial court further found
that the defendant's sentence should be enhanced by an additional consecutive five-year term under section 667(a) 3 because the defendant had
a serious prior felony and his current conviction was also for a serious
felony." The California Court of Appeal affirmed.'5 The California Supreme Court remanded with directions to strike the lesser one-year term
under section 667.5(b)"6 but affirmed all other sentence enhancements. 7

III.
A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion
In 1982, California voters enacted Proposition 8,8 which added sec-

he was "cute and feminine" and that after rebuffing the defendant's sexual advances,
the defendant forcibly inserted his finger into the victim's rectum and sodomized him
three times. Id. The defendant rebutted that the sex was consensual and in exchange
for money and that both men were gay. Id. Additionally, the defendant testified that
he only penetrated the defendant twice and did not insert his finger. Id.
10. The defendant was sentenced under Penal Code § 667(d), or alternatively under § 667(c), both of which provide for full, separate and consecutive sentences for
each commission of certain serious sexual or violent felonies. Id. at 1145, 857 P.2d at
1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754. The defendant was sentenced to a base term of six
years and three consecutive middle terms of six years; thus, the defendant's sentence
was 24 years before calculating the enhancements. Id. at 1145-46, 857 P.2d at 1164,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
11. Id. at 1146, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
12. Id. at 1145, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
13. Id. Section 667 of the California Penal Code was added by Proposition 8 on
June 8, 1982. CAL PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (amended by Stats.
1986, c. 85 § 1.5, urgency, eff. May 1986).
14. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1145, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
15. Id. at 1147, 857 P.2d at 1165, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755.
16. Id. at 1153, 857 P.2d at 1169, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1146, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754-55. See generally Hank
M. Goldberg, Proposition 8: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 23 PAc. U. 947 (1992) (discussing how Proposition 8 has been delayed, ignored, and even changed since being
passed by the voters); Jeff Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact-A Public
Defender's Perspective, 23 PAC. L.J. 881 (1992) (discussing the origins, purposes, and
impact of Proposition 8); J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The Victims Bill of
Rights: Where Did it Come From and How Much Did It Do?, 23 PAC. LJ. 843 (1992)
(providing a general description of Proposition 8).
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tion 28 to article I of the California Constitution,'" and also added several new sections to the Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions
Code,' including Penal Code section 667.2"
The court first addressed whether the legislature created sections
667 and 667.5 with the intent to impose sentence enhancements based on
two different statuses.' Section 667 imposes an enhancement based on
a prior serious felony conviction,' while section 667.5 imposes an enhancement based on a prior prison term for any felony conviction.' The

Proposition 8 was known as the Victim's Bill of Rights initiative. See Brosnahan
v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 242-45, 651 P.2d 274, 277-79, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33-35 (1982)
(summarizing Proposition 8).
19. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1147, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754-55; see CAL
CONST. art I, § 28. The preamble of Proposition 8 provides in part:
The rights of victims pervade the criminal justice system, encompassing
not only the right to restitution from the wrongdoers for financial losses suffered as a result of criminal acts, but also the more basic expectation that
persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be
appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so that the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of
highest importance.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a).
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West 1988 & Supp.
1994); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1767, 1732.5, 6331 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
21. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1146, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754; see CAL
PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
22. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1144-49, 857 P.2d at 1163-66, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753-56.
23. The pertinent text of CAL PENAL CODE § 667 states:
(a)(1) In compliance with subdivision (b) of section 1385, any person
convicted of a serious felony [as defined in subdivision (c) of section 1192.7
and section 1192.8] who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in
this state or any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all
of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement
for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately. The
terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run consecutively.
(b) This section shall not be applied when the punishment imposed
under other provisions of law would result in a longer term of imprisonment.
There is no requirement of prior incarceration or commitment for this section
to apply.
CAL PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
24. The pertinent text of CAL PENAL CODE § 667.5 states:
(a) Where one of the new offenses is one of the violent felonies specified in subdivision (c), in addition and consecutive to any other prison term
therefor, the court shall impose a three-year term for each prior separate
prison term served by the defendant where the prior was one of the violent
felonies specified in subdivision (c). However, no additional term shall be
imposed under this subdivision for any prison term served prior to a period
of 10 years in which the defendant remained free of both prison custody and
the commission of an offense which results in a felony conviction.
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California Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's reasoning that
each statute permissibly punishes a different status.' The majority reasoned that the precedent set by the court in Pratherwas dispositive on
the issue before the court.' The court affirmed that the distinction between a prior felony conviction and a prison term based on that conviction was "'untenable' and by inference 'hypertechnical' and
'supertechnical.'" '

(b) Except where subdivision (a) applies, where the new offense is any
felony for which a prison sentence is imposed, in addition and consecutive to
any other prison terms therefor, the court shall impose a one-year term for
each prior separate prison term served for any felony; provided that no additional term shall be imposed under this subdivision for any prison term
served prior to a period of five years in which the defendant remained free
of both prison custody and the commission of an offense which results in a
felony conviction.
Id. § 667.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994)
25. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1147-48, 857 P.2d at 1165, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755. The
court of appeal reasoned that each statute was meant to punish according to a different status: a prior felony conviction indicates recidivist behavior whereas a prior
prison term indicates a criminal mind undeterred by incarceration. Id. The court of
appeal believed that the drafter's intent was to create separate enhancement punishments by employing the different status phrases. Id.
26. Id. at 1148-49, 857 P.2d at 1166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756. In People v. Prather,
the court held that article I, § 28(0, barred application of Penal Code § 1170.1(g), to
prior prison terms. 50 Cal. 3d 428, 430-31, 787 P.2d 1012, 1013, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605,
606 (1990). Penal Code § 1170.1 generally limits the total term.to a maximum of
twice the base term imposed under Penal Code 1170(b). CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170.1(g)(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994). Although article I, § 28(f) of the California
Constitution specifies that "prior felony convictionis]" shall be used without limitation
for enhancement purposes, the Jones court found prior felony convictions to include
prior prison terms. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1148, 857 P.2d at 1166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
7556. "[W~e hold that the broad mandate of article I, section 28, subdivision(f), concerning the use of any 'prior felony conviction'[s]' for enhancement purposes, necessarily includes the lesser category of enhancements based on prior felony convictions
for which imprisonment was imposed." Id. at 1148-49, 857 P.2d at 1166, 22 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 756 (quoting Prather, 50 Cal. 3d at 440, 787 P.2d at 1020, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 613;
see 3 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for
Crime §§ 1486-1496 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994) (discussing generally the limitations
on the use of enhancements and the exceptions to the rule).
27. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1149, 857 P.2d at 1166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756 (quoting
Pruther, 50 Cal. 3d at 439, 787 P.2d at 1019, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 612). However, the
court recognized that Proposition 8 voters intended to increase prison terms for repeat offenders by stating that "[tihe more obdurate the offender, the greater the sentence to be imposed." Id. at 1147, 857 P.2d at 1165, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755; see also
Brown, supra note 18, at 925-36 (discussing the intent of Proposition 8 proponents).
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Having determined that sections 667 and 667.5 apply to the same
basic facts-a prior felony conviction-the court set out to determine
whether Proposition 8 voters, nonetheless, intended to impose both enhancements cumulatively.' In determining the voters' intent, the court
first looked to the language of the constitutional amendment and section
667.' The majority found the contemporaneous construction of article I,
section 28(f) and Penal Code section 667(b) passed by Proposition 8
voters to be ambiguous.' Where constitutional or statutory language is
ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used to determine the voters' or
the legislature's intent?
The court found that the only reasonable construction of sections
667 and 667.5 barred a cumulative enhancement for the same prior offense.' The majority's support for its conclusion was threefold: (1) any
other construction leads to "peculiar results";' (2) the legislature has
not amended sections 667 and 667.5 to be imposed cumulatively;' and
(3) the court's construction of sections 667 and 667.5 does not conflict
with the California Constitution.

28. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1149, 857 P.2d at 1166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756; see Kaiser
v. Hopkins, 6 Cal. 2d 537, 538, 58 P.2d 1278, 1279 (1936) (holding that voters' intent
governs the construction of a constitutional provision adopted by them).
29. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1146, 857 P.2d at 1164, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754; see Brown
v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 771 P.2d 406, 412, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714
(1989) (holding that determining intent first requires looking at the language of the
provision); Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 755 P.2d 299, 248 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1988) (holding that where a provision's language is unambiguous there is no need to
resort to indicia of voter or legislative intent).
30. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1149, 857 P.2d at 1166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (citing
Prather,50 Cal. 3d at 437, 787 P.2d at 1017, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11). The pertinent
part of article I, § 28(f) provides: "Any prior felony conviction . . . shall subsequently
be used without limitation for purposes of ... enhancement of sentence in any
criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(f) (emphasis added). Penal Code
§ 667(b) states: "This section shall not be applied when the punishment -imposed
under other provisions of law would result in a longer term of imprisonment. There
is no requirement of prior incarceration or commitment for this section to apply."
CAL PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); see also 22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3365-3391 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing sentence enhancement for
subsequent offenders).
31. See Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1149-52, 857 P.2d at 1166-68, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756-58;
see also Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978) (holding that the language of an
initiative must be construed liberally so as to give life to the "growing needs of the
people").
32. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1149-50, 857 P.2d at 1166-67, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756-57.
33. Id. at 1150, 857 P.2d at 1166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
34. Id. at 1150 n.2, 1151-52, 857 P.2d at 1167 n.2, 1166-67, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757
n.2, 758.
35. Id. at 1150-51, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
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The majority found that it is unreasonable to read sections 667 and
667.5 as imposing cumulative punishments.' Penal Code sections
1192.7(c) and 1192.8 define "serious felonies" applicable to 667(a), which
add a five-year enhancement. ' Section 667.5(c) defines "violent felonies"
applicable to section 667.5(a), which adds a three-year enhancement.' A
prior violent felony under section 667.5(c) will a fortiori also be a prior
serious felony under section 667(a), which if imposed cumulatively, will
in most cases lead to an eight-year enhancement instead of a five-year
sentence.' Furthermore, Proposition 8 had no effect on either section
667 or section 667.5 because both have been amended since its
passage.' Considering the legislature's ability to impose harsh enhancements for serious recidivism,4 the court reasoned that voters would
have amended the statutes had they wished for the terms to be combined.'
The court also considered the intent of the legislature. The legislature has amended both sections 667 and 667.5 subsequent to passage of
the Victim's Bill of Rights.' However, the legislature has not amended
these sections to explicitly state that the enhancements are to be im-

36. Id.
37. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 1192.7, 1192.8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
38. Id. §§ 667.5(a), 667.5(c) (West 1988).
39. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1150, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757. However,
conversely, a serious felony under §§ 1192.7 or 1192.8 will not a fortiori also be a
violent felony under § 667.5. Section 1192.7 includes narcotics sales to minors and
violent crimes associated with prison inmates within the definition of 'serious felony,"
which are not included in § 667.5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 1982 & Supp.
1995).
40. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1150 n.2, 857 P.2d at 1167 n.2, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757 n.2.
The California Supreme Court reasoned:
Many felonies serious enough to require incarceration, however, are likely to be encapsulated in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and therefore will
subject the recidivist offender to the five-year enhancement of 667, subdivision (a), on the commission of a new and serious felony. Just as it would be
anomalous for the law to impose an eight-year enhancement when the voters
specified five, so also would it be for the law to impose a six-year enhancement when the voters specified five.
Id. at 1150, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
41. Id.; see, e.g., CAL PENAL CODE § 667.51 (West 1988) (imposing 15 years to life
for recidivist sex offenders); id. § 667.6 (imposing a 10 year enhancement for violent
recidivists); id. § 667.7 (imposing life sentence for habitual offenders); id. § 667.75
(imposing a minimum sentence of 17 years for habitual drug offenders).
42. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1150-51, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
43. Id. at 1150 n.2, 857 P.2d at 1167 n.2, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757 n.2.
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posed cumulatively, as it did with sections 667 and 667.9." The court
considered this omission as evidence of the legislature's intent that sections 667 and 667.5 be imposed alternatively and not cumulatively.'
Moreover, the court considered its statutory interpretation as being
harmonious with article I, section 28(f) of the California Constitution,'
whereas a strict literal interpretation of the constitution would lead to a
nullification of section 667(b).4 7 Thus, the court concluded that Proposition 8 voters did not intend such a literal interpretation, because it would
result in a self-cancelling statute.'
Finally, the court held that the most reasonable interpretation of the
statutory scheme mandated the imposition of the greater of the two enhancement alternatives.' Although section 667 was passed by voter initiative, the legislature retained the power to define enhancements. However, the legislature may not permissibly impose a general cap on enhancement length.' Although construing sections 667 and 667.5 as alter-

44. Id. (citing Pasadena Police Officer's Ass'n v. City of Pasadena, 51 Cal. 3d 564,
797 P.2d 608, 273 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1990)). The court points to another enhancement
statute, § 667.9, which imposes a one or two year enhancement "in addition to the
sentence provided under Section 667" for certain violent crimes knowingly committed
against under people younger than 14, older than 65, or substantially disabled. Id.
However, the dissent points out that § 667.9 enhances a sentence based on aggravating factors in the present offense, not a prior offense, and is thus unpersuaded by
the majority's analogy. Id. at 1159, 857 P.2d at 1173, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763. (Lucas,
C.J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1150-51, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
46. Id.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 1150, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757. The court did not determine whether the defendant's federal constitutional rights were violated because the
court's decision rests on state grounds. Moreover, the court noted that both the State
and the defendant foresaw that this issue might be decided on the basis of California
Penal Code § 654.
Section 654 provides:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same
act or omission under any other.
CAL PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).

The court did not determine the issue of whether § 654 prevented §§ 667 and
667.5 from cumulative imposition because it found that § 654 was prohibited under the
narrower grounds of § 667.5(b). Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1150, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 757. However, under the majority's reasoning, if a prior conviction and prison term are not separate "acts," then § 654 would prohibit the imposition of both
§§ 667 and 667.5 cumulatively because the punishments would be for the same act, a
prior felony conviction.
49. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1150, 857 P.2d at 1167, 22 Cal Rptr. 2d at 757.
50. Id. at 1151-52, 857 P.2d at 1168, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758. The supreme court
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native and not cumulative limits on the length of the enhancement, such
a limitation is permissible because categorizing convictions is within the
legislature's power to define enhancement statutes.5 Thus, under section 667(b), when the enhancement term of another applicable provision
is greater in length than the enhancement term imposed under section
667, the section 667 term is not applied when calculating the total sentence.'
B.

Chief JusticeLucas' Dissenting Opinion

Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice Lucas attacked the majority's
opinion by asserting that it only gave lip service to the statutory rules of
construction.' The dissent rejected the court's position that the statutory and constitutional language is ambiguous.' Furthermore, the dissent argued that there is a valid distinction between a prior felony conviction and a prior prison term served for that felony.' Prather,according to the dissent, should not be dispositive in this case because the
majority had misconstrued the scope of the court's precedent.' Finally,

illustrated the difference between definitional restrictions and general restrictions. The
legislature may limit an enhancement statute to a certain category of felonies, such
as "serious" felonies. However, the legislature may not effectively void an enhancement statute by placing a "general cap" on the total duration of a sentence. Id
(paraphrasing the court's quotation of People v. Pather,50 Cal. 3d 428, 438-39, 787
P.2d 1012, 1018-19, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 605, 611-12) (1990)).
51. Id. at 1152, 857 P.2d at 1168, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
52. Id. at 1152-53, 857 P.2d at 1169, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
53. Id. at 1153, 857 P.2d at 1169, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
The dissent felt there was "little, if any, ambiguity" in article I, § 28(f) of the California Constitution. Moreover, the dissent felt the language of § 667 was likewise free
from ambiguity. Id. at 1153-54, 857 P.2d at 1169, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759 (Lucas, C.,

dissenting).
54. Id. at 1155, 857 P.2d at 1171, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
The dissent believed that the reasonable interpretation of § 667(b), which precludes
application of § 667 when another "provision of law would result in a longer term,"
is that § 667 will not be imposed when § 667.7 can be imposed, because § 667.7
was part of Proposition 8 and imposes a mandatory life sentence. Id. at 1157, 857
P.2d at 1172, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting); see People v. Skeirik,
229 Cal. App. 3d 444, 468, 280 Cal. Rptr. 175, 90 (1991); People v. Lobaugh, 188 Cal.
App. 3d 780, 783-84, 233 Cal. Rptr. 683, 684-85 (1987).
55. Jones, 5 Cal. 4th at 1154-55, 857 P.2d at 1170, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760 (Lucas,
C.J., dissenting). The dissent noted that § 667.5 is discretionary because the judge
may strike the enhancement under § 1170.1(h), while the enhancement under § 667 is
mandatory. Id. at 1158, 857 P.2d at 1172, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
56. Id. at 1154-55, 857 P.2d at 1169-70, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759-60 (Lucas, CJ., dis-
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the dissent argued that section 654 was the proper statute to utilize in
determining whether section 667 and section 667.5 enhancements should
be imposed cumulatively.67 The dissent concluded that it was clearly the
intent of Proposition 8 voters to impose cumulative enhancements under
sections 667 and 667.5 in order to achieve more effective deterrence,
punishment, and public safety.'
IV.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The court's decision impacted the defendant by reducing his thirtytwo year term to thirty-one years. However, the general effect of this
statute will limit the total enhancement term for a single prior felony
conviction or the prison term for that felony. Where the five-year enhancement is available under section 667 for a serious felony, the three
year enhancement under section 667.5(a) for violent felonies or the one
year enhancement under section 667 for any felony cannot be cumulatively added at the discretion of the trial judge. Some courts of appeal
have distinguished' or criticized the holding in Jones' because there
are no other provisions which prohibit cumulative enhancement for the
same prior conviction, with the possible exception of Penal Code section
654.61
Thus, because Jones defines a prior felony and prior term served for
that felony as the same prior act, the crucial issue remains whether section 654 will be interpreted to preclude the imposition of cumulative sentences for prior acts in view of the constitutional amendments enacted
by Proposition 8 voters.

DAVID ANDRIES VOET

senting).
57. Id. at 1155, 857 P.2d at 1170, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760 (Lucas, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id. See generally Frank Carrington & George Nicholson, Victim's Movement: An
Idea Whose Time has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing the rise of the
Victim's Rights movement regarding crime); Bill Blum & Gina Lobaco, The Prop 8
Puzzle, 5 CAL. LAWYER, Feb. 1985, at 29 (discussing the implications within
Proposition 8).
59. People v. Wiley, 25 Cal. App. 4th 159, 164, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 701, 705 (1994)
(rejecting the defendant's assertion that the holding in Jones precluded the trial court
from imposing §§ 667 and 667.5 for a term served when a serious felony enhancement is imposed for the conviction of a separate crime where the two convictions
resulted in a joint trial).
60. People v. Coronado, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1175, 1776-77, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 316
(1994) (holding that the decision in Jones does not bar the use of a same prior offense to elevate a charge to a felony and enhance a sentence under § 667.5(b)).
61. Id. at 1181, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318-19.
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E.

One may be found liable on a theory of aiding and
abetting if he or she forms the intention to commit,
encourage, or facilitate the commission of a burglary prior to the time the perpetratordeparts the
building; therefore CALJIC No. 14.54 as drafted is
an incorrect statement of the law:
People v. Montoya.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Montoya,' the Supreme Court of California considered
whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury, sua sponte, that
in order to be found guilty of burglary on a theory of aiding and abetting,
a person must have formed the requisite intent to commit, encourage, or
facilitate the commission of the burglary prior to or at the time the perpetrator entered the dwelling.' The court of appeal affirmed the judg-

ment of the trial court, holding that the facts of the present case were
adequately different from precedent cases where trial courts were held
to have had a sua sponte duty to instruct.3 The court of appeal also held

1. 7 Cal. 4th 1027, 874 P.2d 903, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128 (1994). Justice George
authored the majority opinion of the court, with Chief. Justice Lucas, and Justices
Arabian, Kennard, Baxter, and Lillie (assigned, Mildred L. Lillie, Presiding Justice,
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Seven) concurring. Id. at 1031-51, 874
P.2d at 904-17, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 129-42. Justice Mosk filed a separate concurring
and dissenting opinion. Id. at 1051-56, 874 P.2d at 917-21, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142-46.
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 1032, 874 P.2d at 904, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 129-30. On September 27,
1990, the defendant, Montoya, accompanied Raymond Gaxiola to an apartment
building, which Gaxiola proceeded to burglarize. Id. at 1033, 874 P.2d at 905, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 130. Montoya contends he never entered the apartment, but rather
remained in the car during the burglary. Montoya claims that he never even knew
that Gaxiola was burglarizing the unit. Montoya maintains Gaxiola told him that
Gaxiola had to go pick up his "stuff" (TV, VCR, Nintendo, radio, and jewelry) from
his girlfriend's apartment, for which he possessed a key. Gaxiola and Montoya then
went to an apartment to sell some of the "stuff" that had just been stolen. Id. at
1037, 874 P.2d at 908, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133.
Montoya and Gaxiola were arrested the same day. Id. at 1035, 874 P.2d at 906,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 131-32. Gaxiola subsequently pleaded guilty. Id. at 1032, 874 P.2d
at 905, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130. A jury subsequently found Montoya guilty of
California Penal Code § 460(a), burglary of an inhabited dwelling. The court of
appeal affirmed the conviction. Id. at 1038, 874 P.2d at 908-09, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
133-34. The California Supreme Court granted review. Id. at 1038, 874 P.2d at 909,
31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134.
3. Id. at 1038, 874 P.2d at 908, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133.
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that an instruction as to when the defendant formed the requisite intent
as an aider and abettor would have been inconsistent with the
defendant's defense theory.' The California Supreme Court held "a person who, with the requisite knowledge and intent, aids the perpetrator,
may be found liable on a theory of aiding and abetting if he or she
formed the intent to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of a
burglary prior to the time the perpetrator finally departed from the structure."5 Additionally, the court concluded that the trial court had no duty,
absent a specific request from the defendant, to instruct the jury as to
the point in time by which an aider or abettor must have formed the
requisite intent.' The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the court
of appeal.7
II.

A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion

The court detailed the evidence presented at the trial court. Justice
George then asserted that the intent of an aider or abettor must be
formed before or as an offense is being committed.' The duration of the
burglary for purposes of establishing liability was the pivotal question."
The defense inferred that since the crime of burglary is complete upon
entry, the requisite intent must be formed by the aider or abettor at that
time."

4. Id. at 1038, 874 P.2d at 908-09, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133-34 (finding that since
the defendant maintained that he did not, know that a burglary had occurred, such
an instruction may have invited a jury to question defendant's defense).
5. Id. at 1050-51, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
6. Id. at 1051, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
7. Id.
8. See supra note 2. The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of burglary and as to culpability for aiding and abetting. The defendant did not request an
instruction concerning when he must have formed the requisite intent. Montoya, 7
Cal. 4th at 1037-38, 874 P.2d at 908, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133.
9. Id. at 1038, 874 P.2d at 909, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134. This is a well established
principle of law. See People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 1158, 1164, 811 P.2d 742, 747, 282
Cal. Rptr. 450, 455 (1991) (stating that intent "must be formed prior to or during
commission of that offense"); People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 558, 674 P.2d 1318,
1324, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 66-67 (1984) (stating that providing aid prior to commission
satisfied intent). See generaUy 1 B.E. WrrIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Introduction to Crimes § 88 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994).
10. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 1038, 874 P.2d at 909, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134.
11. Id. at 1039-40, 874 P.2d at 910, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 135. One may be liable for
burglary upon entry with the requisite intent to commit a felony or theft, whether
the felony or theft actually is committed. Id. at 1041-42, 874 P.2d at 911, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 136; see People v. Macedo, 213 Cal. App. 3d 554, 558, 261 Cal. Rptr. 754,
756 (1989); People v. Forte, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1317, 1321, 251 Cal. Rptr. 855, 857
(1988); People v. Brady, 190 Cal. App. 3d 124, 133, 235 Cal. Rptr. 248, 254 (1987).
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The court rejected this line of reasoning, stating that in determining
the duration of an offense for the purposes of aiding or abetting one
must take into consideration the types of interests that the provision is
seeking to safeguard. 12 Justice George used an example to illustrate this
point-the crime of rape. A "'rape victim.., would not agree that the
crime was completed once the crime was initially committed (i.e., at the
point of initial penetration),' but rather would consider the offense not to
have ended 'until all of the acts that constitute the rape have ceased.'"'3
The court analogized this to a person who happens to be in a structure
during a burglary; he or she would not agree that the burglary has ceased
after entry, but only ceases once the burglar leaves and the danger passes.' Additionally, even if no person is present in the structure, the danger to property does not cease at the time of entry but rather once the
burglar departs. 5
The court further reasoned that in the case of multiple entries and
exits of the structure, as in the case at bar, the duration of burglary for
purposes of aider and abettor liability encompasses any time before final
egress by the perpetrator. 6
After laying a foundation, the court directed its attention to the
original question of whether the trial court erred in not instructing the
jury, sua sponte, that in order to be found guilty of burglary on a theory
of aiding and abetting, a person must have formed the intent to commit,
encourage, or facilitate the commission of the burglary prior to or at the
time the perpetrator entered the structure. Even if no request is made
for a particular jury instruction, a trial court must instruct upon every
theory that is closely and openly connected to the facts before the court

See generally 2 B.E. WrrxN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes
Against Property § 663 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994); 18 CAL JUR. 3d Criminal Law
§ 1087 (1984 & Supp. 1994); 6A CAL. DIG. 2d Burglary §§ 1-2 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
12. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 1040, 874 P.2d at 910, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 135. The
basis of burglary laws are in recognition of personal safety. Id. at 1042, 874 P.2d at
912, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136-37. See generally 18 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law § 1082
(1984 & Supp. 1994); 6A CAL DIG. 2d Burglary § 1 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
13. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 104041, 874 P.2d at 910, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 135 (quoting Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d at 1164, 811 P.2d at 747, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 455 n.7 (1991)).
14. Id. at 1045, 874 P.2d at 913, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138.
15. Id. at 1045, 874 P.2d at 914, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139.
16. Id. at 1045-46, 874 P.2d at 914, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139.
17. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 1047, 874 P.2d at 915, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. See
generally 5 B.E. WITION & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Trial
§ 2924 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994).
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and that are necessary for the jury's understanding."8 The argument of
the prosecutor in the present case was that the defendant was aware of
Gaxiola's intent to commit burglary and therefore, the defendant's intent
to aid or abet was formed prior to initial entry." The argument advanced by the defense was that the defendant did not know that a burglary was planned, nor that a burglary was being committed, nor that a
burglary had been committed.' Justice George concluded that in light of
the parties' arguments "the significance of the precise time at which
defendant must have formed the requisite intent in order to be liable as
an aider and abettor was not an issue 'closely and openly' connected
with the case."" The court further asserted that it was not the duty of
the trial court to identify issues that could have been raised by the parties.' The court concluded that the instructions given to the jury were
adequate' and the trial court was under no duty, sua sponte, to instruct
the jury regarding the point in time by which an aider or abettor must
have formed the requisite intent.' Additionally, a person with the requisite knowledge and intent "may be found liable of aiding and abetting if
he or she formed the intent to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of a burglary prior to the time the perpetrator finally departed
from the structure. " ' Furthermore, the majority held CALJIC 14.54 to be
an inaccurate statement of the law and ordered it not be given in any
2
case. 6

18. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 1047, 874 P.2d at 915, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140.
19. Id. at 1048, 874 P.2d at 916, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
20. Id. at 1049, 874 P.2d at 916, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
21. Id. at 1050, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
22. Id. (citing People v. Wade, 53 Cal. 2d 322, 334-35, 1 Cal. Rptr. 683, 692, 348
P.2d 116, 125 (1959) (stating a "trial court cannot be required to anticipate every
possible theory that may fit the facts of the case before it and instruct the jury accordingly ....

Omniscience is not required of our trial courts.")).

23. The trial court gave the following instructions to the jury: CALIIC 3.01 (aiding
and abetting - defined); CALJIC 3.14 (criminal intent necessary to make one an
accomplice); CALJIC 14.50 (burglary - defined); CALJIC 3.31 (concurrence of act and
specific intent). Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 1047-48, 874 P.2d at 915-16, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 14041.
24. Id. at 1050, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
25. Id. at 1050-51, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
26. Id. at 1047, 874 P.2d at 915, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. 'In order for an accused
to be guilty of burglary as an alder and abettor, [he][she] 'must have formed the intent ... prior to the time (that person] made entry." Id at 1038 n.4, 874 P.2d at
908 n.4, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134 n.4 (quoting CALC 14.54 (1993 Rev.) (Supp. 1994)).
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B. Justice Mosk's Concurringand Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk disagreed in the finding that an aider or abettor may
be liable if intent is formed prior to the perpetrator's final exit from the
structure, but agreed that the trial court had no duty, sua sponte, to give
a jury instruction regarding the point in time by which an aider or abettor must have formed the requisite intent.27 Justice Mosk stated that
since burglary is a specific intent crime, the aider or abettor must share
that intent.' Justice Mosk proposed that once the elements of burglary
have been satisfied,' the burglary is complete and the actual felony or
theft proceeds thereafter.' Justice Mosk logically concluded that one
who forms the intent to assist after the perpetrator's entry is no longer
guilty of aiding and abetting a burglary, but rather guilty of aiding and
abetting the felony or theft taldng place.31 Justice Mosk rejected Justice
George's reference to rape.' Justice Mosk additionally maintained that
CALTIC 14.54 is a correct statement of the law and should not be amended, but rather continued to be given where appropriate.'
HI. CONCLUSION
In Montoya, the California Supreme Court held that a trial court
does not have a sua sponte duty to give jury instructions regarding a
specific issue unless that issue is "closely and openly" connected with
the case.' Furthermore, persons may be held liable as an aider or abettor of burglary if they form the intention to facilitate the offense prior to

27. Id. at 1051, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142-43 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
28. Id. at 1052, 874 P.2d at 918, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 560, 674 P.2d 1318, 1326, 199
Cal. Rptr. 60, 68 (1984)).
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (defining burglary as
entry into a structure with specific intent to commit a felony or theft).
30. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 1052, 874 P.2d at 918, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting).
31. Id. at 1052, 874 P.2d at 918-19, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143-44 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
32. The notion of initial penetration fulfilling the elements of rape is intended to

define what is minimally required to establish rape. Rape encompasses the entire
duration of unconsented sexual intercourse. Id. at 1054, 874 P.2d at 919, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 144 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
33. Id. at 1056, 874 P.2d at 921, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
34. Montoya, 7 Cal. 4th at 1050, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
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the perpetrator's final exit from the structure.'
conclusion regarding aider or abettor liability, the
14.54 was an inaccurate statement of law and
This decision clarified a discrepancy that existed
CALJIC 14.54.

In light of the court's
court held that CALIIC
should not be given.'
between case law and

JACQUES GARDEN

35. Id. at 1050-51, 874 P.2d at 917, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
36. Id. at 1047, 874 P.2d at 915, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140; see supra note 24.
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F.

Sellers of alcoholic beverages cannot rely on the
California constitutional provision that prohibits
minorsfrom buying alcoholic beverages as a defense
to selling alcoholic beverages to underage decoys:
Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals
Board.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board,' the
California Supreme Court granted review to determine whether sellers of
alcoholic beverages can rely on the California constitutional provision
that prohibits minors from buying alcoholic beverages as a defense to
selling alcoholic beverages to underage decoys.2 The court held that sellers of alcoholic beverages cannot use article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution as a defense to selling alcoholic beverages to underage decoys.' In addition, the court found that police use of underage
decoys to purchase alcoholic beverages constitutes neither entrapment,
in the absence of pressure or "overbearing" conduct,4 nor a due process
violation, in the absence of "outrageous" conduct.6

1. 7 Cal. 4th 561, 869 P.2d 1163, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (1994). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the unanimous opinion, in which Justices Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter,
and George concurred. The Honorable Clinton W. White, who is the Presiding Justice
of the First District Court of Appeal and who was assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council, concurred in the opinion as well.
2. Provigo consolidated two cases involving police use of underage decoys to purchase alcoholic beverages. Id. at 564, 869 P.2d at 1164, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639.
Provigo Corporation and Lucky Stores were the respective defendants in the two
cases. Id. The first case involved an underage decoy who purchased a pack of wine
coolers and the second case involved an underage decoy who purchased a six pack
of beer. Id. Both decoys passed through the checkout counters of the respective
defendants' grocery stores. Id. After the police filed accusations, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control suspended the defendants' licenses to sell alcohol. Id. at
564-65, 869 P.2d at 1164-65, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63940. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board subsequently affirmed the suspensions. Id. at 565, 869 P.2d at
1165, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.
3. Id. at 564, 869 P.2d at 1164, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639.
4. Id. at 570, 869 P.2d at 1168, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643.
5. Id. at 570-71, 869 P.2d at 1168, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 (citing United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (holding that due process may bar criminal convictions if
there is "outrageous" police conduct)).
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H.

TREATMENT

In Provigo, the California Supreme Court considered three issues
involved in police use of underage decoys to purchase alcoholic beverages: (1) whether the practice violates article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution, (2) whether it constitutes entrapment, and (3)
whether it violates a defendant's due process rights.'
The California Constitution prohibits both vendors from selling alcoholic beverages to minors, and minors from purchasing alcoholic beverages.7 Accordingly, the defendants argued that the court should excuse
their alcoholic beverage sales to the decoys because the decoys themselves violated the constitution when they purchased alcoholic beverages
as minors.8
The supreme court rejected the defendants' argument. The court
refused to construe article XX, section 22 literally since doing so would
contradict the legislative intent, which is to protect minors "from exposure to the 'harmful influences' associated with the consumption of [alcoholic] beverages."9 The court stated that the seller should not escape
liability simply because a minor purchased the alcoholic beverages.'Y
Conversely, police use of underage decoys to purchase alcoholic
beverages clearly promotes the legislative intent of section 22 because it

6. Id. at 566-71, 869 P.2d at 1166-69, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64143. As a preliminary
matter, the court indicated that it will uphold, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, the decisions of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control regarding the
suspension, revocation, or denial of alcoholic beverage licenses. See CAL CONST. art.
XX, § 22 (granting the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control the power and discretion to deny, suspend, or revoke alcoholic beverage licenses).
7. Article XX, § 22 states in relevant part: "The sale . . . of any alcoholic bever-

age to any person under the age of 21 years is hereby prohibited. . . and no person
under the age of 21 years shall purchase any alcoholic beverage." CAL CONST. art
XX, § 22 (amended in 1954 to include relevant prohibitions); see also CAL Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25658 (West 1993) (making it a misdemeanor to sell alcoholic beverages to minors and for minors to purchase alcoholic beverages). See generally 3 CAL
JUR. 3D Alcoholic Beverages § 10 (1973 & Supp. 1994) ("It is also a misdemeanor to
sell . . . alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of 21 .

Alcoholic Beverages § 54 ("The selling ...

. . .");

3 CAL JUR. 3D

of alcoholic beverages to any person un-

der 21 years of age is prohibited ....
[A] person under the age of 21 may not
purchase any alcoholic beverage . . . .") (1973 & Supp. 1994).

8. Provigo, 7 Cal. 4th at 569, 869 P.2d at 1167, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642.
9. Id. at 567, 869 P.2d at 1166, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641 (citing Lacabanne Properties, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 261 Cal. App. 2d 181, 188, 67
Cal. Rptr. 734, 738 (1968)). Although the court found no clear intent in the available
legislative history behind the enactment, the court stated that this was the likely purpose of § 22. Id.
10. Id. The court stated that it would be absurd to allow the seller to "defend
against criminal or administrative sanctions by relying on the purchaser's minority."
Id.
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helps enforce laws that prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors." Therefore, the court held that the practice does not violate the
California Constitution.
Next, the court considered the entrapment issue. 3 According to the
court, "the use of decoys to expose illicit activity does not constitute
entrapment, so long as no pressure or overbearing conduct is employed
by the decoy.""
The Provigo court found no evidence in the instant case that the
underage decoys pressured or encouraged the defendants' sales personnel to sell the alcoholic beverages to them." Although the decoys were
"mature and self-assured in appearance and demeanor," the court noted
that the defendants could have protected themselves by requiring their
agents to routinely check the identification of buyers."
11. For the use of similar rationale by other state courts, see, e.g., Survey of
1992-93 Developments in Alabama Case Law, 45 ALA. L REv. 317 (1993) (citing Ex

Parte Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., No. 1910325, 1993 WL 40431, at *4
(Ala. Feb. 19, 1993) ("[Tihe use of a minor in an undercover operation 'was probably
the most effective manner of regulating and enforcing the laws of this state prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors.'")).
12. Provigo, 7 Cal. 4th at 567, 869 P.2d at 1166, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641.
13. Id. at 568, 869 P.2d at 1167, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642; see 20 CAL JUR. 3D
Criminal Law §§ 2267-2274 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (describing California entrapment
law). See generally Fred W. Bennett, From Sorrells To Jacobson: Reflections of Six
Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, In Federal Court, 27 WAKE FORFsT L REv. 829 (1992) (discussing entrapment defense in federal practice);
14. Provigo, 7 Cal. 4th at 568, 869 P.2d at 1167, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642 (citing
Reyes v. Municipal Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 771, 777, 173 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1981)
(discussing use of decoy prostitutes)). See generally 20 CAL. JUR. 3d Criminal Law
§ 2270 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
[WIhere a person was regularly engaged in doing certain prohibited acts, such
as unlawfully selling liquor... and had done such acts on his own initiative, it would not avail him as a defense that ... an officer of the law directly or indirectly occasioned the commission of the particular offense
charged."
Id.
15. Provigo, 7 Cal. 4th at 568, 869 P.2d at 1167, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642. The court
analogized the use of underage decoys for buying alcoholic beverages to the use of
decoys for soliciting acts of prostitution. Id. In the latter case, undercover officers
act as prostitutes "despite statutory language maldng it a misdemeanor for 'every
person' to solicit or engage in acts of prostitution." Id. (citing CA. PENAL CODE
§ 647(b) (West 1988)). In both cases, the use of decoys is permissible as long as
there is no "badgering" or "importuning" that would "induce an otherwise law-abiding
person to commit a crime." Id. (quoting Reyes v. Municipal Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d
771, 777, 173 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1981)).
16. Id. at 565, 869 P.2d at 1165, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640 (citing Kirby v. Alcoholic
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In fact, the Business and Professions Code expressly allows sellers
to rely on bonafide evidence of majority as a defense to liability." Routine checking of identification, according to the court, does not overly
burden sales personnel because the procedure is already routinely required when a buyer pays by check or by credit card."'
Finally, the court addressed the due process implications of police
use of underage decoys to purchase alcoholic beverages. 9 The court
stated that a due process violation does not exist in the absence of "outrageous" police conduct.' In the instant case, the court found that the
use of underage decoys to enforce the liquor laws was "at most a technical violation [of due process] that could not be deemed so 'outrageous'
as to afford a defense to prosecution."21
flI.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The supreme court's decision clearly impacts the thousands of alcoholic beverage sellers in California. In order to avoid the loss or suspension of their licenses, sellers will likely be more emphatic in requiring
their personnel to check the identification of buyers. Although this may
inconvenience both the personnel and the buyers, it will certainly prove
less costly for the sellers than outright suspension or revocation of their
licenses to sell alcoholic beverages.
The supreme court's decision also impacts the practices of California law enforcement. Police now effectively have the license to use un-

Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 267 Cal. App 2d 895, 898, 73 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354-55
(1968) (holding that good faith reliance upon a government issued document constitutes a defense to license suspension)). The court stressed that a seller cannot rely
on the appearance of the buyer. Id. at 569, 869 P.2d at 1167-68, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
642-43.
17. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25660 (West 1993) ("Proof that the defendant-licensee, or his employee or agent, demanded, was shown and acted in reliance upon such
bona fide evidence ...
shall be a defense to any criminal prosecution therefor
or . . . suspension or revocation of any license."); see also 3 CAL. JuP. 3D Alcoholic
Beverages § 54 (1990 & Supp. 1994) (quoting same language from Code).
18. Provigo, 7 Cal. 4th at 569, 869 P.2d at 1168, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643.
19. Id. at 570-71, 869 P.2d at 1168-69, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643-44. See generally 20
CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2272 (1990 & Supp. 1994) ("[I~t has been stated that
the defense of police misconduct so gross and outrageous as to constitute a violation
of due process has little application in California . . . [sjince the purpose of the ...
claim is the same as California's entrapment defense.").
20. Provigo, 7 Cal. 4th at 570, 869 P.2d at 1168, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 (citing
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973)). The court assumed that the
Russell rule applies to California: "due process may bar criminal convictions if
'outrageous' conduct by law enforcement officers." Id.
21. Id. The court found no "outrageous" conduct even though the police failed "to
follow the [djepartment's suggested decoy program 'guidelines' and instead used more
mature-appearing persons as decoys." Id.
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derage decoys to target merchandisers who sell alcoholic beverages to
minors. As long as the decoys do not employ pressure or overbearing
conduct, the police do not have to concern themselves with entrapment
issues. Consequently, police departments throughout the state will probably implement this procedure more frequently.2
Moreover, the supreme court's decision affirms the judiciary's commitment to the strict enforcement of constitutional and statutory prohibitions against the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors.' In light of the
numerous deaths caused by teenage drunk driving, as well as the countless criminal incidents that involve intoxicated minors, the supreme
court's decision is both timely and appropriate.' Provigo will certainly
promote the legislative intent of article XX, section 22 to protect minors
from exposure to the "harmful influences associated with the consumption" of alcoholic beverages.'

ROBERT E. SABIDO

22. See Calfornia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control: Minor Decoy Operation Nets Bakersfield Businesses, PR Newswire, June 13, 1994 ("[A] massive minor
decoy operation.. . this past weekend . . . was the biggest minor decoy operation
in Bakersfield since the Supreme Court ruled in April that using minors to check
establishments was not entrapment and did not violate due process requirements.").
23. For previous California cases enforcing the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors, see Burako v. Munro, 174
Cal. App. 2d 688, 691-92, 345 P.2d 124, 127 (1959) (holding that a licensee has the
burden of establishing the defense that the buyer showed a bona fide identification
immediately before the sale of liquor); Nickola v. Munro, 162 Cal. 2d 449, 328 P.2d
271 (1958) (holding that the seller did not have a valid defense when due to a misunderstanding, it served cognac to a minor who ordered a non-alcoholic drink).
24. See, e.g., Safety Board Adds Underage Drinking, Driving to Curb Its "Most
Wanted List", NTSB, May 24, 1994, available in WESTLAW, File No. 248812 ("[Tlhere
are still more than 9,000 deaths annually involving young drivers."); Stronger State
Laws and Vigorous Enforcement Needed to Save Teen Lives, NTSB, Mar. 3, 1993,
available in WESTLAW, File No. 74855 ("Underage drinking and driving continues to
play a major role in youth traffic crashes and fatalities.")
25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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IV.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement is not entitled to relief from a trial
court's failure to advise the defendant of the full
consequences of his plea, if he fails to make a timely
objection; the imposition of a statutorily mandated
registrationrequirement, even when the court fails
to advise the defendant of the requirement, does not
constitute a violation of the plea agreement:
People v. McClellan.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The California Supreme Court in People v. McClellan' held that a
defendant was bound to the terms of a plea agreement, despite the trial
court's error in falling to advise the defendant that a guilty plea to the
charge of assault with intent to commit rape requires the defendant to
register as a sex offender.! The court found that the defendant, by failing
to object to the requirement that he register as a sex offender pursuant
to California Penal Code section 290,' waived his right to relief from the

1. 6 Cal. 4th 367, 862 P.2d 739, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 739 (1993). Justice George
authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Paneli, Arabian,
and Baxter concurring. Id. at 369, 862 P.2d at 741, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741. Justice
Mosk filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 381, 862 P.2d at 749, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749, 24
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissent.
Id. at 385, 862 P.2d at 751, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 381, 862 P.2d at 749, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749. The defendant, Gregory
McClellan pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to assault with intent to commit
rape, and admitted to infliction of great bodily injury, a prior serious felony, and a
prior prison term. Id. at 370-71, 862 P.2d at 741, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741. The plea was
conditioned on the defendant receiving no more than a thirteen year prison term. Id.
No mention was made of a registration requirement by either the people or the defendant. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced McClellan to four years for
the assault with intent to commit rape, a three year enhancement for the infliction of
great bodily injury, a consecutive five year enhancement for the prior serious felony,
and a one year consecutive enhancement for the prior prison term. Id. at 373, 862
P.2d at 743, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743. After the sentencing, the trial court ordered the
defendant to "register as required under the provisions of Section 290 of the Penal
Code." Id. The defendant made no objection and did not request permission to change
his plea. Id. On appeal, McClellan contended that he would not have pled guilty had
he been advised of the registration requirement. Id. The court of appeal unanimously
held that the defendant must be given an opportunity to change his plea, and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at 373-74, 862 P.2d at 743, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743.
3. Penal Code § 290(a) states in pertinent part:
Any person who . . . is . . . convicted in this state of the offense of assault with intent to commit rape . . . shall, within . . . 14 days of coming
into any county or city, or city and county in which he or she temporarily
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court's failure to advise.' The court also held that the imposition of a
registration requirement does not constitute a violation of the plea
agreement because sex offender registration is required by law for all
persons convicted of assault with intent to commit rape.'
In his dissent, Justice Mosk, with Justice Kennard concurring,' argued that the imposition of a registration term is a denial of due process.7 Justice Mosk also argued separately that the defendant should be
entitled either to withdraw his plea or to serve according to the terms of

the plea agreement as represented to him, without having to comply with
the sex offender registration requirement.8
II.

A.

ANALYSIS

Majority Opinion

The court first addressed the defendant's contention that he was
entitled to relief on the grounds that the trial court had failed to advise
him of the consequences of pleading guilty to assault with intent to commit rape.' The court relied on prior California Supreme Court decisions
holding that sex offender registration was one consequence of a plea
agreement of which a defendant must be informed." The court relied on
its holdings in In re Birch" and BunneU v. Superior Court2 as the basis for its finding of error. In Birch, the court found that a sex offender
registration requirement was one "grave and direct consequence" of a

resides or is domiciled for that length of time register with the chief of police of the city in which he or she is domiciled or the sheriff of the county
if he or she is domiciled in an unincorporated area ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).

4. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 377, 862 P.2d at 746, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746.
5. Id. at 380, 862 P.2d at 748, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748.
6. Justice Kennard issued a separate dissent in which she concurred with Justice
Mosk in all but one respect. See infra note 42.
7. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 381-82, 862 P.2d at 749, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749 (Mosk,
J., dissenting); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 384, 862 P.2d at 751, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
9. Id. at 374, 862 P.2d at 743, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743.
10. Id. at 376, P.2d at 745, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745 (citing Bunneil v. Superior Court,
13 Cal. 3d 592, 531 P.2d 1086, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975); In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314,
515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973)).
11. 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1973).
12. 13 Cal. 3d 592, 531 P.2d 1086, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975).
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plea bargain of which the defendant must be informed, 3 and that the
responsibility for advising the defendant "in the absence of counsel...
rested with the court." 4 In Bunnell, the court held that Birch specifically applied to statutory registration requirements such as section 290."
Thus, the court found that because the trial court had failed to advise the defendant that a guilty plea would compel him to register pursuant to Penal Code section 290, a Bunnell error had occurred." However,
the court reasoned that Bunnell error alone did not entitle the defendant
to relief from his guilty plea. 7 The court cited People v. Walker" for the
proposition that the failure to object when the court fails to advise operates as a waiver of the defendant's right to notice. 9 The purpose of the
waiver doctrine is "to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a
fair trial had."' Since the defendant had been presented with the probation report which recommended that he be compelled to register as a
sex offender eleven days before the sentencing hearing, 2' and he still
failed to object both to the report and to the imposition of the registration requirement,' the court concluded that the defendant had waived
any claim of prejudicial error.'

13. Birch, 10 Cal. 3d at 322, 515 P.2d at 17, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (vacating a conviction for lewd conduct based on a guilty plea after the trial court failed to inform
the defendant, in pro per,. that a conviction for urinating outside of a Taco Bell restaurant would require his registration as a sex offender).
14. Id.
15. Bunnell, 13 Cal. 3d at 605, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
16. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 376, 862 P.2d at 745, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745; Bunnell,
13 Cal. 3d at 605, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
17. McCleUan, 6 Cal. 4th at 377-78, 862 P.2d at 74647, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746-47.
18. 54 Cal. 3d 1013, 819 P.2d 861, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (1991).
19. Id. at 1023, 819 P.2d at 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 908.
20. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 377, 862 P.2d at 746, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746 (quoting
People v. Melton, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1406, 1408-09, 267 Cal. Rptr 640, 642 (1990) (finding
waiver where the defendant failed to object at his sentencing hearing to the imposition
of a fine)). For a discussion of the waiver doctrine as it applies to criminal procedure,
see generally 21A Am. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 633-634 (1981 & Supp. 1993) (discussing waiver doctrine); see also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 71 (1904) (holding
that the rights of a criminal defendant may not be waived when there is a statutory
mandate, or when doing so would be contrary to public policy). For a discussion of
the waiver doctrine as applied by California courts in criminal cases, see People v.
Saunders, 5 Cal. 4th 580, 589-91, 853 P.2d 1093, 1096-98, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638, 641-43
(1993) (finding waiver where the defendant failed to object to the trial court's premature dismissal of the jury in a bifurcated trial), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1101 (1994).
21. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 377, 862 P.2d at 746, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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The court also rejected the defendant's contention that no waiver
had occurred due to the failure of the court to advise him of his right
under Penal Code section 1192.5' to change his plea should the sentence imposed be more severe than what he expected.' The defendant
cited Walker to support his claim that waiver does not occur when the
court has failed to advise the defendant of his rights under section
1192.5.' The court rejected the defendant's claim, holding that Walker
applied only to cases in which the plea agreement was violated, and did
not extend to the failure to object to the direct consequences of a plea
agreement.'
Furthermore, the court noted that the record did not establish that
the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to advise him of
the section 290 registration requirement.' Although the court noted that
the defendant's appellate pleading stated that he would not have pled
guilty if he knew of the registration requirement,' the court refused to

24. Penal Code § 1192.5 reads in pertinent part:
If the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the defendant prior to
the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may, at the
time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement
of the judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of
the matter, and (3) in such case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1982).

25. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 377-78, 862 P.2d at 746, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746.
26. Id.; see Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1024, 819 P.2d at 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909 (finding waiver of the right to advisement of the consequences of the plea agreement by
defendant's failure to object, but finding no waiver of defendant's claim of deviation
from the plea agreement).
27. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 377-78, 862 P.2d at 746, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746.
28. Id. at 378, 862 P.2d at 746, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746. The court's analysis of the
defendant's claim of prejudice is worth noting. Having established that the defendant
waived any claim of prejudicial error, the court did not have to analyze this claim.
Since the court resolved the case by deciding that the defendant waived any possible
claim of prejudice, the court's arguendo review of the defendant's prejudice claim is
curious. Perhaps the court sought to prevent reversal of the case by grounding its
holding on the alternate basis of failure to establish prejudice in the event that the
United States Supreme Court overrules the court's waiver analysis. See, e.g., 5 CAL.
JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 487 (1973); see also Lissak v. Crocker Estate Co., 119 Cal.
442, 446-47, 51 P. 688, 689 (1897) (refusing to rule on a demurrer after ordering a new
trial which resulted in allowing the parties an opportunity to amend their respective
complaints); 5 Am. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error § 760 (1962 & Supp. 1994) (discussing
the judicial principle of refusing to decide unnecessary or moot questions).
29. McCleUan, 6 Cal. 4th at 378, 862 P.2d at 746-47, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746-47.
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accept the pleading as evidence of prejudice since an appellate pleading
gives a trial court "no occasion to pass upon the veracity of [the]
defendant's present claim."' The court limited its consideration of prejudice against the defendant to the trial court record, and found that the
imposition of the registration requirement did not effect the defendant's
willingness to plead guilty."
The court then analyzed the defendant's claim that the terms of the
plea agreement were violated, entitling him to relief from the plea
agreement.' The court observed that although there was no mention of
the requirement of sex offender registration at the defendant's hearing,
the registration requirement could not properly constitute a term of the
plea agreement because the parties made no mention of it.' The court
cited Santobello v. New York for the proposition that for a plea term to
be binding, it must be based on "a promise or agreement of the prosecutor.., that.., can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration. "' The court found that the registration requirement in McClellan
did not constitute such a term.'
Next, the court distinguished McClellan from Walker, in which the
court granted relief to a defendant whose plea agreement called for jail
time and no punitive fine, but who was subsequently sentenced to jail
time and a "restitutionary" fine. 7 The Walker court reasoned that it was
appropriate to consider fines in plea negotiations.' The defendant in
Walker, therefore, could have reasonably understood that, according to
his agreement, there would be no fme.' However, in McClellan, the

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. For an overview of the plea bargain process and the constitutional rights involved, see John . Farley, Guilty Pleas, 81 GEo. LJ. 1184 (1993).
33. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 379, 862 P.2d at 747, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747. The
court's opinion McClellan and in its companion case, In re Moser, 6 Cal. 4th 342, 862
P.2d 723, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723 (1993), suggest that the court's analysis in cases in
which the defendant alleges that the prosecution breached a plea agreement, will turn
on a close examination of the elements of the bargain. Only those areas which the
trial court clearly addresses will constitute terms of the bargain for the purpose of determining whether or not the prosecution violated the agreement. Id.

34. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 365-374 (1989 &
Supp. 1993) (discussing plea bargaining and negotiations); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal

Law § 2824 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing a defendant's remedies for breach of a
plea agreement).

35. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 379, 862 P.2d at 747, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747 (quoting
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262).
36. Id. at 379, 862 P.2d at 747, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747.
37. Walker, 54 Cal. 3d 1013, 1030-31, 819 P.2d 861, 871, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 912-13.

38. Id. at 1024, 819 P.2d at 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 908-09.
39. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 379-80, 862 P.2d at 748, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748 (quoting
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court held that the statutory registration requirement, because it is imposed by law on anyone convicted of assault with intent to commit rape,
gave no discretion to the court to forego the imposition of the requirement, and thus it was an improper subject for plea negotiations.' Accordingly, the court found no violation of the defendant's right to due
process of law."'
B.

Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion

Justices Mosk, joined by Justice Kennard,' argued in a passionate
dissent that McClellan's right of due process had been violated.' While
the dissenters conceded that "not any deviation from the terms of the
agreement is a violation of due process,"' they argued that any significant deviation from the agreement "may not be added without violating
the defendant's rights."'
The dissenters further noted that even the Attorney General had
agreed that the defendant was entitled to "some relief."' They characterized the majority as apparently "conclud[ing] that unless the plea expressly excludes a term of punishment, that term may be added ex post
facto."" Such a rule, they contended, was contrary to Walker and
Santobello as well as established contract principles.'

Moser, 6 Cal. 4th at 356-57, 862 P.2d at 732-33, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732-33 (explaining
the rationale behind the Walker decision)).
40. Id. at 380, 862 P.2d at 748, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748; see also Moser, 6 Cal. 4th at
357, 862 P.2d at 733, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733 (stating that the length of a parole term
in which the term is statutorily mandated is an improper subject for plea settlement
negotiations).
41. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 381, 862 P.2d at 749, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749.
42. Justice Mosk authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Kennard concurred
in all respects except for the proposition that the defendant was entitled to specific
performance of the plea bargain. Id. at 385, 862 P.2d at 751, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard wrote that because sex offender registration
was mandated by law, "the only remedy available to the defendant is withdrawal of
the guilty plea." Id. at 385, 862 P.2d at 751, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 381, 862 P.2d at 749, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 382, 862 P.2d at 749, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 382, 862 P.2d at 749-50, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749-50 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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The dissenters then criticized the majority's distinguishing Walker
on the basis that the registration requirement, as opposed to fines, was
not a proper subject of bargaining. The court in Walker, the dissenters
argued, granted the defendant relief because restitutionary fines were not
discussed in the plea settlement,' and not because fines were a proper
subject of negotiation,' as the majority asserted.
Justices Mosk and Kennard then dismissed the statutory requirement of sex offender registration as controlling the issue, arguing that
"[tihe prosecution... may not escape its voluntary promise and still get
the benefit of the guilty plea simply because its promise may have been
ultra vires."" The dissenters further argued that if the plea agreement
had been ambiguous as to the issue of sex offender registration, then
such an ambiguity should be construed against the government.'
The dissenters also criticized the majority for refusing to grant relief
to the defendant on the basis that his lawyer failed to make a timely ob-

49. Id. at 383, 862 P.2d at 750, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Both the majority and the dissent cited the same passage in Walker as support for their respective arguments. The disputed passage in
Walker holds:
When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as
the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement. The punishment may not significantly exceed that which the parties agreed upon.
"'[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled' . . . . The Supreme Court
has thus recognized that due process applies not only to the procedure of
accepting the plea, . . . but that the requirements of due process attach also
to implementation of the bargain itself. It necessarily follows that violation of
the bargain by an officer of the state raises a constitutional right to some
remedy." . . . . Although the purpose of a restitution fine is not punitive, we
believe its consequences to the defendant are severe enough that it qualifies
as punishment for this purpose. Accordingly, the restitution fine should generally be considered in plea negotiations.
This does not mean that any deviation from the terms of the agreement
is constitutionally impermissible . . . the variance must be "significant" in the
context of the plea bargain as a whole to violate the defendant's rights. A
punishment or related condition that is insignificant relative to the whole,
such as a standard condition of probation, may be imposed whether or not it
was part of the express negotiations.
Walker, 54 Cal. 3d at 1024, 819 P.2d at 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 908-09 (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Mancheno, 32 Cal. 3d 855, 860, 654 P.2d 211, 214, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 441, 444 (1982).
51. McClellan, 6 Cal. 4th at 383, 862 P.2d at 750, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
52. Id. at 384, 862 P.2d at 750-51, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750-51. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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jection to the registration requirement.' "No court should callously compel that result,"' the dissenters concluded, as "[tihere is no rational reason why this court should obdurately refuse relief."'
HI.

CONCLUSION

McClellan sought to clarify the issues that must be considered in
determining whether plea agreements are violated. Errors made by the
trial court such as the failure to advise the defendant of the consequences of his plea, and the failure to advise him of the right to change a
plea, are waived if the defendant does not object and there is no violation of the plea agreement. Accordingly, the court's analysis of whether a
plea agreement has been violated will involve a close scrutiny of the
exact terms of the agreement in future cases. Any additional impositions
on the defendant, if not specifically bargained for, will not be considered
terms of the agreement for purposes of SantobeUo analysis if they are
insignificant or not a permissible subject for a plea agreement, such as
statutorily mandated requirements.

SANFORD A. TOYEN

53. Id. at 384, 862 P.2d at 751, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
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V.

DEATH PENALTY
A.

California's death penalty selection factors are not
subject to the Eighth Amendment vagueness standard despite the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Stringer v. Black, the correct standardfor
the penalty selection-phase is specificity of terms
used and their relevance to sentence determination:
People v. Bacigalupo.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Bacigalupo (Bacigalupo II),' the California Supreme
Court held that the California penalty selection phase factors set forth in
California Penal Code section 190.3,2 assisting a jury in its sentence se-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 457, 862 P.2d 808, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2782 (1994). Justice Kennard delivered the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas
and Justices Arabian, Baxter, and George concurring. Id. at 462-79, 862 P.2d at 810-21,
24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810-21. Justice Panelli concurred in the judgment but fied a separate opinion. Id. at 479-84, 862 P.2d at 821-25, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 821-25 (Panelli , J.,
concurring). Justice Mosk also concurred in the judgment but filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 484-93, 862 P.2d at 825-31, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825-31 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
2. Section 190.3 provides the following non-exclusive list of factors for the trier of
fact to consider in the penalty phase:
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted . . . and . . . any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to
section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or
implied threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not . . . the defendant reasonably believed [there] to be
a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the
substantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law was impaired [by] mental disease or defect, or
the affects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
0) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and
his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.
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lection for a defendant already determined eligible for the death penalty,
are not subject to the Eighth Amendment vagueness standard used to
evaluate the preliminary question of death sentence eligibility.4 The court
also established an alternative standard for sentence selection factors
and upheld the specific factors upon which the defendant appealed.5
The defendant was found eligible for the death penalty by a jury
which then imposed a death sentence upon considering the factors set
forth in section 190.3.6 The defendant appealed to the California Supreme Court on the ground that the enumerated factors were vague.'
However, the court declined to review the defendant's conviction, stating
that the Eighth Amendment standard applied to only the death penalty
eligibility phase, not the penalty selection phase.' Relying on Stringer v.
Black,' decided shortly after Bacigalupo I,° the defendant appealed to
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
All further statutory references are to the California Penal code unless otherwise
specified.
3. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment thus subjects the
death penalty to several restrictions. One notable limitation requires that any capital
punishment statute defining death eligibility must set forth a "narrowing principle that
channels jury discretion and provides a principled way to distinguish those cases in
which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"
Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 462, 862 P.2d at 810, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810. If the statute does not meet this standard, it is viewed as vague under the Eighth Amendment,
and is therefore unconstitutional. Id. (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)).
4. Id. at 463, 862 P.2d at 810, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810. Three days before the announcement of the Bacigalupo II decision, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear two California cases addressing Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130
(1992), in which the court could either affirm or reject the California Supreme Court's
rationale in the instant case. See People v. Proctor, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 842 P.2d 1100, 15
Cal. Rptr. 2d 340 (1992), cert. granted sub noma.; Proctor v. California, 114 S. Ct. 598
(1993); People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 842 P.2d 1142, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (1992),
cert. granted sub nom. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 598 (1993), affd, 114 S. Ct.
2630 (1994); see also 3 B.E. WITIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
Punishment for Crime § 1381 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994).
5. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 463, 862 P.2d at 810, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810.
6. Id. at 457, 86Z P.2d at 808, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 808.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 464, 862 P.2d at 810, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810. In People v. Bacigalupo, 1
Cal. 4th 103, 820 P.2d 559, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 360 (1992) (Bacigalupo 1), the defendant argued that factor (b) of § 190.3 was impermissibly vague. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal.
4th at 463-64, 862 P.2d at 810, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810.
9. 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
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the United States Supreme Court." The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Stringer.12

On remand, the California Supreme Court first reviewed the application of the vagueness standard to death penalty cases prior to Stringer,
highlighting the distinction between the death penalty eligibility phase

and the penalty selection phase." The court then explained why the
Stringer analysis was inapplicable to California's sentence selection factors. 4 Based on these considerations, the court determined that the contested factors passed muster under a more lenient alternative Eighth
Amendment standard. 5
II. TREATMENT

A.

Majority Opinion

In Bacigalupo II, the California Supreme Court noted the United
States Supreme Court's distinction between two aspects of death penalty
statutes-"'narrowing' and 'selection.'"'" The Court has required that
"narrowing" factors define conduct which would render a defendant
eligible for the death penalty, a function subject to review under the
Eighth Amendment vagueness standard.'7 The court articulated this
standard in Godfrey v. Georgia, establishing that any statutory designation of conduct deserving potential imposition of the death penalty must
narrow the- class of defendants eligible for a death sentence as well as

10. 1 Cal. 4th 103, 820 P.2d 559, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (1992).
11. In Bacigalupo I, the jury found the defendant guilty on two counts of first degree murder. The jury also found true the allegation of special circumstances-robberymurder and multiple-murder. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 464, 862 P.2d at 810, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 810; see also CAL PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (enumerating special circumstances utilized in death penalty eligibility-phase).
12. Bacigalupo v. California, 113 S. Ct. 32 (1992).
13. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 465-71, 862 P.2d at 811-16, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81116.
14. Id. at 471-77, 862 P.2d at 816-20, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816-20.
15. Id. at 477-79, 862 P.2d at 820-21, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820-21.
16. Id. at 465, 862 P.2d at 812, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 812 (quoting Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983)); see also William J. Kopeny, Capital Punishment-Who
Should Choose? 12 W. ST. U. L REv. 383 (1985).
17. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 465, 862 P.2d at 811, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990), for the proposition that "'the infliction of
a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be...
wantonly and . . . frealdshly imposed' violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the federal Constitution"). For a general discussion of California death penalty cases,
see John G. Marich et al., California Supreme Court Survey, 10 PEPP. L REV. 835
(1983). See generally 22 CAL Jun. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3340-3342 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
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provide an objective basis for distinguishing between cases actually warranting the death penalty from those that do not. Once a defendant is
determined "death penalty-eligible," the sentence selection must also be
considered. In this second phase, the jury or court must make an individualized determination regarding the imposition of death."9
Capital statutes divide the death penalty determination into two
phases: eligibility for the death penalty and subsequent sentence selection.' The narrowing and selection aspects noted above are not always
addressed in the separate phases respectively; in other words, the narrowing function is not always sufficiently confined to the eligibility
phase." Some statutory schemes limit the class of people eligible for
capital punishment by strictly confining the definition of capital offenses
such that an initial "finding of guilt" represents the requisite narrowing
function during the eligibility-phase, i.e., requiring a specific intent to
kill. 2 "Other states define capital offense[] more broadly," and then require the sentencer 'to determine whether one or more aggravating circumstances are present.' This approach fulfills the narrowing function
within the penalty phase. The California Supreme Court emphasized that
the individualized determination may include a consideration of numerous factors bearing on the offender's background and character and
entails virtually unbridled discretion.'

18. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-29 (1980). The narrowing function is
served by the legislature's prescription of the circumstances and conduct that bring
particular actions within the purview of the death penalty; a constitutional capital statute also must provide an objective basis for appellate review. Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 878 (1983); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (setting forth the principle that the determination of whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty must be sufficient-ly narrowed and be made on an objective basis reviewable on appeal); see also
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1988) (holding that certain aggravating
circumstances were unconstitutionally vague).
19. The requirement that the sentencing determination be sufficiently individualized is
satisfied when the capital statute allows for broad sentence discretion to consider a
myriad of both mitigating and aggravating evidence such as the character of the defendant and victim impact. Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (1993); Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983).
20. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 465, 862 P.2d at 811-12, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811-12.
21. Id. at 476, 862 P.2d at 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819.
22. Id. at 465, 862 P.2d at 812, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812.
23. See id.
24. See supra note 18; see also 3 B.E. WmN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime §§ 1592-1593 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994); 22
CAL. JuE. 3D Criminal Law § 3344 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the court's deter-
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The majority analyzed the California death penalty statute before
further developing the significance of these distinctive capital statutory
features.25 Divided into two phases,' California's statute first requires
two determinations: (1) that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder and (2) the truth of any alleged special circumstances, any of which,
if found true, render the offender death penalty-eligible.' The second
phase' focuses solely on whether or not the death penalty-eligible defendant shall receive a capital sentence instead of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.' Thus, the California statute addresses
the narrowing and selection requirements in separate and distinct phases.
The special circumstance requirement of the California statute's
guilt phase' serves to "guide and channel" the jury by restricting the
class of murderers to those who will become eligible for the death penalty.3 Thus, California's eligibility phase "special circumstances" requirement performs the same function as the "aggravating circumstances" or

mination of death as punishment at a penalty hearing).
25. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 467, 862 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813.
26. "If the defendant is found guilty of first degree murder and one or more special
circumstances as enumerated in section 190.2 has been charged and found true....
there shall . .. be further proceedings on the sentence to be imposed . . . conducted
in accordance with the provisions of Sections 190.3 and 190.4." CAL PENAL CODE
§ 190.1 (West 1988); see also 22 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3342 (1985 & Supp.
1994) (discussing the procedure used to determine a convicted defendant's punishment).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1988). Section 190.1 provides in pertinent part
that "the question of defendant's guilt shall first be determined. If the trier of fact
finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall at the same time determine
the truth of all special circumstances charged as enumerated in § 190.2." Id.; see also
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984) (limiting death sentence to a small subclass of
offenders by requiring the jury to find at least one special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt).
28. Section 190.1 provides an alternative phase when defendants plead insanity. CAL
PENAL CODE § 190.1 (b) (West 1988). However, that section is not relevant to this
discussion.
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). For a thorough discussion of the
guiding factors set forth in the second phase, see Richard R. Wirick, Dark Year on
Death Row: Guiding Sentence Discretion After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 689 (1984).
30. This phase can also be referred to as the death penalty eligibility phase. See 22
CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3343 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the court's consideration of findings regarding special circumstances when determining a convicted
defendant's punishment).
31. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 467, 862 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813 (quoting People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 539-40, 726 P.2d 516, 531, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 849
(1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987)). For
a general discussion of the current court with regard to special circumstances, see
John W. Poulos, The Lucas Court and Capital Punishment: The Original Understanding of the Special Circumstances, 30 SANTA CLARA L REV. 333 (1990).
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"aggravating factors" used by other states during the penalty selection
phase to satisfy the constitutionally required narrowing function.'
Next, in the penalty phase, the California Code provides a nonexclusive list of discretion-guiding factors.' This second phase provides a
separate opportunity for the sentencer to consider additional evidence
and exercise individualized discretion in determining whether to impose the death sentence.' The court explained that the weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating factors required by the California statute allows for a "mental balancing process. "' Recognizing the distinct functions death penalty statutes must perform, the court emphasized that the
section 190.3 factors pertain exclusively to sentence selection, and were
clearly unrelated to the narrowing prong.'
After discussing the two functions served by death penalty statutes,
the court focused on the reasoning in several capital cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court.' These cases established the Supreme
Court's distinction between weighing states and non-weighing states, as
were termed in Stringer.' The Court's vagueness of each analysis dif-

32. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 468, 862 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813; see
also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 n.44 (1976) (setting forth special circumstances in a 1962 model code §).
33. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
34. The penalty selection-phase is grounded in "'the jury's moral assessment of those
facts ... [bearing on the character of the individual and the circumstances of the
crime] as they reflect on whether [the] defendant should be put to death.'" Bacigalupo
II, 6 Cal. 4th at 468-69, 862 P.2d at 814, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814 (quoting Brown, 40
Cal. 3d at 540, 762 P.2d at 576, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 834, see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 879 (1983); see also 22 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3344 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
35. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 470, 862 P.2d at 815, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815 (stating that the statute does not require that the death penalty be imposed unless the juror is convinced after balancing the various factors that death is the appropriate penalty); see also id. at 476, 862 P.2d at 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819. For a less obfuscated
explanation as compared to Justice Kennard's treatment regarding this aspect, see Justice Panelli's concurrence. Id. at 480-81, 862 P.2d at 822, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822
(Panelli, J., concurring); see also Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992) (interpreting
Arizona law-ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703E (1989)); Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct.
2926 (1992) (interpreting Florida law-FA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(a) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1994)).
36. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 467, 862 P.2d at 813, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 813 (stating that this distinction underlied the court's denial of a vagueness review in
Bacigalupo 1).
37. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct 1130 (1992); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
38. Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136.
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fers subtly. In a weighing state, after guilt is determined, and at .least one
aggravating factor has been found, the statute requires imposition of the
death penalty unless the sentencer finds the aggravating factor's sufficiently outweighed by mitigating factors. In a non-weighing state, the
sentencer "must find the existence of one aggravating factor before imposing the death penalty, but aggravating factors as such no specific
function in the jury's [decision regarding death sentence eligibility]."'
Zant v. Stephens ' was a decision involving the Georgia death penalty statute-a non-weighing statute. In Zant, the Court considered one
death sentence eligibility factor (out of three relied upon by the jury)
that was unconstitutionally vague and asked whether the consideration
of that factor "infected" the subsequent sentence selection.4' The Court
found no infection of the sentence phase, reasoning that the narrowing
factors are confined to the eligibility phase and not designed to play a
role in the selection-phase.42
Stringer involved a Mississippi capital statute in which the narrowing process occurred within the penalty selection phase.' In the Mississippi statute, the sentencer determines the truth of any aggravating factors after the guilt phase. After an aggravating factor is found to be true
during the eligibility phase, the defendant is then eligible for the death
penalty." The sentencer then weighs any mitigating evidence against the
aggravating factors already considered.* The Stringer court revisited
the infection issue in this context and found that the selection process
had been tainted by the vagueness of the aggravating factors employed in
the selection-phase." The Stringer court stated that:
[A] vague aggravating factor employed for~the purpose of determining whether a
defendant is eligible for the death penalty fails to channel the sentence discretion .... [and] used in the weighing process is... worse, for it creates the risk
that the jury will treat the defendant as more deserving of the death penalty."T

In Bacigalupo II, the defendant argued that Stringer should be read as
applying the Godfrey standard to both the eligibility phase and the sen-

39. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 473, 862 P.2d at 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817 (quoting Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136).
40. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
41. Id. at 471, 862 P.2d at 815-16, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815-16.
42. Id. (citing Zant, 462 U.S. at 874). The court left unanswered whether consideration of a similarly vague aggravating eligibility factor in a weighing state might infect
the sentence selection. Id.
43. Id. at 471-72, 862 P.2d at 816, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 816.
44. Id. at 473, 862 P.2d at 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817.
45. Id. at 474, 862 P.2d at 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817.
46. Id. (citing Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1136).
47. Id. at 473-74, 862 P.2d at 817-18, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 817-18.
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tence selection phase.' The majority in Bacigalupo II explained that the
Stringer court did not hold that factors used solely for the sentence
selection-phase were subject to the Godfrey standard.' In fact, the court
pointed out that the Godfrey analysis is more appropriately limited to
those factors used to circumscribe the class of dependant's eligible for
the death penalty-the narrowing function.'
The majority reasoned that when a capital statute provides sufficient
narrowing factors in the eligibility phase, the Eighth Amendment places

no similar restraint on the penalty selection phase.5' The court stated
that applying the same standard to the two separate phases is contrary
to the high court's line of decisions distinguishing between them.' As
further support for its conclusion that the California selection-factors are
exempt from the vagueness standard, the Bacigalupo II court also noted
that "in granting the jury 'unbridled discretion' in its sentence selection
decision," the Zant court upheld a sentence selection scheme that did
not provide an objective basis for a reviewing court.'
The court emphasized that section 190.3 factors merely guide the sentencer's broad discretion with factors that draw attention to the character of the crime and the defendant's background.' 4 The court further

reasoned that such factors are not employed until after the narrowing
function has already been performed in the eligibility-phase.' Thus, the

48. Id. at 475, 862 P.2d at 819, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819.
49. Id. at 476-77, 862 P.2d at 819-20, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819-20; see supra note 17
and accompanying text.
50. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 475-76, 862 P.2d at 819-20, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81920 (quotipg Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1992)). The California Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's contention as incorrectly implying that the mere inclusion of the term "weighing" brought the California statutory scheme under the Stringer
analysis. Id; see also id. at 480-81, 862 P.2d at 822, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822 (Panelli, J.,
concurring) (clarifying the implicit logic of the majority's conclusion).
51. Id. at 475, 862 P.2d at 818-19, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 818-19.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 476-77, 862 P.2d at 819-20, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819-20; see also Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990); 3
B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Punishment for Crime
§§ 1605-1606, 1608-1609 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994) (discussing factors properly considered as mitigating circumstances).
55. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 477, 862 P.2d at 819-20, 24 Cal. Rptr, 2d at 819-20.
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majority held that the penalty-phase factors were not subject to the
Eighth Amendment vagueness standard.'
After concluding that the Godfrey standard did not apply to the sentencing factors, the court turned its attention to the potential for
"randomness" and "death penalty bias" in the selection-phase as the
court had previously addressed in People v. Tuilaepa57 and the United
States Supreme Court had considered in Stringer.' The court explained
that the sentence selection factors must meet the dual standards of
"'specificity'" and "'relevance,'" providing terms that are "sufficiently clear
and specific" and that direct the sentencer to "relevant" and "appropriate" evidence for penalty determination.'
According to the court, factors (a) and (b),' which defendant complained were impermissibly vague, did not relate to the narrowing function and, therefore, were not subject to that standard." Instead, the
court analyzed the defendant's contention under a new standard articulated in Tuilaepa and determined both subsections were sufficiently
clear and relevant.'
B.

The Concurringand Dissenting Opinions

In his concurring opinion, Justice Panelli agreed with the majority
regarding the inapplicability of the Eighth Amendment vagueness standard to sentence selection factors when those factors are clearly separate from the narrowing process.' However, Justice Panelli stated that
the majority's opinion reflects the ambiguous and questionable applicability of Stringer to the California sentencing factors and provided a
more clearly reasoned justification for the same conclusion.'
Justice Panelli disagreed with the majority's reliance on Tuilaepa because the majority was adding to it to create a "new Eighth Amendment
vagueness standard," which only applies to sentencing factors.' Justice
56. Id. at 477, 862 P.2d at 820, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820.
57. 4 Cal. 4th 569, 842 P.2d 1142, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382 (1992), cert. granted sub
nom. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 598 (1993), qffd, 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994).
58. 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1139 (1992). This is the extent of the case precedents upon
which the majority based its prescription of a new standard.
59. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 477, 477 P.2d at 820, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820 (quoting Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th at 595).
60. See supra note 2.
61. Bacigalupo I, 6 Cal. 4th at 478, 862 P.2d at 820-21, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 820-21.
62. Id. at 478, 862 P.2d at 821, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 821.
63. Id. at 480-81, 862 P.2d at 822-23, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822-23 (Paneli, J., concur-

ring).
64. Id. at 480-83, 862 P.2d at 822-24, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 822-24 (Panelli, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 483, 862 P.2d at 824, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824 (Panelli, J., concurring) (stat-
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Panelli generally criticized the majority for ignoring the dearth of
precedential authority for its implicit activism.' He specifically criticized
the piecemeal application of Stringer to the California statute, stating
that it either "applies to our sentencing factors or it does not."' Justice
Panelli reasoned that in Tuilaepa, without deciding applicability, the
court had held the sentencing factors valid in the event Stringer controlled.' Justice Panelli concluded by stating that, "properly interpreted,
Stringer has nothing to say about California's sentencing factors; but
assuming for the sake of argument that it does, our sentencing factors
are not vague."'
In a separate opinion, Justice Mosk concurred in the judgement but
dissented with both the majority and the concurrence.' Justice Mosk
viewed the court's recognition of subtle distinguishing nuances as ignoring what he viewed as the United States Supreme Court's correct and
express rationale in Stringer. Justice Mosk significantly relied on the
statement in Stringer,that a vague aggravating factor utilized in the sentence selection phase is perhaps more dangerous than in the eligibility
phase due to the potential that the sentencer will rely on an "illusory
circumstance."" Justice Mosk disagreed that the statement was made
within a context distinguishable from California's statute, concluding that
Stringer does in fact impose the traditional Eighth Amendment standard
on California's penalty selection factors.'

ing that the majority goes much further in Bacigalupo II than in Tuilaepa by creating
a new standard).
66. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 483, 862 P.2d at 824, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824 (Panelli, J., concurring).
69. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring) (citing People v. Montiel, 5 Cal. 4th 877, 944, 855
P.2d 1277, 1316, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 744, (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2782 (1994);
People v. Simms, 5 Cal. 4th 405, 465-66, 853 P.2d 992, 1029, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 574,
(1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2782 (1994); People v. Stansbury, 4 Cal. 4th 1017, 1071,
846 P.2d 756, 789, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 209, cert. granted sub nom. Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 380 (1993)).
70. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 484, 862 P.2d at 825, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); see 3 B.E. WmKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Punishment for Crime § 1370A (2d ed. 1989 & Supp.
1994) (citing several recent California Supreme Court decisions in which Stringer has
been repeatedly rejected where it challenges the selection factors as unconstitutionally
vague). However, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to two of the
cases cited. See supra note 4.
72. Bacigalupo II, 6 Cal. 4th at 491-92, 862 P.2d at 829-30, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829-
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III.

IMPACT

The sentence selection factors enumerated under section 190.3 withstood recent constitutional scrutiny when the Supreme Court affirmed
the California Supreme Court's decision in Tuilaepa.h The Court has
also denied certiorari in Bacigalupo II.' Both decisions have implications regarding the applicability of Stringer to section 190.3 and the
vagueness review to which the selection factors will be subject. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Tuilaepa is considerably more enlightening than the denial of certiorari.
Although the Court recognized that eligibility and selection factors
alike shall be subject to a vagueness review, they indicated that such a
review has been and will continue to be "quite deferential" to a state's
particular statutory construction.' The Court held that neither phase of
the California penalty scheme was unconstitutionally vague. 6 Furthermore, the Court stated that the section 190.3 selection factors are subject
to a less stringent standard than the eligibility factors." It should be noted that the Court did not go as far as California went in Bacigalupo II
when it articulated the distinctly separate vagueness review for sentence
selection factors. Even so, the Court clearly established that where the
narrowing function is sufficiently satisfied in the eligibility phase sentence selection factors are subject to a less stringent vagueness review.'h
It is clear from both Tuileapa and Bacigalupo II that California's particular selection factors are constitutionally sound.'
Although the California Supreme Court's "specificity" and "relevance"
test, as set forth in Bacigalupo II, is not strongly supported by precedent, that standard appears to be simply a more specific manifestation of
the United States Supreme Court's implicit distinction recognized in
Tuilaepa and thus, arguably in line with the high Court's reasoning. However, because the Court denied certiorari in Bacigalupo II, it is unclear
whether or not they are favorably disposed to the new standard. Finally,
regarding the applicability of Stringer, as the petitioners in both cases
relied on the reasoning there in their challenges to section 190.3, it is
clear that the Supreme Court did not intend to apply the Stringer analysis to a death penalty scheme such as California's.

30 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
73. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994).
74. People v. Bacigalupo, 114 S. Ct. 2782 (1994).
75. Id. at 2635.
76. Tnilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2634.
77. Id. at 2635-37.
78. Id.
79. Id,
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The. Bacigalupo II standard of review allows a greater degree of
vagueness for the selection factors, but also recognizes the need to provide reasonable safeguards when life, the most revered of rights, lies in
the balance. However, that standard has not been embraced by the high
court. Thus, the decision stands as the state of the law with regard to the
limited applicability of Stringer to the California's death penalty scheme,
but in as far as it establishes California's new vagueness test its constitutional legitimacy is not secured.

BRIAN D. JONES

1257

B.

A witness' psychiatricrecords not obtained or created as part of the prosecution's investigation, but
derived from previous psychotherapy, might not be
deemed in the government's possessionfor purposes
of applying the Pennsylvania v. Ritchie exception to
privileged therapist-patientcommunications; when
a laboratory evidentiary procedure provides a directly identifiable image that is clear to a lay jury,
it is not subject to the People v. Kelly scientific evidence standard: People v. Webb.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Webb,' the California Supreme Court ruled against each of
the defendant's numerous contentions on automatic appeal from his
death penalty sentence. The defendant's legal arguments were not particularly compelling. Thus, analysis of the court's opinion is limited to the
following holdings: denial of the defendant's request to view prosecution
witness' psychiatric records did not violate his right to due process; the
People v. Kelly 2 evidentiary standard, which states that scientific procedures must be generally accepted within the scientific community, did
not apply to the laboratory analysis of the defendant's fingerprint; the
police did not fail to adequately preserve evidence (a revolver); and the
defendant's claims regarding penalty phase mitigation, defendant sentencing testimony, and the constitutionality of the death penalty were without merit?
The trial court convicted the defendant of two counts of first degree
murder, and found three aggravating factors.' He was thereby rendered
eligible for capital punishment. At trial, the sentencer found the aggravating evidence outweighed that in mitigation and, therefore, imposed
the death penalty. On automatic appeal, the defendant raised a significant number of meritless claims that the court patiently addressed.

1. 6 Cal. 4th 494, 862 P.2d 779, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (1993). Justice Baxter delivered the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian, and
George concurring. Id. at 503, 862 P.2d at 784, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784. Justice Mosk
and Justice Kennard each filed separate opinions that concurred with the judgment, but
dissented with a portion of the majority's opinion. Id. at 537, 862 P.2d at 807, 24 Cal.
Rptr. at 807.
2. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 503, 862 P.2d at 784, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784. The special circumstances
were multiple murder, robbery-murder, and burglary-murder. Id.
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II. DISCUSSION
This Note discusses the more significant claims the defendant brought
before the California Supreme Court, but relegates treatment of the less
significant issues to minimal footnote commentary. The most contentious
issue addressed by the majority was the defendant's assertion that the
trial court erred when it denied his motion for full access to the key
prosecution witness' (Sharon White Bear) psychiatric record.5
The defendant claimed he was prejudicially denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective cross-examination because the trial court granted
only limited disclosure of the prosecution witness' psychiatric file.6 In
arguing for an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the
defendant relied on Pennsylvaniav. Ritchie,7 which stands for the proposition that the state is required to give the defense "all 'material' exculpatory evidence in its 'possession,' even" when the evidence is privileged8 under state law. The court rejected the petitioner's claim, recognizing that both the magistrate and the superior court subjected the files
to multiple in camera reviews and found little "relevant" information
supporting the defendant's contention that the defendant's confrontation
clause rights should prevail over the therapist-patient privilege.'" The
California Supreme Court noted that the lower court had provided "sanitized" versions of the file that revealed only the relevant information. The
court held that even assuming Ritchie applied, the lower court satisfied
the necessary in camera reviews and properly concluded the irrelevance
of the evidence to the defendant's claims.

5. The majority's treatment of the psychiatric evidence issue drew comment from
both dissenters. Id. at 537-38, 862 P.2d at 807-08, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807-08.
6. Id. at 517-18, 862 P.2d at 793-94, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793-94 (but also noting that
absolute privileges are not subject to the rule in Ritchie).
7. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).

8. The court included a caveat that Ritchie apparently does not apply when the
recognized privilege is absolute. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 518, 862 P.2d at 794, 24 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 794; see Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56-58; see also 3 B.E. WMTN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE,
Introduction of Evidence at Trial §§ 1683A, 1683B (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the right to compulsory process and the right to present evidence).
9. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 518, 862 P.2d at 794, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794 (quoting
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56-58). Ritchie established the rule that where the defendant seeks
potentially privileged evidence the court must view it in camera to determine the
evidence's "materiality" to guilt or innocence. Id.
10. Id. at 516-17, 862 P.2d at 793-94, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
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Prior to reaching its decision, the court raised its own question regarding the applicability of Ritchie in this particular instance." One of the
necessary elements of Ritchie is that the psychiatric records "be deemed
' 2
'in the possession' of the 'government.""
The court indicated that the
records were not compiled by the prosecution, nor in the course of the
investigation, and that neither party controlled access to the records."
Thus, the court intimated, that based on such facts, "it seems likely that
defendant [had] no constitutional right to examine the records even if
they [were] 'material' to the case." 4 However, it appears the court relied
on the "in camera examinations" as the basis of its conclusion that the
trial court properly denied the requests.'5 Thus, the court's language
questioning Ritchie is merely dicta."
The court also considered the defendant's contention that fingerprint
evidence should not be admitted because it was the result of a technical
procedure not accepted within the scientific community. 7 The court recognized that California adopted the "Kelly test" to prevent jurors from
being unduly influenced by scientific evidence that only appears reliable
to the layperson." However, the court reasoned that the use of the laser
and chemical process utilized in the petitioner's case was reliable because it produced a directly recognizable photographic image. 9 The

11. Id. at 518, 862 P.2d at 794, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
12. Id.; see 3 B.E. WITIGN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Introduction of Evidence at Trial
§ 1683A (3d ed. Supp. 1994) (discussing the Ritchie decision); see also 21 CAL. JuR. 3D
Criminal Law § 2843 (discussing discovery by the defendant and rights of the accused).
13. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 518, 862 P.2d at 794, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
14. Id. In fact, the magistrate and superior court both controlled access to the files.
Id.
15. Id.
16. See Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 518, 862 P.2d at 794, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794; see also
id. at 537-38, 862 P.2d at 807-08, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807-08 (Mosk, J. & Kennard, J.
separately dissenting).
17. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 523, 862 P.2d at 797, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
18. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148
(1976) (setting forth the rule that evidence derived from new and scientific methods is
not admissible unless it is shown that the procedure is not viewed with skepticism
within the scientific community); see 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific Evidence §§ 862-864 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the scientific basis and reliability of evidence of chemical and physical tests);
see also People v. Stoli, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1155-61, 783 P.2d 698, 707-14, 265 Cal. Rptr.
111, 120-26 (1989). For the origination of this evidentiary standard, see Frye v. United
States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 523-24, 862 P.2d at 797-98, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-98. The
prosecution's latent print analyst isolated a fingerprint that was found on a role of
tape the police seized at the scene of the crime, and without physically altering it,
produced a photographic image of the print that matched a sample print from the
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court concluded that because the procedure provided an image "whose
existence, appearance, nature, and meaning" was clear to a lay jury, it
was not subject to a Kelly analysis.nO
The defendant also challenged the trial court's decision to reject his
alternative motion to suppress the gun that the prosecution offered as
the murder weapon.2 He argued that the police had failed to adequately
preserve evidence.' The court stated that the police's duty under
Californiav. Trombetta' only applies to material evidence. To be material, the evidence must possess exculpatory value that is evident before
its destruction, and be so uniquely critical to a defendant's case that the
defendant could not obtain comparable evidence.' The United States
Supreme Court recently added the requirement that the defendant must
show police bad faith in the demise of the evidence to prove there was a
failure to preserve evidence.'
In the instant case, the court reasoned that the police did not intentionally expose the gun to destructive forces, but merely left it at the
crime scene." The court found that the gun was not material to the
drug related arrest because it was not until sometime later that the de-

defendant.
20. Id. By so deciding the court avoided discussing the relatively new conflict between the "Kelly Test" (or the federal "Frye Test") and the high court's recent opinion
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). For a thorough and timely review of the this issue and related concerns, see William P. Haney,
Comment, Scientific Evidence in the Age of Daubert: A Proposalfor a Dual Standard
of Admissibility in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 PEPP. L REV. 1391 (1994).
21. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 518-19, 862 P.2d at 794, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794. Prior to investigating the defendant for the murder, the police arrested the defendant and Sharon
at Sharon's home for entirely unrelated drug possession and sales crimes. At that time
the police discovered three hand guns and marked them as evidence, but accidentally
left one behind. Sharon was released, but the defendant was kept in jail due to a probation violation. Soon thereafter, before the police suspected the defendant, the defendant instructed Sharon to destroy the weapon that had been overlooked by the police.
Id. at 518-20, 862 P.2d at 794-95, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794-95.
22. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, (1984) (discussing police duty to preserve
evidence); see 3 B.E. WrrTKN, CAUFORNLA EVIDENCE, Introduction of Evidence at Trial
§§ 1791, 1791A, 1793 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the failure to gather evidence).
23. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
24. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 519, 862 P.2d at 795, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795 (citing
Tombetta, 467 U.S. at 479).
25: See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
26. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 519-20, 862 P.2d at 795, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
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fendant was suspected of the handgun killings, and because the defendant himself instructed Sharon White Bear to destroy the gun.' Applying the Trombetta test, the court concluded that because no proof of
police bad faith intent existed, and the evidence did not have exculpatory
value evident at the time the officers seized it, the officers' actions did
not constitute a failure to preserve evidence in the manner the high court
sought to prevent.'
The court next turned its attention to the defendant's penalty deliberation complaints. The defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his
motion to strike evidence of a prior felony, one of the aggravating factors
employed in the selection phase,' because the defendant had knowingly
and intelligently waived his jury trial, confrontation, and self-incrimination rights when he pled guilty to the prior criminal charge.' Although
there was no transcript of the guilt plea hearing, the "Stipulation of Evidence" and the "Waiver of Jury" documents signed by the defendant
contained express statements waiving these rights.3 Thus, the court
concluded that the "documentary record of the prior proceeding" established that the defendant knowingly waived his rights, and therefore the
sentencer properly considered the prior conviction.'
The defendant also questioned the penalty selection phase regarding
aggravating and mitigating factors.Y He requested that the inapplicable
mitigating factors be struck from the jury instructions' and argued that
certain of the aggravating factors were unconstitutionally vague.'

27. Id.
28. See id.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(c) (West 1988).
30. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 531-32, 862 P.2d at 803, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803 (citing
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); In re Tall, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81
Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969) establishing that a court must expressly advise defendants, on the
record, of the Boykin/Tahl rights; see 4 B.E. WITIGN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL LAw, Proceedings Before Trial §§ 2149-2150, 2157-2158 (1989 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing the requirements for a valid plea in felony cases and admonitions required);
21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2816-2817 (1985 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the necessity that the defendant's plea be voluntary and advice to the defendant).
31. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 532, 862 P.2d at 803, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 532-33, 862 P.2d at 804, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 535, 862 P.2d at 806, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806. The questioned aggravating
factors were "circumstances of the crime" and "age." Id. For a more thorough discussion of the various factors considered in the California death penalty statutory scheme,
see Richard E. Wirick, Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant, Barclay, and Harris, 17 U.C. DAvis L REV. 689 (1984). The defendant
also complained that the prosecution, in closing arguments, inappropriately told the
jury that an absence of mitigating evidence was an aggravating factor. Although ac-
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The defendant cited Stringer v. Black,' which he argued might be
construed as extending the Eighth Amendment vagueness analysis, that
is generally applied to the special circumstances phase, to the aggravating factors set forth in the penalty selection phase." The vagueness
analysis, however, has traditionally been limited to the factors in death

sentencing statutes that serve to narrow the acts which qualify an offender for capital punishment.' But until Stringer's arguably narrow ruling,
the test had not been applied to subsequent sentence selection unless the
two functions of narrowing and selection were insufficiently separate.3
Referring to its opinion in Bacigalupo II, issued at the same time as
Webb, the court rejected the defendant's claim that the individual sentencing factors enumerated in section 190.3 were unconstitutionally
vague. ' It should also be noted that the United States Supreme Court
recently upheld California's sentence selection factors against a similar

vagueness challenge."'
In addressing the defendant's claim that the jury should not be informed of any inapplicable mitigating factors, the court stated that
"'[s]entencing discretion is best guided where the jury is fully apprised of
the factors which the state deems relevant to the penalty determination.'"42 The court reasoned that it is the jury's function to determine
which factors apply when considering the weight of the factors either for

knowledging that such a statement constitutes incorrect law, the court explained that,
'in actuality, the prosecution instructed the jury that "the opposite was true." Webb, 6
Cal. 4th at 533, 862 P.2d at 804, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804. The court also explained that
the prosection correctly instructed the jury not to weigh the number of factors, but
rather their value, as the jury saw fit to assign each factor. Thus, the court held that
the prosecution did not use an "improper 'arithmetical approach.'" Id.; see People v.
Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985), rev'd, California v.
Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1989).
36. 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
37. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 535, 862 P.2d at 806, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806.
38. See People v. Bacigalupo (Bacigalupo If), 6 Cal. 4th 457, 862 P.2d 808, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 808 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2782 (1994).
39. Id.
40. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 535, 862 P.2d at 806, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806 (rejecting the
broad application of Stringer to all capital statutes that weigh aggravating against mitigating factors; choosing, rather, to view Stringer as limited to only those statutes that
insufficiently distinguish between narrowing and selection phases).
41. Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630 (1994).
42. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 532-33, 862 P.2d at 804, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 804 (quoting
People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 653, 798 P.2d 849, 868-69, 274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 271-72
(1990)).
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or against a death sentence. Thus, the court concluded that the jury
should be able to consider the possibility that a defendant's act lacked
justification for a more lenient sentence when compared to other similar
acts under different circumstances.'
The court considered a number of other issues raised by the defendant. As is the "nature of the beast" with automatic appeals from death
penalty verdicts, not all the claims raised by the defendant were worthy
of significant review. Therefore, the defendant's arguments regarding
venue," corpus delicti, ' sufficiency of the evidence," probable cause
for the search warrant, 7 the preemptory judicial challenge,' as well as
Miranda and Sixth Amendment right to counsel claims,' merited only
routine examination from the supreme court which agreed with the trial
court's application of well-settled legal principles.
In his dissent, Justice Mosk questioned the majority's brief dismissal of
the defendant's objection to the standard instruction defining reasonable
doubt.' Justice Mosk simply renewed: (1) his long standing assertion
that the "unnecessarily confusing" definition of reasonable doubt within
the standard instruction violates due process, and (2) his suggestion that
the definition be deleted by the legislature so that the standard would
read as it did from 1850 to 1927.51
Both Justices Mosk and Kennard criticized the majority's assertion in
dictum that the Ritchie compulsory discovery mechanism did not apply
to the prosecution witness's psychotherapy records.' Justice Kennard
questioned the majority's reasoning that Ritchie was inapplicable because the records were not in the prosecution's "possession."' Instead,

43. See People v. Whitt, 51 Cal. 3d 620, 653, 798 P.2d 849, 868-69, 274 Cal. Rptr.

252, 271-72 (1990).
44. Webb,
45. Id. at
46. Id. at
47. Id. at
48. Id. at
49. Id. at
50. Id. at

6 Cal. 4th at 514-15, 862 P.2d at 791-92, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791-92.
529-31, 862 P.2d at 802-03, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802-03.
528-29, 862 P.2d at 801-02, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-02.
521, 862 P.2d at 796, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796.
522-23, 862 P.2d at 797, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
525, 862 P.2d at 798-99, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798-99.
537, 862 P.2d at 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807 (Mosk, J., concurring and

dissenting).
51. Id.; see also CALIIC No. 2.90 (1979); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994).
52. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th at 537-38, 862 P.2d at 807-08, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807-08 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting, & Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
53. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk provided only a brief
comment in disagreement. He took contention with the majority's intimation that the
term "government," as used in Ritchie, did not encompass records that were not developed or created in the course of a criminal investigation. Id. at 537, 862 P.2d at 807,
24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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she argued that the emphasis is more appropriately placed on whether
the evidence is material and favorable to the accused,' in conjunction
with the provision for an in camera review of the records as a precautionary privacy measure.
III.

IMPACT

The decision in Webb, beyond the consequence to the defendant, is not
likely to have a significant impact. The reasoning that pertains to the
Ritchie standard for production of psychiatric records is notable. However, this standard is not relied upon for the court's ultimate conclusion.
Thus, it provides only questionable authority upon which the prosecution
might rely in the future. The only other noteworthy commentary appears
in the court's affirmation of its Bacigalupo II holding that the California
death penalty statute is constitutionally viable. However, it is only a brief
reference that adds nothing to the rationale set forth in Bacigalupo II,
and has been resolved, largely, by the United States Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Thilaepa.

BRIAN D. JONES

54. Id. at 537-38, 862 P.2d at 807, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807 (Kennard, J. concurring
and dissenting) (citing numerous California case authorities).
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VI. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Under section 21160 of the CaliforniaEnvironmental Quality Act, the Department of Forestry is authorized to require that timber harvesting plans include information not specified within the Board of
Forestry rules; the Board of Forestry's approval of a
plan, absent such information, is subject to judicial
review under the abuse of discretion standard:
Sierra Club v. State Board of Forestry.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sierra Club v. State Board of Forestry,' the California Supreme
Court considered two issues. First, the court considered whether the
Department of Forestry (Department) has authority to request information not specified in the California Board of Forestry rules when it is
evaluating a timber harvesting plan (THP).2 Second, the court considered
whether the Board of Forestry (Board) abused its discretion by approving a THP that lacked the information requested by the Department.'
The court held that the Department has the authority to request any
information considered necessary to determine whether a THP will significantly affect the environment.' The court further held that the Board
abused its discretion by approving a THP that lacked such information.'

1. 7 Cal. 4th 1215, 876 P.2d 505, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19 (1994). Justice Baxter wrote
the unanimous opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Kennard, Arabian,
George and Werdeger concurring. Id. at 1219-37, 876 P.2d at 507-19, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
21-33.
2. Id. at 1227-35, 876 P.2d at 513-18, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-32. Although the court
noted that, prior to review of this case, the California Board of Forestry (Board) rules
were amended to authorize the Department of Forestry's (Department) request for information pertaining to the presence of old-growth-dependent species. It determined
that the issue was not moot because the amendment did not address the Department's
authority to request other types of information. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1227-28, 876
P.2d at 513, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27; see CAL CODE REGS., tit. 14 § 1034, subd. (w)
(1994).
3. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1235-37, 876 P.2d at 518-19, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32-33.
The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection and the State Board of Forestry are
the two state agencies responsible for regulating California timber harvesting operations
in accordance with the Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973. See generally CAL
PUB. RES. CODE §§ 4511-4592 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the provisions of
the Forest Practice Act). The board is responsible for reviewing the department's decisions and ensuring that all THPs adhere to the Forest Practice Act and board rules
and regulations. CAL PuB. RES. CODE § 4582.7 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
4. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1228, 876 P.2d at 513, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
5. Id. at 1220, 876 P.2d at 508, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22.
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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On February 16, 1988, the Department received two THPs from the
Pacific Lumber Company (Pacific Lumber).' The Department returned
one of them, requesting Pacific Lumber to conduct additional wildlife
surveys in the area and resubmit the THP with the results.7 Pacific Lumber refused to conduct additional surveys on the grounds that such information exceeded the requirements set forth by the Board's rules.' Despite Pacific Lumber's refusal to submit additional information, the Board
accepted the THPs for filing on March 3.
On March 11 and March 21, the Department of Fish and Game (Fish
and Game) and Pacific Lumber conducted joint pre-harvest inspections
of the area.'" Subsequently, Fish and Game prepared a report recommending that the THP include mitigation measures to maintain adequate
old-growth habitat for species present in the area." But Fish and Game
could not recommend the nature and extent of the mitigation measures
until additional surveys were conducted to determine the existence of six
particular species in the area. 2 As a result, Fish and Game also re-

6. Id. at 1221, 876 P.2d at 508, 32 .Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22. Pacific Lumber was seeking
the Department's approval to log "virgin old-growth redwood" timber in an area covering a total of three hundred and nineteen acres in Humboldt County. Id.; see Ruth
McLay, The Timber Harvest Plan Exemption from the California Environmental Quality Act: Due Process and Statutory Intent, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 727 (1990) (discussing the
harmful clear-cutting policies adopted after Maxxam Corp. took over Pacific Lumber in
1985).
7. Both the Department and the Department of Fish and Game (Fish and Game)
considered the surveys necessary to determine whether the operation would have a
significant adverse effect on the following old-growth-dependent species: the goshawk,
the Olympic salamander, the tailed frog, the red tree vole, the Pacific fisher, the spotted owl, and the marbled murrelet. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1222, 876 P.2d at 509, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23.
8. Id. at 1222, 876 P.2d at 509, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1223, 876 P.2d at 510, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. Prior to the inspections, the
Department sent another letter to Pacific Lumber including Fish and Game's request
for the same information the Department had requested. Id. at 1222-23, 876 P.2d at
509, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23.
11. Id. at 1223, 876 P.2d at 510, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. Fish and Game's report concluded that the plan, as submitted, would not "provide and maintain" an adequate habitat for the species present in the area and would, therefore, result in significant impact
on those species. Id. at 1223, 876 P.2d at 510, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24.
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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quested Pacific Lumber to conduct additional surveys.'3 Pacific Lumber
refused to conduct any additional surveys. 4
On April 19, the department rejected both THPs as incomplete due to
Pacific Lumber's refusal to conduct the requested surveys. On May 20,
Pacific Lumber appealed the Department's decision to the Board.'" After
a hearing on the matter, the Board approved the THPs on June 8, overturning the Department's decision. 7 On June 16, the Sierra Club and the
Environmental Protection Information Center, Inc. filed "a petition for
writ of mandate seeking an order to compel the board to withdraw its
approval of [the THPs]." 8 On October 23, 1989, the trial court denied
the petition for writ of mandate. 9 The court of appeal reversed the trial
court's ruling.' Pacific Lumber filed a petition for review, which the
California Supreme Court granted on June 11, 1992.21

III.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The Department Has the Authority to Request Information Not
Specified in the Board's Rules

The California Supreme Court began its analysis of this case with a
discussion of the Forest Practice Act, its purpose and goals, and the

13. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1223, 876 P.2d at 510, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. Pacific
Lumber provided some information on the tailed frog and the Olympic salamander, but
without additional surveys regarding the other species, Fish and Game could not make
an appropriate recommendation as to what mitigation measures should be implemented.
Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The Department considered the THPs materially incomplete because they
neither confirmed nor denied the existence of the remaining species in the plan area.
Id.
16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Board's appellate review of Department decisions and any order pursuant to such power is an adjudicatory function
subject to judicial review. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
17. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1224, 876 P.2d at 510, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. The
Board found that the THPs "were 'in conformance with the rules and regulations.'" Id.
at 1224, 876 P.2d at 510, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24. The Board reasoned that the information on the record proved adequate to assess mitigation measures and that requiring
additional surveys, based on speculation that certain species might exist in the area,
was unreasonable. Id. at 1224, 876 P.2d at 510-11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24-25.
18. Id. at 1224, 876 P.2d at 511, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25.
19. Id. at 1225, 876 P.2d at 511, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25.
20. Id.; see Sierra Club v. Department of Forestry, 225 Cal. App. 3d 537, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 243 (1st Dist. 1990) (reversing and remanding with instructions to issue the writ
of mandate that the Board rescind its approval of the THPs).
21. Sierra Club v. California Bd. of Forestry, 832 P.2d 146, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834
(1992).
22..Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1226, 876 P.2d at 512, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26. "The
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respective roles that the Board and the Department play in achieving
those goals.' The court stated that neither the Forest Practice Act nor
the Board rules expressly authorizes the Department to request information not specified in the rules. 4
However, the court noted the Board specifically imposes upon the Department the obligation to disapprove plans that fail to incorporate mitigating measures that "substantially lessen significant adverse impacts on
the environment. "' The court reasoned that it would be impossible for
the Department to discharge this duty without the ability to request information necessary to identify the adverse impact.' Accordingly, the
court concluded that the Board impliedly vests the Department with the
authority to seek whatever information is necessary to determine whether a THP will have a significant impact on the environment.'
More importantly, the court concluded that section 21160 of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) expressly vests the Department with the authority to request information necessary to identify a

purpose of the Forest Practice Rules is to implement the provisions of the Z'bergNejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 in a manner consistent with . . . the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) of 1970." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 896 (1994). For
a thorough discussion of the Zberg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act, see Regulation of
Private Logging in California, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 139 (1975) (concluding that the Act did
not radically depart from prior law); see also REVIEW OF SELECTED 1973 LEGISLATION, 5
PAC. U. 420 (1974) (surveying the Z'berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act and discussing
the legislative intent behind the Act).
23. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1226, 876 P.2d at 512, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26. The
court recognized that the Forest Practice Act grants the Board power to adopt sitespecific rules and regulations to achieve the twin goals of controlling harvesting of
commercial forests while protecting the environment The Department is responsible for
reviewing THPs and ensuring that they adhere not only with the legislative requirements but also with any additional requirements expressly specified in the board's rules
and regulations. Id. For a general discussion of California legislation dealing with management of forest products, see 4 B.E. WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 83 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1994).
24. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1228, 876 P.2d at 513, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
25. Id.
26. Id. In this case, the significant adverse impact was the potential loss of habitat
of several species. Id. at 1221, 876 P.2d at 508, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
27. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1228, 876 P.2d at 513, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77.
28. CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21193 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994). For administrative regulations mandated for the implementation of CEQA, see CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
14, §§ 15000-15387 (1990).
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plan's environmental impact.' The court noted the language of section
21160, which provides in part:
[Wihenever any person applies to any public agency for a lease, permit, license,
certificate, or other entitlement for use, the public agency may require that person
to submit data and information which may be necessary to enable the public
agency to determine whether the proposed project may have a significant effect
on the environment or to prepare an environmental impact report.'

The court reached its conclusion based on the fundamental assumption that since CEQA applies to all state agencies including the Department, the process of reviewing and approving THPs must comply with
both the Forest Practice Act and CEQA.3"
Acknowledging that CEQA's application to the timber industry is an
issue frequently visited in the courts, Justice Baxter explained the court's
conclusion in detail.' At the root of the controversy over CEQA's application to the timber industry is a certification procedure that exempts
certain regulatory processes from CEQA's provisions.' Under this process, the THP regulatory "scheme" is exempt from several CEQA provisions.' However, the court explained that the THP exemption is only a
partial, and not a complete, exemption from CEQA's provisions.' The

29. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1228, 876 P.2d at 513, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27; see also
Lynn Considine Cass, Validity, Construction, and Application of Statutes Requiring
Assessment of Environmental Information Prior to Grants of Entitlements for Private
Land Use, 76 A.L.R.3D 388 (1977) (discussing applicability of CEQA to timber harvesting industry).
30. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1228, 876 P.2d at 513, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27 (quoting
CAL. PuS. RES. CODE § 21160).
31. Id.; see also Gallegos v. State Bd. of Forestry, 76 Cal. App. 3d 945, 952, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 86, 90 (1978) (holding that timber harvesting operations are subject to CEQA);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App. 3d 959, 131
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1976) (holding that application of CEQA to the timber industry is not
redundant despite the similar aims of CEQA and the Forest Practice Act).
32. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1228-30, 876 P.2d at 513-15, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-29.
33. Id. at 1230, 876 P.2d at 514, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28. The Secretary of Resources
has statutory power to exempt from the preparation of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) any state agency regulatory program that requires the preparation and review of a document that is functionally equivalent to an EIR. Id.; see also CAL PUB.
RES. CODE § 21080.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (providing that a written plan-required
by a regulatory scheme may be submitted in lieu of a required EIR in some circumstances).
34. In 1976, the Secretary of Resources expressly exempted the THP process from
the provisions in CEQA's chapters 3, 4, and § 21167. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1230,
876 P.2d at 514-15, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28-29.
35. Id. The court found it significant that at the time of the enactment of the Forest
Practice Act the legislature temporarily exempted the THP process from CEQA's provisions for a period of a year but later failed to adopt several bills designed to provide
a permanent exemption. Id. at 1231 n.4, 876 P.2d at 515 n.4, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29
n.4.
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court, applying the "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" 36 maxim of
statutory construction, refused to imply additional exemptions. 7 As a
result, Justice Baxter found that the specific exemptions do not preclude
the application of CEQA's remaining provisions to timber harvesting.'
The court concluded that the THP process is not exempt from CEQA's
section 21160, meaning the Department has the authority to require information "necessary" to determine whether a THP will have a "significant"
effect on the environment.'
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro and several other Amici Curiae joined Pacific Lumber in arguing that Public Resources Code section 4582.75 "precludes the department from requesting information not expressly specified in the forest practice rules."' Section 4582.75 provides: "The rules
adopted by the board shall be the only criteria employed by the [Department] when reviewing [THPs] pursuant to section 4582.7. " 41 After clarifying that "a request for information is not a criterion for reviewing a
[THP], but is instead a prerequisite to the application of the criteria", the
court rejected Pacific Lumber's argument with respect to section
4582.75. 42

36. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).

37. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1230, 876 P.2d at 515, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29. See
generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Validity, Construction, and Application of Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531-1543), 32 A.L.R. FED. 332, § 5 (1977 &
Supp. 1994) (providing an example of the United States Supreme Court's application of
the maxim within the context of the Endangered Species Act).
38. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1230, 876 P.2d at 515, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29; see also
Californians for Native Salmon Assn. v. Department of Forestry, 221 Cal. App. 3d 1419,
1422, 271 Cal. Rptr. 270-71 (1990) (holding that CEQA is considered part of the Forest
Practice Act and fully applies to timber harvesting with the exception of a few procedural requirements relating to the EIR); Environmental Protection Info. Ctr., Inc. v.
Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d 604, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1985) (holding that partial exemptions from CEQA's EIR requirement do not exempt the industry from adhering to
CEQA as a whole).
39. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1231, 876 P.2d at 515, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29. For the
express language of § 21160, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
40. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1231, 876 P.2d at 516, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29.
41. Id. (quoting CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 4582.75 (1984 & Supp. 1994)).
42. Id. at 1232-33, 876 P.2d at 516, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30. The court explained that
the purpose of § 4582.75 was to limit the Department's incorporation of mitigation
measures to those based on the Board's rules, not to hamstring the Department's power to compel the production of relevant information. Id. at 1233-34, 876 P.2d at 516-17,
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30-31; see CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 4582.75; cf. CAL CODE REGS., tit.
14, § 898.1 (c)(1) (stating that the Director should disapprove plans that do not incor-
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The court also rejected the argument that permitting the Department
to require information not specified in the rules violates the time frame
provisions requiring speedy pre-harvest inspections and review of
THPs.' The court reasoned that these sections do not apply until after
the Department makes the threshold determination that the THP is complete.'
Therefore, the court concluded that the department's exercise of its
"information gathering powers" does not violate the time frames established in sections 4582.7 and 4604 of the California Public Resources
Code.'
B.

The Board Abused Its Discretion

Concluding that the Department possessed the authority to request
information not specified in the Board's rules and regulations, the court
considered the Board's approval of the THP under the circumstances.'
The court noted that under the abuse of discretion standard of review,
"[oinly if the manner in which an agency failed to follow the law is
shown to be prejudicial, or is presumptively prejudicial as when the department or board fails to comply with mandatory procedures, must the
decision be set aside."47 The court then reasoned that the Board's approval of the THP, based solely on the information already on the record,
and without the additional data requested by the Department, constituted
a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of CEQA.' The court

porate procedures designed to lessen the adverse impact on the environment).
43. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1234-35, 876 P.2d at 517-18, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31-32;
see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4582.7 (requiring Department review of a THP within
15 days of pre-harvest inspection); CAL PuB. RES. CODE § 4604 (requiring pre-harvest
inspection within ten days of filing of a THP).
44. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1235, 876 P.2d at 518, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32; see also
CAL CODE REGS., tit. 14, § 1037 (granting the Department ten days from time of submission of a THP to determine if it is complete); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4582.7 (providing that the Director has fifteen days from when the inspection is complete or the
determination is made that no inspection is needed to review the plan for conformance
with regulations).
45. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1235, 876 P.2d at 518, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1236, 876 P.2d at 518, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32 (quoting Environmental Protection Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Johnson, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 622, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
For a discussion of the abuse of discretion standard in Federal Courts, see Michelle
Migdal Gee, What Standards Govern Appellate Review of Trial Courts, Conditional
Ruling, Pursuant to Rule 50(c)(1) Of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure On Party's
Motion For New Trial, 52 A.L.R. FED. 494 (1993).
48. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1236, 876 P.2d at 518, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32. According to CEQA, the Board "shall" give "major consideration . . . to preventing environmental damage," CAL PuB. RES. CODE § 21000 (g), and "should not approve projects as
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found that such a failure to comply was prejudicial.' Accordingly, the
court affirmed the lower court's decision directing the Board to rescind
its approval of the timber harvesting plans.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court decided that section 21160 of CEQA grants the
Department authority to request information not specified in the Board's
rules whenever it is evaluating a THP as long as such information is
"necessary" to determine whether the THP will significantly affect the
environment. The court further decided that the Board's approval of a
THP that lacks such necessary information is an abuse of discretion. In
doing so, the court concluded that timber harvesting exemptions from
CEQA's environmental impact statement provisions do not preclude the
application of CEQA's remaining provisions to the THP process. This
decision clarifies the Department's authority favoring an informed decision-making approach that is consistent with the environmental policies
and goals identified by the legislature in both the Forest Practice Act and

CEQA.

JOSE ANTONIO EGURBIDE

proposed ...

if feasible mitigation measures [are] available." CAu

PUB. RES. CODE

§ 21002. In the instant case, although mitigating measures existed, the Department was
unable to recommend any of them without first identifying the THP's effect on all the
species in the area. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1236, 876 P.2d 518, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
32 (emphasis added). The record on which the Board relied contained no data whatsoever on four of the six old-growth-dependent species identified by Fish and Game. Id.
The record also reflected that neither the Department nor Fish and Game had made
any recommendations for mitigation measures. Id.
49. Id. at 1236-37, 876 P.2d at 519, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33; see also CAL CIv. PROC.
CODE § 1094.5 (stating that prejudicial abuse of discretion is established "if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law").
50. Sierra Club, 7 Cal. 4th at 1237, 876 P.2d at 519, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
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VII. EVIDENCE
The Kelly-Frye "general acceptance" standard remains the rule for admissibility of novel scientific
evidence: People v. Leahy.
I. INTRODUCTION
If People v. Leahy' is not the most significant case reviewed by the
California Supreme Court this year, it is at least the most widely anticipated case in quite some time.2 In Leahy, the California Supreme Court
considered whether to replace the existing standard for admissibility of
novel scientific evidence, that of general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community,' with the much looser relevancy standard established in 1993 by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' In a six-to-one decision, the California Supreme Court decided to retain the Kelly-Frye general acceptance standard.5

1. 8 Cal. 4th 587, 882 P.2d 321, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (1994). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, George, and
Werdegar. Justice Baxter wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 613, 882 P.2d at
337, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679.
2. Most of the media attention given to this case stems from Leahy's impact on
the admissibility of DNA evidence in the O.J. Simpson murder trial. People v. Orenthal
James Simpson, BA 097211 (L.A. Super. Ct. 1995). Newspapers and magazines have
printed numerous articles in anticipation of Leahy's impact on DNA testing. See, e.g.,
Harriet Chiang, State Court Won't Relax DNA Rules; 6-1 Decision Will Be Factor in
O.J. Case, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 1994, at Al (discussing the impact of Leahy on DNA
evidence and the O.J. Simpson trial); Harriet Chiang, Justices Consider Easing Admission of DNA Tests, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1994, at A3 (anticipating the court's decision
and its possible impact on the O.J. Simpson trial); Maura Dolan, Court Upholds Scientific Evidence Rule, LA. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at A3 (addressing the impact of the
decision on DNA evidence and noting that the supreme court "took the unusual step
of issuing a summary of its opinion to reporters"); Richard C. Paddock, Court Hears
Case Pivotal to DNA Tests, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at BI (explaining Leahy's potential application to the Simpson trial).
3. The general acceptance standard was originally established in the 1923 landmark
federal case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and was adopted in
California in People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
Hence, the general acceptance rule in California is called the Kelly-frye rule. See generally, 2 B.E. WITKIN CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific
Evidence § 864 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing the application of the KellyFrye rule and listing other sources addressing this issue). However, now that Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) has overruled Frye, the
more current and proper description of the California law is simply the Kelly rule.
4. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
5. Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th at 591, 882 P.2d at 323, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673. California is
not the only state to refuse to adopt the Daubert relevancy standard on state law
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Although Leahy clearly will affect the courts, it is unclear if the impact
will be significant. In more established sciences, such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis,8 the decision may not be as significant as some
imagine. Leahy's true impact will likely be felt on the fringes-the borderland of science and scientific theory.7 Under the Kelly-Frye standard,
to be admissible, a new scientific technique must undergo peer review
and testing and gain general acceptance! This process of moving from
the experimental stage to the demonstrable stage takes time. Therefore,
scientific techniques in the process of passing through this stage will

grounds. See State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 45-46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting
Daubert in light of the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1989 reaffirmation of Frye, stating,
"It is for our supreme court, not this court, to decide Daubert's impact in Minnesota");
State v. Dean, 523 N.W.2d 681, 692 (Neb. 1994) ("Daubert does not apply to state
court decisions. The increasing prevalence of expert evidence cautions against the admission of scientific evidence which is still' the subject of dispute and controversy in
the relevant scientific communities. [Citations omitted.] We thus adhere to the Frye
standard . . . ."); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 n.2 (N.Y. 1994) (noting that
Daubert applies only to federal courts and declining to adopt its more relaxed standard).
6. The forensic use of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) involves: (1) the collection of
biological evidence samples from a crime scene; (2) a comparison of those samples to
samples from a known individual, usually the suspect or the victim; and (3) if a match
is indicated, a laboratory calculation of the statistical probability that the sample found
at the crime scene came from the same individual as the known sample.
7. By scientific theory, the author means scientific techniques that are so new it is
difficult to assess whether they are legitimate techniques suitable for demonstrable use
in court. In Prye v. United States, the court addressed this situation by stating:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D. C. Cir. 1923); see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1977))
("The general acceptance standard also safeguards against the possible prejudicial effects of testimony based upon 'an unproved hypothesis in an isolated experiment.'");
2 STEPHEN A. SALTEBURG E' AL, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANuAL, Rule 702, at *5
(6th ed. 1994) available in LEXIS, GENFED Library, FREMAN file ("The difference
wrought by Daubert will probably be felt at the margin.").
8. See iqfr notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Kelly-Frye standard
in more detail).
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likely not be admissible, even though they may in fact prove to be reliable.
By contrast, the federal relevancy standard avoids this "cultural lag""
by allowing a judge to determine whether the particular method is reliable, with general acceptance being only one factor considered."° Therefore, by retaining the Kelly-Frye standard, it is possible, even likely, that
situations will occasionally arise in which courts exclude otherwise reliable evidence because the evidence has not had time to receive general
acceptance. This is where Leahy's impact will be felt, and not surprisingly, is one of the major criticisms of the general acceptance standard."
As for scientific evidence that has moved beyond the experimental
stage and has become more established in the relevant scientific community, Leahy's affirmation of Kelly will likely prove to be less outcomedeterminative, although still providing additional hoops through which
proponents of scientific evidence must leap. The forensic use of DNA
best exemplifies this fact. Although the forensic use of DNA is still relatively young," there can be little doubt that DNA is now admissible in
both Frye and Daubert jurisdictions.'3 Therefore, as this Note demonstrates, all of the hype and anticipation of Leahy's impact on DNA admissibility will prove to be much ado about nothing.
The purpose of this Note is to survey the decision in People v. Leahy
and present an analysis of its impact, particularly on the use of forensic
DNA evidence in court. Part II provides a summary of the historical
background of the case, analyzing the creation of the general acceptance

9. Courts and commentators have used this term as a criticism of the time necessary for an otherwise reliable science to be reviewed by the relevant scientific community and thereby gain general acceptance. See, e.g., Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th at 602, 882
P.2d at 330, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672 (citing People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1156, 783
P.2d 698, 710, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 123 (1989)) (referring to the "'considerable lag' between scientific advances and their admission as evidence").
10. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing the factors judges consider in assessing reliability under the Daubert relevancy standard).
11. See, e.g., Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th at 626, 882 P.2d at 34546, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687-88
(Baxter, J., dissenting) (stating that Kelly's conservatism is "of no benefit to the defendant who is convicted and sentenced to death when probative and even crucial evidence is excluded" because the evidence has yet to meet with general acceptance).
The commentator most associated with criticisms of Frye is Professor Paul C.
Gianneli. His article, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half Century Later, 80 CoLUM. L REV. 1197 (1980), is a must for serious students of the relevancy/general acceptance debate. Professor Giannelli outlines the various criticisms of frye and concludes that the Frye test "has proved unworkable." Id.
at 1250.
12. DNA was used for the first time in a United States court in 1988. Andrews v.
State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (admitting DNA evidence).
13. See infra notes 97-164 and accompanying text.

1276

[Vol. 22: 1175, 19951

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

test in Frye v. United States, its adoption in California, and the United
States Supreme Court's subsequent abandonment of Frye in Daubert v.
4
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.'
Part Ill summarizes the factual setting
6
of Leahy" while Part IV addresses the court's near-unanimous affirmation of the Kelly-Frye general acceptance standard. 6 Part V discusses
the impact of the court's decision in detail, 7 focusing on the current
status of DNA admissibility in California. Although California appellate
courts are split on whether DNA is admissible, 9 the current status of
the scientific debate clearly warrants admission of both restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) and polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
DNA typing results using the product rule rather than the ceiling principle.' Finally, this Note concludes that the court's decision in Leahy was
the right decision."' Although the general acceptance standard has received criticism from many sources, the Daubert alternative is equally
problematic. Kelly-Frye is deeply ingrained in California law.' Dismissal
of it would have been dismissal of a standard that, while not perfect,
does provide a conservative means of filtering new and novel scientific
evidence through those best suited to assess its reliability---experts, not
judges.

14. See infra notes 23-51 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 61-88 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 97-164 and accompanying text A detailed discussion of the scientific techniques and procedures used in DNA typing is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a thorough description of these procedures, see People v. Barney, 8 Cal.
App. 4th 798, 805-10, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 734-37 (1992); Kamuin T. MacKnight, The
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): The Second Generation of DNA Analysis Methods
Takes the Stand, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 287, 294-308 (1993);
Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84
A.LR.4th 313, 318-23 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
19. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 129-51 and accompanying text (discussing recent developments
in the admissibility of DNA).
21. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text
22. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 51-52, 641 P.2d 775, 794-95, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,
263 (1982) (noting that California courts have invoked Kelly-Ptye to determine the
admissibility of polygraph examinations, truth serum, Nalline testing, experimental systems of blood typing, voiceprint analysis, human bite marks, and microscopic identification of gunshot residue particles), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
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II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND2

A. Establishment of the General Acceptance Standard-Frye v. United
States
In Frye v. United States,u the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia established the standard for the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence in federal courts--the general acceptance standard.' Under
this test, any novel form of scientific evidence admitted into evidence
"must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs."'0 This test requires the trial
judge to determine, based on expert testimony, whether legitimate debate exists within the scientific community regarding the reliability of the
particular technology."' Although the true meaning of general acceptance is somewhat unclear,' it does not require a showing of universal
acceptance.' In California, subsequent cases have delineated that general acceptance means a "consensus," or the absence of public opposition
by "'scientists significant either in number or expertise. ' "'
In applying the general acceptance standard to a particular science or
technology, trial courts hold pre-trial in limine hearings at which expert
witnesses for both sides testify before the judge regarding the reliability
of the scientific test at issue. The judge determines whether the technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community based
on: (1) the expert testimony presented at the hearing; (2) prior judicial
opinions; and (3) publications in scientific and legal journals.' If the

23. Leahy's historical background is given here in brief form only. For a more expansive discussion of Frye and Daubert, including a survey of criticisms, see William
P. Haney, III, Comment, Scientific Evidence in the Age of Daubert' A Proposal for a
Dual Standard of Admissibility in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 PEPP. L.REv. 1391,
1394-1436 (1994).
24. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defendant appealed his second-degree
murder conviction after the trial court refused to allow expert testimony concerning a
systolic blood pressure deception test taken by the defendant. Id. at 1013.
25. Id. at 1014.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Giannelli, supra note 11, at 1210-11.
29. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 759 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
30. People v. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 1127, 1134, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (1987) (quoting People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 56, 641 P.2d 775, 797, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 266,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982)).
31. People v. Smith, 215 Cal. App. 3d 19, 25, 263 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1989) (stating
that courts may examine "California precedent, cases from other jurisdictions, and scientific literature to ascertain whether a particular technique is generally accepted"); see
also State v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960, 964 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (-There are
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technique is generally accepted, the evidence is admissible. Although the
Frye test has been criticized over the years,' it remains the most common standard among the states.'
B. People v. Kelly: CaliforniaAdopts the Frye GeneralAcceptance Test
California adopted a modified Frye standard in People v. Kelly. 4 The
Kelly-Frye test requires that the proponent of a new scientific technique
prove that the technique satisfies three criteria: (1) "the technique or
method [must be] sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in its field; (2) testimony with respect to the technique and its
application [must be] offered by a properly qualified expert; and (3) correct scientific procedures have been used in the particular case. "' As
these three elements demonstrate, Kelly did not leave Frye in its original
form. Rather, Kelly built upon Frye by requiring that the correct scientific procedures be used in the particular case.' This reliability requirethree methods of proving the general acceptance of newly discovered scientific principle or theory: (1) expert testimony, (2) authoritative scientific and legal writings, and
(3) judicial opinions.").
32. Frye has been widely debated in both commentaries and judicial opinions. See
generally United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233-39 (rejecting Frye "based on
the language and policies of the Federal Rules of Evidence"), affd, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d
Cir. 1985); Lawrence B. Ebert, Frye After Daubert The Role of Scientists in Admissibility Issues as Seen Through the Analysis of the DNA Profiling Cases, 1993 U. CHI.
L SCH. ROUNDTABLE 219, 244-53 (1993) (responding to criticisms of Frye and concluding that Frye is preferable to Daubert); Haney, supra note 23, at 1397-98 (summarizing
criticisms and benefits of Frye). Essentially, the criticisms are: (1) Frye is too conservative; (2) it produces inconsistent results; and (3) it was overruled by the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.
33. R. Stephen Kramer, Admissibility of DNA Statistical Data: A Proliferation of
Misconception, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 145, 156 (1993) ("The majority of state and federal
').
courts have used the standard set forth in Frye ....
34. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976). In Kelly, the court examined the general reliability of a voice print analysis used by police to identify the
defendant. Id. at 28, 549 P.2d at 1242-43, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 14647. The court concluded
that the voiceprint evidence was unreliable. Id. at 40, 649 P.2d at 1251, 130 Cal. Rptr.
at 155. See generally 2 B.E. WrrIuN CALFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative, Experimental
and Scientific Evidence § 864 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994) (discussing Kelly and collecting sources).
35. People v. Wash, 6 Cal. 4th 215, 242, 861 P.2d 1107, 1122, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421,
436 (1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 116 (1994); see also Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30, 549
P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148. See generally 2 B.E. WrrIN CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE,
Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific Evidence § 864 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1994).
36. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 20, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148. Other courts
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ment was later added to the federal approach in United States v. Two
37
Bulls.
C. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' and the
Promulgationof the FederalRules of Evidence
The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 acutely
focused the criticism of Frye in the federal courts. By design, the federal
rules are liberal in their admission of expert testimony.' Conversely,
-Fryeis conservative and even restrictive.' Since the federal rules do not
mention Frye, Many argued Frye had been superseded.4' Then, in 1993,
the debate over Prye's future in the federal courts came to an end with
42
the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert.
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court found that the Federal
Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.' Instead of the general acceptance

also use a similar modified Frye test. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
37. 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).
38. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). In Daubert, the plaintiff sued Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals to recover for birth defects allegedly caused by Bendectin, a drug
manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 2791.
39. Id. at 2794 (mentioning the "'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules") (quoting Beach
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)); see FED. R. EVID. 702; Saltzburg, supra note 7, at *5 ("[Fiederal rules 702 and 403 are written in terms of a presumption
of admissibility. . . ").
40. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (describing the general acceptance standard as
rigid and austere); Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 31, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (describing Frye as conservative and supporting "a posture of judicial caution"); Saltzburg,
supra note 7, at *5 (describing Frye as relatively exclusive and conservative).
41. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. To avoid the Frye/relevancy controversy, some
states have incorporated the Frye rule into their relevancy statutes. See, e.g., TENN. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (providing that "Tennessee law is consistent with
Frye"). However, subsequent Tennessee cases have noted that the inclusion of this
comment did not solve the confusion concerning which standard to apply. See State v.
Harris, 866 S.W.2d 583, 586-87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (noting disagreement as to
whether relevancy or Frye standard controls).
42. For a thorough, critical discussion of Daubert, see Robert G. Blomquist, Comment, The Dangers of 'Veneral Observations" on Expert Scientific Testimony: A Comment on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 KY. L.J. 703, 728 (1994)
(summarizing the Court's holding, projecting the impact of the decision, and concluding
that Daubert's "grasp ... exceeds its reach"). Some commentators have welcomed
Daubert. See Kimberly Ann Satterwhite, Note, Taking the Sizzle Out of the Frye Rule:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Opens the Door to Novel Expert Testimony,
28 U. RICH. L REV. 531 (1994) (concluding that Daubert should result in "more informed decisions" and should increase the efficiency of litigation). However, other commentators have noted that Daubert itself is open to many of the same criticisms as
Frye. See infra note 48.
43. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
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test, Daubert directs district court judges to act as gatekeepers for the
admission of novel scientific evidence." To do this, the trial court must
conclude, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, that the proposed
testimony constitutes "scientific ...knowledge [that] will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'
This requires the court to make "a preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology ... is scientifically valid and of whether
that reasoning methodology can properly be applied to the facts in issue."' To assess the reliability of novel scientific evidence under Rule
702, the Court instructed trial judges to consider: (1) whether the theory
or technique is capable of being or has been tested; (2) whether it has
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error in using a particular scientific technique and the standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether the 4theory
7
or technique is generally accepted in the particular scientific field.
Unfortunately, Daubert did not end the debate on the propriety of
Frye. In fact, many commentators have correctly noted that Daubert is,
in fact, open to many of the same criticisms.' Others have stressed that
the similarities between the Daubert factors and those commonly utilized
in Frye jurisdictions indicate that Daubert does not substantially change
the standard of admission.4' In terms of DNA admissibility, the two major differences between Frye and Daubert are: (1) Daubert requires a
consideration of error rates whereas Frye typically does not;' and (2) in

44. Id. at 2794-95.
45. Id. at 2794.
46. Id. at 2796.
47. Id. at 2796-97.
48. See Timothy B. Dyk & Greg A. Castanias, Daubert Doesn't End Debate on Experts, NAT'L .J.,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 17 (suggesting problems with Daubert's application
and noting that judges are the wrong people to assess the reliability of various sciences); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term, Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 258-64
(1993) (criticizing Daubert and noting that "judges lack the competence to carry out
the [gatekeeping role]") (hereinafter Leading Cases). Perhaps the greatest criticism of
Daubert is that it places judges in the position of scientists, requiring them to assess a
science's reliability rather than allowing the appropriate expert to do so. Id. "Ifthe
scientific community is in discord about whether a particular science has received
general acceptance, can judges be expected to have the competence necessary to determine whether the technique or theory is scientifically valid?" Id. at 261.
49. See Leading Cases, supra note 48, at 258 ("[Tihe similarity of the four Daubert
criteria to factors commonly utilized under Frye suggests that the practical impact of
the new test will be minimal.").
50. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 53 n.26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) ("Courts are admitting
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Frye jurisdictions, the debate over how to calculate the significance of a
genetic match goes toward the admissibility of the evidence, whereas in
Daubertjurisdictions, it goes toward the weight."
This series of events presented the California Supreme Court with a
dilemma. While California is still relying on Frye, the federal courts, in
which Frye originated, abandoned the standard. Does this not require
California to follow suit and abolish Kelly-Frye? The supreme court
granted review in People v. Leahy to answer this question.
III.

FACTS OF THE CASE

William Michael Leahy was pulled over for speeding.2 Upon observing
Leahy, the officer noted that Leahy's "face was flushed, his eyes were red
and watery, his speech was slurred, his balance was unsteady," and he
smelled of alcohol.' The officer proceeded to give Leahy a field sobriety
test, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test." The officer
concluded that Leahy failed the HGN test and subsequently arrested
him.' Leahy was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.'
At trial, Leahy moved in limine to exclude the HGN test results. 7 The
trial court denied the motion on the grounds that "Kelly-fre... is inapplicable because the nature of this test isn't a specific test for the determination of alcohol. "' The court of appeal reversed, concluding that
"[ilt was error to admit HGN evidence.., without a proper scientific
[Kelly-Frye] foundation."' The supreme court granted review on the
question of whether the Kelly-Frye standard should be modified pursuant
to Daubert.'

DNA test results from laboratories with no known or available error rates."); Barry C.
Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARIozo L. REV. 1959, 1967 (1994) ("Laboratory error
rate . . .has not been considered a Prye issue by the courts.").
51. See infra note 165.
52. People v. Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th 587, 592, 882 P.2d 321, 323, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663,
665 (1994).
53. Id.
54. Id. "An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from
side to side . . . is known as .. . HGN." Id. Alcohol is believed to increase the frequency and magnitude of HGN. Id.
55. Id. at 592, 882 P.2d at 324, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 593, 882 P.2d at 324, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666. HGN is merely a signal of
possible alcohol consumption. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 591, 882 P.2d at 323, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665.
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IV.

TREATMENT

A. Majority Opinion
1. Daubert Does Not Afford a Compelling Reason For Abandoning
Kelly
The court, discussing the adoption of the Kelly-Frye rule in California,
began by summarizing Kelly,1 Daubert,' and the applicable California
rules of evidence.' The court noted that California Evidence Code sections 350, 351 and 210, all dealing with admissibility of relevant evidence,
mirror the "'liberal' adnissibility provisions of federal law."' Therefore,
if adopted, Daubert would be compatible with the California rules. Although the court found nothing in the legislative history of the evidence
code to indicate an intent to include a general acceptance standard, the
court nevertheless concluded that "[n]o significant relevant developments
have occurred in this state since Kelly was decided to justify abandoning
its conclusions. Thus, the principle of stare decisis appears applicable
here, unless the criticism of the Frye doctrine persuades us otherwise. " '
Interestingly, both the defendant and the state urged the court to retain the KeUy-Frye standard.' In addition, numerous amici curiae briefs
supported the retention of Kelly.'7 After summarizing the arguments
made by the amici, and after acknowledging the criticisms of the KellyFrye standard, the court found it significant that it has had the opportunity to review and abandon Kelly on numerous occasions, but has never
done so.' Further, the legislature could have amended the evidence

61. Id. at 594-95, 882 P.2d at 324-25, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666-67.
62. Id. at 595-97, 882 P.2d at 325-27, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667-69.
63. Id. at 597-98, 882 P.2d at 327, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 669.
64. Id. at 597, 882 P.2d at 327, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 669. The pertinent California
Evidence Code sections dealing with expert testimony are §§ 720 and 802. Id. The
court also noted that these sections are equivalent to Federal Rule of Evidence § 702.
Id.
65. Id. at 599, 882 P.2d at 328, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 670.
66. Id.
67. Id. Other amidci curiae, however, supported Daubert, including the California District Attorneys Association. Id. "These amidci seem more concerned with the narrow
issue of the exclusion of DNA test evidence . . . than with the general question of the
retention of Kelly." Id.
68. Id. at 604, 882 P.2d at 331, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673.
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code if it so desired.' The court concluded that "the KeUy formulation
survived Daubert in this state, and that none of the above described
authorities critical of that formulation persuades us to reconsider or
modify it at this time."'m
2. HGN Testing is a New Scientific Technique Under Kelly 7'
The court next addressed whether the HGN test was a "'new scientific
technique' within the scope of the Kelly formulation."' Although law
enforcement has used HGN for more than thirty years, the court found
more persuasive the fact that other states have subjected HGN to Frye
m
with mixed results.'
Therefore, the court reasoned that HGN is "new"
or "novel" under Kelly-Frye.74 The court also found that HGN was a
"scientific" technique.' Because HGN is a new scientific theory, the
court concluded that HGN is subject to the general acceptance standard
of KeUy-Frye.6
3. A Police Officer's Testimony is Insufficient to Establish General
Acceptance'
Because the HGN test is subject to Kelly-Frye, expert testimony must
establish its general acceptance.' In the present case, only the arresting
police officer testified that the HGN test was properly administered at
the time of arrest.m The court found his testimony to be insufficient and
concluded that an officer's testimony "regarding the mere administration of the test is insufficient to meet the general acceptance standard
required by Kelly."u The court concluded that remand for a trial court
determination on the issue of HGN's general acceptance was appropriate.s 1

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73 Id. at 605-06, 882 P.2d at 332, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674. "To hold that a scientific
technique could become immune from Kelly scrutiny merely by reason of longstanding
and persistent use by law enforcement outside the laboratory or the courtroom, seems
unjustified." Id. at 606, 882 P.2d at 332, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674.
74. Id. at 606, 882 P.2d at 332, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675.
75. Id. at 606, 882 P.2d at 333, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675.
76. Id. at 607, 882 P.2d at 333-34, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676.
77. Id. at 608, 882 P.2d at 334, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676.
78. Id. at 612, 882 P.2d at 337, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679.
79. Id. at 609, 882 P.2d at 334, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 610, 882 P.2d at 335, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677. The court deemed a full
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B. Justice Baxter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Baxter dissented on the issues of whether the HGN test is a
novel scientific principle' and whether Kelly-Frye should be abolished.' Justice Baxter explained that "[o]ne need not be a rocket scientist to be able to observe and assess the reaction of the suspect."' In
other words, the testimony of trained officers who observe a suspect's
eyes during an HGN test should be admissible.'
Further, Justice Baxter disagreed with the Kelly-Frye formulation,
stating that the court lacks the power to exclude relevant evidence using
a "court made rule of evidence."' Justice Baxter argued that both the
evidence code and "The Victim's Bill of Rights" are liberal in the admissibility of evidence, whereas Kelly-Frye is not.' Attacking both the conservative nature of Kelly-Frye as well as the majority's misplaced lack of
confidence in the ability of trial judges to determine admissibility under a
Daubertstandard, Justice Baxter concluded that not only is HGN outside
the scope of Kelly-Frye, but that Kelly-Frye itself should be abandoned.'
V. IMPACT

A. Generally
Because California has operated under Kelly-Frye for over twenty
years, Leahy simply means it is business as usual in California.' Al-

trial unnecessary. Id. If the trial court determined that HGN is generally accepted, the
trial court must then reinstate the judgment. Id. If the trial court determined otherwise,
then a new trial would be appropriate. Id. The defendant unsuccessfully objected to
the limited remand order. Id. at 611, 882 P.2d at 336, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678.
82. Id. at 613, 882 P.2d at 337, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 614, 882 P.2d at 338, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 614-15, 882 P.2d at 338, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 624-25, 882 P.2d at 345, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 625-26, 882 P.2d at 345, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 626-29, 882 P.2d at 346-47, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 688-89 (Baxter, J., dis-

senting).
89. Because the California Supreme Court did not adopt Daubert, a discussion of
Daubert's impact is beyond the scope of this article. However, environmental litigation
will feel Daubert's wake, but no one can agree on just how much. For a discussion of
Daubert's effect on toxic tort law, see FuU Impact of 'Daubert' Ruling Discussed by
Speakers at N.Y. Bar Association Seminar, 8 Toxic L REP. 691 (1993), available in
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though Frye has been criticized for years, one should not quickly discount its propriety. The primary problem with the relevancy standard is
the awkward role in which it places judges, one for which they are not
well suited-that of scientific expert.' Under Daubert, judges must
make the determination as to whether a particular science is reliable. A
cursory reading of DNA texts and articles highlights the difficulty with
this position."' Some sciences are so intricate and specialized that judges truly may be unsuited to evaluate them. Kelly and Frye each recognized that fact.'
Additionally, in relevancy jurisdictions, judges will likely continue to
rely on experts to assist them in their determinations.' The problem
with this is that rather than having experts on both sides argue for or
against a particular technology, only one or two experts may ultimately
assist the judge and create a false impression of a technology's reliabili94
ty.
LEXIS, BNA Library, TOXICS file (discussing varying views of Daubert's impact and
suggesting that the impact will not be significant); George E. Berry & Jean Hobart, The
Ninth Circuit After Daubert The District Court as Evidentiary Gatekeeper, 9 Toxic L
REP. 639 (1994), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, TOXICS file (discussing post-Daubert
Ninth Circuit cases and Daubert's impact on them, including DNA, voiceprint analysis,
and a breast implant ruling, concluding that all district court admissibility holdings
have been affirmed on appeal); PractitionersDebate Impact of 'Daubert' on Evidence
Admitted in Environmental Cases, 7 Toxic L. REP. 1398 (1993), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, TOXICS file (presenting different views of Daubert's impact on environmental litigation).
90. This is perhaps the most powerful criticism of Daubert and a criticism not lost
on the dissenters in that opinion. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2786, 2800 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I do not think [Rule 7021 imposes
on [district judges] either the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists
in order to perform [the role of gatekeeper]."); see also People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,
31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 ("The requirement of general acceptance . . . assures that Those (sic) most qualified to assess the general validity of a
scientific method will have the determinative voice.'") (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
91. One court even admitted that it was unqualified to assess some aspects of the
DNA issue. State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 517 (Wash. 1993) (admitting that the court
"lack[s] the scientific expertise to either assess or explain the [NRC's] methodology").
92. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text. Further, allowing a judge to make a subjective determination of reliability
allows for more inconsistency than does Frye. What one judge finds reliable the next
may not.
93. See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va.) ('In making the threshold finding of fact, the court must usually rely on expert testimony."), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 908 (1990); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 n.19 (3d Cir. 1985)
(noting that a judge may appoint an expert to assist in his determination of scientific
reliability); Leading Cases, supra note 48, at 262 ("The general lack of judicial scientific competence means that courts' reliance on experts in some form is unavoidable.");
see also FED. R. EVID. 706 (providing for court-appointed experts).
94. Alan Dershowitz noted, in the context of formulating legal defenses, that "we
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In sum, despite the fact that Frye has been criticized, Daubertpresents
problems of its own. Kelly-Frye is a process with which California's trial
courts are familiar,' and it provides California with a conservative
means for filtering new scientific evidence into the courtroom. Furthermore, Kelly-Frye ensures more consistent opinions because the standard
is not dependent on the subjective viewpoint of the particular judge.'
Despite Kelly-Frye's shortcomings, the court's affirmation of the general
acceptance standard in Leahy should be welcomed.

must not be seduced by the jargon of experts, particularly 'experts' who are really
advocates for a particular position or worldview. New knowledge must prove its worth,
first empirically and then morally, before society is prepared to rely on it for important policy judgments." ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXcUSE 38 (1994). Although the
above quote is given in a different context, Professor Dershowitz properly recognizes
that one "expert" may have an opinion that is one-sided and not representative of
others in the field.
This highlights the problem presented by Daubert. For example, in the case of
DNA, if a judge relies on Barry Scheck or Peter Neufeld, two "pioneers in the field of
discrediting DNA," the judge would likely not admit the evidence, even though most
other DNA experts would attest to DNA's reliability. See also People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.
4th 587, 611, 882 P.2d 321, 336, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 678 (1994) (quoting Kelly, 17 Cal.
3d at 37, 549 P.2d at 1248, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 152) ("[It is] questionable whether the
testimony of a single witness alone is ever sufficient to represent, or attest to, the
views of an entire scientific community."); Leading Cases, supra note 48, at 262 ("A
judge . . . may not always recognize whether she is receiving a fair assessment of the
scientific evidence, particularly if only one side can afford experts.").
95. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
96. But see Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237 (concluding that Prye has "provetni too
malleable" and created inconsistent results).
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B. Admissibility of DNA Evidence'
1. Introduction
The most widely anticipated impact of Leahy is its obvious application
in the area of DNA typing.' Ironically, however, the admissibility of
DNA evidence is the one area in which Leahy will have little impact. Today, using either Kelly-Frye or a relevancy standard, DNA typing evidence is likely admissible.' However, in the early 1990s, California Appellate courts excluded DNA evidence, not because the science itself was
unreliable, but because of the debate over how to calculate the significance of an apparent genetic "match."'" This debate focused on whether subgrouping (or substructuring) affects the multiplication rule."0 '

97. For the practitioner dealing with the admissibility of DNA evidence for the first
time, there are numerous sources available to assist in developing a strategy for the
Kelly hearing. See generally Fleming, supra note 18, at § 3b (providing "practice pointers," including what kind of experts to seek and the best areas on which to closely
cross-examine opposing witnesses); 8 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Foundation for
DNA FinderprintEvidence 749 (1990 & Supp. 1994) (providing method for laying foundation for admission of DNA testing, including a sample direct examination). For assistance in locating and preparing scientific experts, see 2 Am. JUR. TRIAS 585 (1964 &
Supp. 1994) (discussing the proper methods to prepare expert witnesses to take the
stand); F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL CASES 182-97 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the selection and preparation of expert witnesses). For an excellent and comprehensive treatment of DNA in an easy to understand format, see HOWARD COLEMAN & ERIC SWENSON, DNA IN THE COURTROOM A TRIAL
WATCHER'S GUIDE (1994).
For those seeking to exclude DNA evidence, an interesting and comprehensive
place to begin and end is the O.J. Simpson case. BA 097211 (L.A. Super. Ct.). The
defense team's memorandum of points and authorities in support of excluding DNA
evidence can be found on Westlaw. 1994 WL 568647 (Cal. Super. Doc.). Two of the
pioneers in the field of opposing DNA in court, Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, prepared the memorandum. Scheck and Neufeld focused on the "absence of generally
accepted statistical methods that address both the probability of a coincidental match
between two people who share common genetic characteristics and the probability that
that match would mistakenly be reported due to laboratory error," and the "failure of
the testing laboratories to use a generally accepted method for determining the probability of a coincidental match." Id. at *2.
98. See supra note 2.
99. The California Supreme Court recently granted review on several DNA cases to
consider whether or not RFLP evidence will be admissible in California. See Maura
Dolan, State High Court to Rule on DNA Tests, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, at A3.
100. People v. Wallace, 14 Cal. App. 4th 651, 659, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725 (1993);
People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 822, 1O Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 745 (1992); see also
People v. Pizarro, 1O Cal. App. 4th 57, 89, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 457 (1992) (remanding
on issue of statistical calculation process). The Frye standard traditionally has been an
obstacle to DNA proponents. Kramer, supra note 33, at 164 ("States employing a Frye
related test have had more difficulty with the admission of DNA statistical data.").
101. See Richard L Lewontin & Daniel L. Hart, Population Genetics in Forensic
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After a DNA test is completed and an apparent genetic match declared,
the laboratory must then determine what statistical significance should
be attached to the match. For example, are the chances that the sample
came from someone other than the defendant one in one hundred, one in
a million, or some number far higher? The problem was that if
subgrouping existed, using current genetic databases to calculate the
significance of genetic matches would be unreliable and possibly highly
prejudicial because the genetic databases did not account for
subgrouping. ' 2 The subgrouping debate forced California, as well as
other Frye jurisdictions, to exclude DNA evidence. It also prompted the
development of an "interim" method for making statistical DNA typing
calculations by the National Research Council (NRC)."

DNA Typing, 254 ScI. 1745, 1747 (1991). Substructuring, originally espoused by Dr.
Richard L Lewontin and Dr. Daniel L Hart, is the theory that homogenous populations--Caucasians, Hispanics and African Americans--do not mate randomly. Id. Rather,
very diverse subpopulations are likely to exist within the larger racial classification. Id.
For example, rather than group all Hispanics together, proponents of substructuring
would contend that genetic databases must subdivide the larger Hispanic group into
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, etc. The theory is that these subgroups do not mix together
randomly, even in the United States. Id. Rather, they marry among themselves and do
not form a "biological melting pot." Id.
102. People v. Soto, 30 Cal. App. 4th 340, 353, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 853 n. 15 (summarizing testimony that use of the product rule was questionable "because of fears that
population substructuring might negatively affect the accuracy of such applications"),
review granted and opinion superseded by, 1995 WL 150936 (Cal. Mar. 16, 1995).
103. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (National
Academy of Sciences, 1992). In an effort to allow DNA to continue to be admitted
during the subgrouping debate, the NRC developed what is now called the "ceiling
principle." Id. Basically, this method allows a very conservative statistical estimate to
be given to the jury. Id. It is conservative because it does not use race as a determinative factor. Id. Rather, frequency estimates are given in relation to the population as
a whole, not just to African-Americans, Hispanics, Caucasians, etc.
In People v. Barney, the court stated that if the NRC report was met with general
acceptance in the scientific community, then it could be used by the courts. 8 Cal.
App. 4th at 822, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745. See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying
text. At least two California appellate courts have approved of the NRC approach.
People v. Venegas, 31 Cal. App. 4th 234, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856 review granted and
opinion superseded by, 1995 WL 150958 (Cal. Mar. 16, 1995); People v. Taylor, No.
A064328, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 256, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1995) (admitting
DNA using modified ceiling principle). Several other jurisdictions have also used the
NRC ceiling principle to admit DNA evidence. See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641
N.E.2d 1342, 1349-50 (Mass. 1994) (admitting DNA using ceiling principle); State v.
Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 167 (Minn. 1994) (same); State v. Vandebogart, 1994 WL
698238, at *7 (N.H. Dec. 9, 1994) (using ceiling principle); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d
29, 47 (N.M. 1994) (same); State v. Duran, 881 P.2d 48, 49 (N.M. 1994) (finding NRC's
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Today, however, the theory that substructuring adversely affects statistical probabilities has disintegrated, clearly signaling that future KellyFrye hearings will find DNA evidence admissible. 4 This signal is just

now been seen by the courts, ' and, surprisingly, entirely ignored by
others."° Despite this fact, and despite the fact that the California appellate courts are split on whether or not DNA is admissible,"°7 recent

"modified ceiling principle" admissible at trial); State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 517
(Wash. 1993) (admitting DNA using ceiling principle). But see People v. Wallace, 14
Cal. App. 4th 651, 660, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725 (1993) ("However, recent developments have shown that general acceptance [of the NRC report] may not be easily
achieved."); Peter Aldhouse, Geneticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically Flawed,
259 Sci. 755, 755-56 (1993) (surveying the assault on the NRC report in the scientific
literature); B. Devlin, et al., Comments on the Statistical Aspects of the NRCs Report
on DNA Typing, 39 J. FORENSIC Sci. 28, 28 (1993) (finding the report "difficult to justify because it is based on inadequate population genetics and statistical theory"); B.
Devlin, et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA Fingerprinting:A Critique of the NRC's
Report, 259 Sci. 748, 748-50 (1993) (discussing "serious flaws" in the NRC approach);
Bernard Robertson & Tony Vignaux, Why the NRC Report on DNA is Wrong, 142 NEw
L.J. 1619, 1619-21 (1992) ("The whole [NRC] report so seriously fails to meet proper
standards of argument that one suspects that hidden agendas are being pursued.").
104. See infra notes 139-51 and accompanying text (presenting authority supporting
conclusion that subgrouping proponents have lost the debate).
105. See People v. Wilds, 31 Cal. App. 4th 636, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (finding RFLP
admissible due to end of subgrouping debate), review granted and opinion superseded
by, 1995 WL 150940 (Cal. Mar. 16, 1995); People v. Soto, 30 Cal. App. 4th 340, 361, 35
Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 858 (finding RFLP admissible and the use of the product rule appropriate in light of the end of subgrouping debate); State v. Grayson, No. K2-94-1298,
1994 WL 670312 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 8, 1994) (finding PCR admissible under Frye
standard).
106. At least one recent decision in a Frye jurisdiction has simply relied on older
California cases such as Barney and has not considered controlling scientific developments that have occurred since Barney was decided. State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763,
783 (Neb. 1994) (relying on Barney and finding PCR inadmissible due to subgrouping
debate). Without considering the fact that the subgrouping debate has ended, Carter
and other decisions like it are as obsolete as Barney. This is unfortunate since Carter
is one of the first state supreme courts to consider the PCR DNA issue.
107. People v. Taylor, No. A064328, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 256, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 21, 1995) (admitting DNA using modified ceiling principle); Wilds, 31 Cal. App. 4th
636, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (finding RFLP admissible due to end of subgrouping debate);
People v. Venegas, 31 Cal. App. 4th 234, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856 (1995) (remanding for a
determination of whether or not the FBI's RFLP technique has met with general acceptance); Soto, 30 Cal. App. 4th 340, 361, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 858 (1994) (holding RFLP
DNA typing admissible due to end of subgrouping debate); People v. Wallace 14 Cal.
App. 4th 651, 659, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 725 (1993) (finding RFLP inadmissible); People
v. Pizarro, 10 Cal. App. 4th 57, 89, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436, 457 (1992) (remanding on
issue of statistical calculation process); Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 820, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d 731, 743 (1992) (finding RFLP inadmissible due to subgrouping debate); People v.
Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 856, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 423 (1991) (finding RFLP admissible).
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scientific developments have eclipsed those cases excluding DNA."'
Given the layperson's trust in DNA evidence,"° the fact that DNA is
now likely to be universally admitted in California is not insignificant.
The discussion below will. independently address the two types of DNA
testing currently employed-RFLP"' and (DQa) PCR -arguing that
both are now admissible under the Kelly-Frye standard affirmed in
Leahy.
2. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) Tests
RFLP is the most established and widely used DNA test to date."' It
has been endorsed by the Office of Technology Assessment of the United
States Congress as well as the National Research Council."' Like PCR
testing, RFLP produces genetic band patterns that technicians compare

108. See infra notes 129-70 and accompanying text (discussing recent scientific developments and cases pertinent to DNA admissibility).
109. A recent Gallup telephone poll asked 521 adults, "How reliable do you think
DNA blood tests are in matching blood to an individual person ... ?" Seventy-seven
percent of the respondents said they thought DNA was very reliable or somewhat reliable. Only 896 thought it was somewhat unreliable or very unreliable. Fifteen percent
expressed no opinion. Gallup Poll, Survey 9/18/94-9/20/94. This poll seems to indicate
that jurors may be willing to rely heavily on DNA evidence in the courtroom.
110. Although a thorough description of the RFLP and PCR techniques are beyond
the scope of this article, a short description of the techniques may prove useful. "Basically, RFLP involves (1) using restriction enzymes to chop up the DNA of interest into
segments of differing sizes and molecular weights; (2) running these DNA segments on
an electrophoresis gel to separate them into 'bands' based on their size and weight; (3)
denaturing the DNA to make it single-stranded; (4) 'blotting' the DNA onto a membrane; (5) adding radioactively labeled DNA oligonucleotide probes complementary to a
particular sequence of interest; (6) exposing the membrane to X-ray film to produce an
autoradiogram; (7) observing the banding patterns produced by the radioactive probes
on the autoradiogram (or 'autorad'); and (8) comparing the banding patterns produced
by the different test samples." MacKnight, supra note 18, at 296-97.
111. "PCR tests identify an area of DNA in which there tends to be variation from
one person to another and then 'amplify' that area by causing the DNA strands to
replicate themselves multiple times. Once it is amplified, the DNA can be 'typed'
through the use of genetic probes. If the two samples have the same type, they may
have a common source; if they do not have the same type, they could not have the
same source." William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic
Identification Tests: Lessons From the DNA War, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY-22, 28
(1993). Generally, labs use a PCR technique which examines the DQ-alpha gene. Id.
However, numerous new PCR techniques are currently being employed. Id. at 30.
112. Fleming, supra note 18, at 320.
113. Kramer, supra note 33, at 161.
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to the sample given by the test subject. See Figure 1. One purported
weakness of the RFLP technique is the subjectivity involved in interpreting these band patterns because they are often blurry and difficult to
read."4 Nevertheless, most courts have recognized the reliability of
RFLP testing and have admitted them in the criminal context and in paternity cases."5 In California, the acute nature of the debate over admissibility of RFLP results is reflected in the development of the appellate
case law.

114. Fleming, supra note 18, at 326. However, the California appellate courts have
continually rejected this argument. See People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d, 836, 868, 1
Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 431 (1991) (rejecting attacks on the matching step of DNA analysis);
People Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 811-4, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 738-9 (1992).
"Appellant's challenge to the subjectivity of interpreting a match does not invalidate the
procedure because interpretation of bands on an autorad is fairly straightforward and
involves a minimal amount of subjective analysis." Id. at 813 (quoting Axe//, 235 Cal.
App. 3d at 864-65, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429); see also People v. Wilds, 31 Cal. App. 4th
636, 645, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 356 (1995) ("[W]e hold that the processing and matching
steps of the DNA analysis undertaken in this case are satisfactory under Kelly.").
115. Fleming, supra note 18, at 328.
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a. People v. Axell" '
The evolution of the RFLP evidence issue in California has developed
rapidly, beginning with the 1991 case of People v. Axell. In Axell, the
court held that RFLP DNA tests are admissible."7 After hearing testimony from several experts, the court allowed comparison of samples found

at the crime scene to the genetic database for Hispanics."8 At the time,
the debate over subgrouping had yet to develop. Therefore, because the
Hispanic database was "representative of Hispanics in Southern Califor-

nia, the relevant population group," it was the correct database with
which to compare the samples found at the crime scene."' In holding
RFLP evidence admissible, the Axell court is in agreement with most
jurisdictions across the country."n
b. People v. Barney 2' and the debate over subgrouping
Shortly after Axell, a significant debate erupted among scientists. The

central question was whether general racial databases should be used to
calculate the statistical significance of a DNA match, as was done in
Axell, or whether racial databases must account for substructuring. This
debate focused around two key articles published in Science. The first,
by Lewontin and Hartl, argued that the use of the multiplication rule
with current genetic databases was improper because there is "on aver-

116. 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1991). See generally 2 B.E. WrrKiN,
CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative Experimental and Scientific Evidence § 864F (3d
ed. Supp. 1994) (discussing Axell).
117. Axelt, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 856, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423. The RFLP procedures in
Axell were performed by Celmark. Id. Evidently, however, California courts will require the techniques used in each laboratory performing RFLP to be independently
established as generally accepted. See People v. Venegas, 31 Cal. App. 4th 234, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 856 (1995) (holding that the FBI's RFLP procedure had not been established
in California as generally accepted and noting that AxeUl dealt with Cellmark tests, not
FBI).
118. AxeUl, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429.
119. Id. at. 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431. "Any question or criticism of the size of the
data base or the ratio pertains to weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility."
Id. at 868, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
120. See, e.g., Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884, 893 (Colo. 1993); Smith v. Deppish,
807 P.2d 144, 159 (Kan. 1991); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1994); State
v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1990), affd 442 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 1994); State v.
Myers, No. 03-C-01-9108-CR-00255, 1992 WL 297626, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 22,
1992); see also State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 41 (N.M. 1994) (listing frye jurisdictions
in which DNA has been admitted).
121. 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (1992). See generally 2 B.E. WITIUN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative Experimental and Scientific Evidence § 864G (3d
ed. Supp. 1994) (discussing Barney).
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age, one third more genetic variation among Irish, Spanish, Italians,
Slavs, Swedes, and other subpopulations, than there is on the average
between Europeans, Asians, Africans, Amerinds, and Oceanians."' In
the other article, Chakraborty and Kidd specifically disagreed, arguing
that even if subgrouping does exist, it has a negligible effect on DNA
typing probabilities."n
This debate brought about the decision in People v. Barney. In Barney,

the court found that there was no consensus in the scientific community
on whether or not subgrouping affects the multiplication rule.1" In
holding that RFLP DNA tests were inadmissible as a result of this lack of
consensus in the scientific community, the court stated that "in a future
Kelly-Frye hearing... DNA analysis evidence will be admissible" only if
there is a "sufficiently conservative method for determining statistical
significance," such as the NRC's ceiling principle."a The court noted
that it did not disagree with Axell, but that Axell had simply "been
eclipsed on this point by subsequent scientific developments." 26 Therefore, after Barney, the admissibility of RFLP DNA evidence essentially
rests on the NRC's ceiling frequency method, assuming that method receives general acceptance.'27 The Barney court stated the issue succinctly:
The question now at hand is whether the interim and future methods of statistical calculation proposed by the NRC report will be generally accepted by population geneticists. If, as appears likely, this question is answered in the affirmative
in a future Kelly-Frye hearing, then DNA analysis evidence will be admissible in
California."

122. Lewontin & Hart, supra note 102, at 1747.
123. Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic
Work, 254 ScI. 1735, 1738 (1991).
124. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 820, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743.
125. Id. at 821-22, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745.
126. Id. at 821, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744. Another California court agreed with Barney
and held DNA inadmissible due to the subgrouping debate. People v. Pizarro, 10 Cal.
App. 4th 57, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (1992). See generally 2 B.E. WIrIN, CAUFORNIA EVIDENCE, Demonstrative Experimental and Scientifc Evidence § 864H (Supp. 1994) (discussing Pizarro).
127. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (collecting cases approving of the
ceiling principle and articles criticizing it).
128. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 822, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745. For a critical analysis of
the court's opinion in Barney, see Rockne P. Harmon, Legal Criticisms of DNA Typing: Where's the Beef? 84 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 175, 178-85 (1993) (criticizing
Barney on numerous grounds).
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c. Recent scientific developments eclipse Barney's rationale
Since the Barney decision, dramatic developments have occurred in
the debate over whether subgrouping has an effect on statistical probability estimates. These developments place Barney's rationale in question. Specifically, Lewontin and Hard, the two scientists who originally
argued for substructuring and wrote the Science article that sparked the
debate, have significantly changed their opinion that substructuring affects the multiplication rule."
On April 23, 1993, Lewontin and Hartl published their revised opinion
in a letter to the editor, in which they concluded that "there is approximately as much genetic variation among ethnic groups within major
races as there is among the races." 3 ' In other words, even if
substructuring exists, it makes little or no difference for purposes of
calculating the statistical frequency of a DNA match. "This reversal of
opinion should be sufficient to illustrate that the effect of population
substructuring has little impact on the significance attached to DNA profile match found in forensic case analysis."' As one commentator noted:
Lewontin's and Hart's recent reversal of opinion represents a major breakdown in their population substructuring theory. By saying that there is at least as
much genetic variation among ethnic groups as there is among major races,
Lewontin and Hartl have abandoned the idea that subgroups affect the multiplication rule. Essentially, their data yields the same conclusion that Chakraborty,
Kidd and the NRC committee found-any effect of population substructure on the
multiplication rule's reliability is negligible. "'

Equally damaging to DNA opponents are two additional and independent endorsements of the forensic use of DNA typing. First, and perhaps
most important, is an article published in late 1994 by Eric Lander, a
molecular biologist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
Bruce Budowle, a forensic scientist with the FBI. ' This article, supporting the use of DNA evidence in court, is significant because Lander
had been regarded as "'the most vocal and important critic of DNA testing.'"" Lander and Budowle found Lewontin and Hartl's analysis

129. Daniel L Hart & Richard C. Lewontin, DNA FingerprintingReport (Letter), 260

Sci. 473, 474 (1993).
130. Id.
131. Ranajit Chakraborty, NRC Report on DNA Typing (Letter), 260 Sd. 1059, 1059
(1993). Chakraborty's letter was published in response to Lewontin and Hartl's revised
opinion. Id. Chakraborty again concluded that subgrouping has a negligible effect on
the multiplication rule. Id.
132. Kramer, supra note 33, at 176.
133. Eric Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA FingerprintingDispute Laid to Rest, 371
NATURE 735 (1994) (endorsing the use of DNA typing).
134. Harriet Chiang, State Court Won't Relax DNA Rules: 6-1 Decision Will Be Factor
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"flawed" and also noted that the NRC report allowed this "minor academic debate to snowball to the point that it threatens to undermine the use
of DNA fingerprinting. " "
Secondly, the FBI published a five-volume study of DNA profiling data
that essentially refutes the Lewontin and Hart subgrouping argument.'"
The FBI study specifically denies the contention that subgrouping affects
probability estimates. 37 Therefore, Lewontin and Hartl's revised opinion, the articles by Chakraborty and Kidd, Lander and Budowle's article,
and the FBI's extensive study all lead to the conclusion that DNA evidence and the accompanying statistical probabilities should now be admissible.

in O.J. Case, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 1994, at Al (quoting George Clark, deputy district
attorney in San Diego).
135. Lander & Budowle, supra note 133, at 737.
136. 1A U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, FBI REP., VNTR POPULATION DATA: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 2
(1993). The FBI study concluded:
(1) that there are sufficient population data available to determine whether or
not forensically significant differences might occur when using different population data bases [sic]; (2) that subdivision, either by ethnic group or by U.S.
geographic region, within a major population group does not substantially
affect forensic estimates of the likelihood of occurrence of a DNA profile; (3)
that estimates of the likelihood of occurrence of a DNA profile using major
population group databases (e.g., Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic) provide a
greater range of frequencies than would estimates for subgroups of a major
population category; therefore, the estimate of the likelihood of occurrence of
a DNA profile derived by the current practice of employing the multiplication
rule and using general population databases for allele frequencies is reliable,
valid, and meaningful, without forensically significant consequences; and (4)
that the data do not support the need for alternate procedures, such as the
ceiling principle approach (NRC Report 1992), for deriving statistical estimates
of DNA profile frequencies (Budowle et al. 1993a and 1993b, submitted).
People v. Soto, 30 Cal. App. 4th 340, 357, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 856 (quoting 1A U.S.
DEPT. JUSTICE, FBI REP., VNTR POPULATION DATA: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 2 (1993).

137. Some prosecutors have attempted to bypass the subgrouping debate entirely by
subjecting DNA samples to twice as many tests and by testing at more than one laboratory. Rachel Nowak, Forensic DNA Goes to Court with O.J.: DNA Fingerprinting
Evidence in O.J. Simpson Murder Case, 265 Sci. 1352 (1994). "There are experts that
hold that you can eliminate the statistical issue' if you conduct enough different
tests ....

And if you send samples to more than one laboratory . . . 'you can pretty

much blow the possibility of a laboratory error out the window.'" Id. (quoting Los
Angeles prosecutor Lisa Kahn).
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d. People v. Soto"s recognizes the end of the subgrouping debate
The first court in California, and one of the first in the United States to
recognize the impact of these recent developments is the Fourth District
Court of Appeals. In People v. Soto, the court held that RFLP DNA typing
is admissible under Kelly-Frye." In Soto, the defendant allegedly raped
an elderly woman, who suffered a severe stroke shortly thereafter.'O
The only evidence introduced by the prosecutor against Soto was RFLP
DNA test results derived from semen stains found on the victim's bed.'
After his conviction, Soto appealed on the grounds that the method used
to calculate the statistical significance of his DNA match, the product
rule, had not been "sufficiently accepted in the relevant scientific community" to meet the Kelly-Frye requirement."2 The court disagreed and
affirmed the conviction.'4
In support of its conclusion, the Soto court noted that: (1) both Lander
and Hartl had shifted their positions away from support of
substructuring;' (2) the recent and extensive FBI report concluded
that "[subgrouping] ... within a major population group does not substantially affect forensic estimates of the likelihood of occurrence of a
DNA profile;" and (3) a large number of jurisdictions have admitted
DNA evidence. 4 ' Based on this analysis, the court concluded that the
trial court properly admitted DNA typing evidence in conformity with the
decision in Axell' 47 Shortly thereafter, California's Second District Court
agreed with Soto in People v. Wilds and issued a similar opinof Appeal
48
ion.1

138. 30 Cal. App. 4th 340, 361, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 858 (1994) (holding RFLP DNA
typing admissible using product rule due to end of subgrouping debate); see also People v. Wilds, 31 Cal. App. 4th 636, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (1995) (same).
139. Soto, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 361, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858.
140. Id. at 345-57, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848-49.
141. Id. at 345, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847.
142. Id. at 345, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-48.
143. Id. at 345, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
144. Id. at 359, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
145. Id. at 357, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
146. Id. at 359-60, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-58.
157. Id. at 361, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. Specifically, the court stated that "[b]ecause
DNA RFLP is so highly reliable and relevant, to 'allow a minor academic debate ...
to snowball to the point that it threatens to undermine the use of [it] in court is
throwing the baby out with the bathwater." Id. at 362, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859 (citations omitted). The court reaffirmed what Axell had stated several years earlier, that
"'any question or criticism of the size of the data base or the ratio pertains to the
weight of the evidence not to its admissibility.'" Id. at 361, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858
(quoting People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d 836, 868, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411, 431 (1991)).
148. People v. -Wilds, 31 Cal. App. 4th 636, 639, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351, 352 (1995)
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Soto and Wilds properly recognize the impact signaled by the scientific
advances discussed above. Other courts have been slower to recognize
this signal, or at least less thorough in their analysis."4 Without exception, these cases fail to mention either the Lander article, the LewontinHart change in position, or the publication of the FBI report. Rather,
they rely on past case law, including the Barney case in California. By
relying only on cases from several years ago, these decisions fail to recognize recent scientific discussions that have eclipsed Barney, just as
Barney temporarily proclaimed to eclipse Axell.
In addition, the courts should no longer consider the NRC's ceiling
principal as an alternative in admitting probability statistics with DNA
evidence. The issue is no longer whether the ceiling principle has gained
general acceptance in the scientific community; rather, the issue is
whether the ceiling principle is still necessary given the end of the
subgrouping debate. Because the ceiling principle was developed as an
interim method for admitting statistics during the height of the
subgrouping debate and because it was never meant to be exclusive,"

("[We] find that the [disagreement over subgrouping] has now passed. We are back to
the analysis set forth in Axe//. The question of whether genetic profiling evidence sat-

isfies Kelly has been unequivocally answered in the affirmative.").
149. See State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763, 783 (Neb. 1994) (finding PCR inadmissible
due to subgrouping debate); cf People v. Venegas, 31 Cal. App. 4th 234, 36 Cal. Rptr.
2d 856 (1995). In Venegas, the court issued an interesting and relatively unusual deciskon. First, the court held that the FBI's RFLP procedure had not been established in
California as generally accepted. Id. at 243, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863. California cases
such as Axe// have only held Cellmark's procedures to be generally accepted. Id. Second, the court held that the NRC ceiling principle was properly found to be generally
accepted. Id. at 245, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865. Third, the court found'that the FBI did
not adhere to the accepted NRC methods in its calculations of the statistical probability of the match. Id. The court reversed and remanded the case for a determination of
whether the FBI's procedures are also generally accepted and to afford the FBI a
chance to recalculate the statistical component. Id. at 248, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. The
court noted that the FBI procedures will likely meet with general acceptance. Id.
150. One reason the NRC developed the conservative ceiling principle approach was
to bypass the issue of substructuring. See State v. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d 483, 494 (N.H.
1992) ("The NRC asserts that the ceiling principle can account for any error caused by
possible population substructure. Therefore, the admissibility of population frequency
estimates does not necessarily await resolution of the population substructure issue .... "). If the substructure issue has been decided, then in many ways, the NRC
approach has become irrelevant. See People v. Soto, 30 Cal. App. 4th 340, 361, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 846, 858 ("[Tihe FBI's report indicates an 'interim' approach is unnecessary.").
Soto also stated that "the ceiling principle was not intended to be exclusive." Id. at
361 n.24, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858 n.24.
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its value was by design short-lived. The end of the subgrouping debate
heralded the end of the need to consider the ceiling principle as a viable
method of producing probability statistics. As in Axell, Soto, and Wilds,
the product rule should once again be the method of choice for calculating probability statistics for use with DNA evidence. 6'
In short, the forensic use of DNA has developed at a blinding speed.
Having been used for the first time in a United States court in 1988,
scholarly debate on the forensic use of DNA evidence continues to
evolve. As with the demonstrable use of any new science, growing pains
clearly surfaced. In Axell, the court found DNA RFLP evidence admissible. Then came the subgrouping debate and the Barney decision, temporarily erecting a wall to the admission of DNA evidence. Finally, with the
end of the subgrouping debate, that wall rightly came down under Soto
and Wilds. In essence, a Kelly-Frye analysis of RFLP DNA evidence
should now bring about a conclusion in line with Axell, Soto, and
Wilds-RFLP evidence is admissible using the product rule.

151. Accord, e.g., Lindsay v. People, No. 93SC167, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 41 (Colo. March
6, 1995) (finding RFLP and accompanying statistical calculations using product rule
were properly admitted under Frye); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 336 (admitting RFLP
under Daubert using the product rule) (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). But see People v.
Taylor, No. A064328, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 256, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1995)
(admitting DNA using modified ceiling principle); State v. Buckner, No. 62043-1, 1995
WL 109013 (Wash. Mar. 16, 1995) (reversing and remanding so that the DNA can be
presented to the jury using the ceiling principle rather than the product rule); State v.
Streich, No. 91-335, 1995 WL 73724, at *8-9 (Vt. Feb. 17, 1995) (finding RFLP admissible using ceiling principle and noting that "even under Daubert it is inappropriate to
allow evidence based on the unmodified product rule.").
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3. Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Tests"u
Another method of DNA identification is PCR amplification. PCR allows testing on samples smaller in size than allowed by RFLP. In fact,
PCR techniques can analyze a sample as small as a single strand of
hair."n However, PCR is less specific in identifying a particular individual to the exclusion of others." Additionally, because the technique is

152. The discussion below focuses on DQ-alpha (DQa) PCR testing. DQa is the most
commonly utilized PCR technique and the technique that has been at issue in all state
and federal cases in which the admissibility of PCR was debated. Genetic researchers
are currently developing and utilizing other PCR techniques. These techniques, called
AMPFLPs (amplifiable fragment length polymorphism), include: (1) D1S80, (2) 2p24-p23,
(3) D17S30, and (4) 12q13.1. S. Rand, et al., Population Genetics and Forensic Efficiency Data of 4 AMPFLP's, 104 INT. J. LEGAL MED. 329, 329 (1992). D1S80 is the most
commonly utilized of these AMPFLPs. However, only one state case has even mentioned DIS80. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 648 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
("Although the record is unclear, it appears that genetic "fingerprinting" results may be
possible with the DISSO test after PCR amplification.").
Although AMPFLPs are newer, there is a large amount of published research on
them. See R. Deja et al., Population Genetic Characteristics of the DIS8O Locus in
Seven Human Populations, 94 Hum. GENETICS 252, 252 (1994) ("Characteristics of the

DIS80 locus make it a very useful marker for population genetic research, genetic linkage studies, forensic identification of individuals, and for determination of biological
relatedness of individuals."); Ate D. Klooseterman et al., PCR-Amplification and Detection of the Human DIS80 VNTR Locus, 105 INT. J. LEGAL MED. 257, 257 (1993) ("The
results of this study suggest that in the near future analysis of the DIS80 locus by
DNA-amplification can be applied in actual forensic case work."); E. Donald Shapiro et
al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L & HEALTH

1, 36 n.186 (1992-93) ("[AFLP] . .. relies on technology that is newer and perhaps less
widely accepted than the other tests.") (citations omitted); Antti Sajantilla, et al., PCR
Amplification of Alleles at the DIS80 Locus; Comparison of a Finnish and a North
American Caucasian Population Sample and Forensic Casework Evaluation, 50 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 816, 823-24 (1992) (AMP-FLP analysis of the DISSO locus can be applied to routine forensic casework and "should provide a powerful new forensic tool
for the DNA characterization of identity"); Gurpreet S. Sandhu et al., Amplification of

Reproducible Allele Markers for Amplified Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis,
12 BIoTECHNIQUES 16 (1992) ("Using the AFLP [DIS80] technique ... should prove
suitable in forensic analyses . . . ."); Thompson, supra note 112, at 28 n.36 ("The use
of these newer [AMPFLP] methods in forensic identification appears to be still at the
experimental stage. Most forensic PCR tests conducted to date have examined only the
HLA DQ-alpha gene.").

153. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence
Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 475 (1990) (stating that Cetus
Corporation, which uses PCR techniques, "claims to be able to conduct its test on a
single hair"). The hair must include the root. Id.
154. Id. at 475.
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several years newer than RFLP, PCR has had less opportunity to find its
way into published opinions. In fact, PCR has yet to be established by a
California appellate court as an admissible form of scientific evidence.
Nevertheless, there is substantial authority for California courts to hold
that PCR tests are admissible pursuant to Leahy.
Although no published California case has dealt with the admissibility
of PCR test results,' numerous other Frye5 ' and relevancy"'
jurisdictions have admitted the evidence. Additionally, journal treatment
of PCR generally has been very favorable," and molecular geneticists
155. California trial courts frequently have dealt with the issue, however, with the
more recent cases admitting the evidence. See, e.g., People v. Moffett, No. 103094 (San
Diego County Super. Ct. May 1991) (admitting PCR); People v. Quintanilla, No. C-23691
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 1991) (same). But see People v. Mack, No.
86116 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. Sept. 1990) (holding that PCR evidence should be
excluded as not being accepted in the relevant scientific community); People v. Martinez, No. C 82183 (L.A. County Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that PCR evidence should be
excluded).
156. Seritt v. State, 647 So. 2d 1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (finding trial court properly
admitted DQa PCR evidence under adopted frye standard); Harrison v. State, 644
N.E.2d 1243, 1254 (Ind. Jan. 4, 1995) (finding "no reversible error in the trial court's
admission of the [PCRI DNA test results"); State v. Grayson, No. K2-94-1298, 1994 WL
670312, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 8, 1994) (finding PCR admissible under Frye); State
v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (finding trial court properly
admitted DQa PCR evidence); People v. Palumbo, 618 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1994) (finding PCR (DQa) typing "has been generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community"); State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105, 1118 (Wash. 1995) ("It is now
settled law in this state that the PCR technique of DNA analysis passes the Frye test
and is admissible evidence in Washington.").
Dozens of trial courts have also found DQa PCR evidence admissible. One article
recently compiled a useful table which lists the trial court cases that have dealt with
DQa typing. See Edward Blake et al., Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Amplification
and Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)-DQa Oligonucleotide Typing on Biological Evidence Samples: Casework Experience, 37 J. FORENSIC SCI. 700, 722-23 (1992) (collecting

trial court case admitting PCR). According to this article, DQa PCR tests have been
admitted in several trial court cases following a Frye hearing. Id. According to that
same article, DQa tests were also admitted in several cases, although a Frye hearing
was not held or the court was in a relevancy jurisdiction. Id.
157. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 475 (Mont. 1994) (holding that PCR analysis is sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence); State v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1303,
1311 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (admitting PCR evidence under "relevancy test"); Trimboli v.
State, 817 S.W.2d 785, 792 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding admission of PCR evidence),
affd en banc, 826 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Clarke v. State, 813 S.W.2d 654,
655 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding admission of PCR evidence as relevant), qffd per
curiam, 839 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1611 (1993);
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609 (Va 1990) (upholding admission of PCR evidence under relevancy test), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); cf Harrison v. State, 644
N.E.2d 1243, 1254 (Ind. 1995) ("Likewise, we find no reversible error in the trial court's
admission of the [PCR DNA test results ....
[The record suggests that defense
counsel consented to the admission of the test results . .
").

158. A great number of journal articles discuss PCR. The articles typically support
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have subjected the technology to substantial review and validation."

the procedure and its application in the area of forensic science. See Norman Arnheim
et al., Application of PCI: Organismal and Population Biology; Polymerase Chain
Reaction, 40 BIOSCIENCE 174 (1990) ("PCR has many virtues that are likely to lead to
its rapid dispersal through the community of organismal and population biologists. It is
a . . . simple method for acquiring information about the sequence of DNA . .. .);
Blake et al., supra note 156, at 723-24 (concluding that "DQa testing [is] . . . a very
useful tool for the analysis of biological evidence" and that DQa "promises to have a
major impact in forensic science"); Catherine Comey & Bruce Budowle, Validation
Studies on the Analysis of the HLA DQa Locus Using the Polymerase Chain Reaction,
36 J. FORENSIC SC. 1633, 1633 (1991) ("The results of [the] . . . validation experiments
indicate that typing of the DQa gene . . . can be accomplished . . . without producing
false positive or false negative results."); Henry A. Erlich et al., Letter, Reliability of
the HLA-DQa PCR-Based Oligonucleotide Typing System, 35 J. FORENSIC SC. 1017,
1017-18 (1990) (arguing that DQa typing results are reproducible and reliable);
MacKnight, supra note 18, at 314-22 (arguing for the reliability of the PCR procedure
and addressing its perceived problems); A.F. Markham, The Polymerase Chain Reaction: A Tool for Molecular Medicine; Education and Debate, 306 BRrr. MED. J. 441
(1993) ("In the past four years [PCR] . . . has become probably the most widely used
single technique in all branches of the biological sciences."); Barry C. Scheck, DNA
and Daubert, 15 CARDoZO L REV. 1959, 1963-64 n.17 (1994) ("Certainly, a strong case
can be made for the admissibility of HLA DQ-Alpha technique, particularly when it is
used to exclude someone as the source of trace evidence.").
Molecular geneticists have also extensively reviewed and validated the application
of the DQa PCR technique. See Rhea Helmuth et al., HLA-DQa Allele and Genotype
Frequencies In Various Human Populations, Determined by Using Enzymatic Amplification and Oligonucleotide Probes, 47 AM. J. HUM. GENErICS 515 (1990).
159. For the purposes of a Kelly-Frye analysis of admissibility, the courts generally
do not consider error rates. See, e.g., State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 53 n.25 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) ("Courts are admitting DNA test results from laboratories with no known or
available error rates."); Scheck, supra note 158, at 1967 ("Laboratory error rate...
has not been considered a Frye issue by the courts.").
Nevertheless, laboratories have substantially blind-tested the PCR DQa technique to
determine error rates. These tests proved the technique is very reliable. First, laboratories conducted two blind trials involving DQa typing of simulated evidence samples
taken from the trial court case, Texas v. Fuller. "In the first ... blind trial carried out
in 1987 using the DQa dot-blot format, all 50 samples [tested] gave typing results....
However, one sample out of 50 was incorrectly typed . . . ." Blake et al., supra note
156, at 704-05. "In the second . . . blind trial . . . in 1989.
[a]ll 50 samples were
correctly typed." Id. at 705.
Secondly, in other, more extensive tests, five forensic science laboratories evaluated the DQa kit to assess the labs' ability to perform the PCR DQa technique. See P.
Sean Walsh et al., Report of the Blind Trial of the Cetus AmpliType HLA DQa Forensic Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Amplification and Typing Kit, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI.
1551, 1556 (1991) (summarizing the success of the blind trial of DQa techniques). None
of the DNA-containing samples were mistyped. Id. In fact, results were reported for
178 of the 180 samples analyzed (98.9%), and all of the 178 samples were correctly
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PCR is also used extensively outside the courtroom. For example, PCR
has been used to help identify those killed in the Persian Gulf War and is
also used in HIV detection and diagnostics, neonatal screening, and in

the development of numerous other tests."
However, PCR does not come without its difficulties. Commentators
have recognized at least four primary problems with PCR testing: (1)
allelic drop-out or differential amplification; (2) the sensitivity of the test

and the potential for contamination; (3) the small number of labs conducting the tests; and (4) interpretation problems."' These problems,
however, "do not affect the general acceptance of the underlying PCR
methodology."'62 Although the courts have recognized that these problems may exist, courts generally do not consider them significant enough
to warrant the exclusion of the evidence."

typed. Id. at 1554. The tests showed "that a forensic science laboratory can . . . successfully use the Amplilype RLA DQa forensic DNA amplification and typing kit to
analyze forensic samples." Id. at 1556; see also State v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960, 966
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (stating that PCR techniques are almost unanimously
positive and attributing the few errors to human error and "not to any problem or
defect in the procedure itself"); Comey & Budowle, supra note 158, at 1633 (reporting
on experiments that evaluated DQa and concluding that DQa typing "can be accomplished, when the typing is done using proper protocols, without false positive or false
negative results").
For studies dealing with the Amplilype PM PCR testing system, see N. Fildes &
R. Reynolds, Consistency and Reproducibility of AmpliType PM Results Between Seven
Laboratories: Field Trial Results, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. (forthcoming 1995) ("The field
trial demonstrated that laboratories can easily implement the AmpliType PM system to
analyze DNA-containing samples and controls successfully for forensic casework applications."); George Herrin, Jr. et al., Evaluation of the AmpliType PM DNA Test System
on Forensic Case Samples, 39 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1247, 1247 (1994) ("In all cases in
which a conclusive answer was reached for the AmpliType PM system, the results
agreed with or surpassed results previously obtained with RFLP testing.").
160. MacKnight, supra note 18, at 302-04. Additionally, Science, a leading scientific
journal, designated PCR the "molecule of the year" in 1989. Id. at 304.
161. See id. at 314-22 (discussing each of these problems in detail and explaining
why they are not significant).
162. State v. Russell, 882 P.2d 747, 767 (Wash. 1994). The court went on to address
the "potential testing problems" of PCR analysis. Id. at 767-68.
163. See, e.g., id. at 768 (dismissing these problems and admitting DQa PCR typing);
State v. Lyons, 863 P.2d 1301, 1309-11 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing these problems
while nevertheless admitting PCR); see also Markham, supra note 158 (stating that the
problems with the PCR technique are not usually serious and "any teething troubles
can usually be overcome quickly by minor and obvious adjustment to reaction conditions"); ANDREA A. MOENSSENS gT AL, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
§15.10 (4th ed. 1995) ("While some contaminants may suppress PCR amplification or
otherwise affect the reaction, for the most part they do not prevent the success of
PCR typing.").
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As with RFLP, court concern over the subgrouping debate, not concern about the underlying methodology, is the primary reason for the
exclusion of PCR in recent decisions."' Therefore, as with RFLP, the
end of the subgrouping debate may have also heralded the beginning of
widespread acceptance of PCR typing in the courts. Without subgrouping
proponents arguing against DNA evidence, appellate courts in Frye jurisdictions across the country will likely embrace PCR testing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Leahy decision will not live up to its media-given status as the key
to lock or unlock the door to DNA evidence. Relevancy jurisdictions
have typically admitted DNA, considering the subgrouping debate as a
factor going towards the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence." Therefore, courts in relevancy jurisdictions admitted DNA evidence through the height of the subgrouping debate in the early 1990s.
Conversely, Frye jurisdictions, including California, excluded DNA evi-

164. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763, 783 (Neb. 1994) (finding PCR inadmissible due to subgrouping debate). Early trial court cases in California did, however,
find that PCR was not a generally accepted technique. See, e.g., People v. Mack, No.
86116 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. Sept. 1990) (holding that PCR evidence should be
excluded as unaccepted in the relevant scientific community); People v. Martinez, No.
C 82183 (LA. County Super. Ct. 1989) (same).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Wle
conclude that under Daubert the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of a [RFLP] DNA match and testimony regarding the probability of a coincidental match."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 946 (1995); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d
1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe general theory and techniques of DNA profiling are
valid under... Daubert, and.., in the future courts can take judicial notice of their
reliability."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 734 (1994). Those jurisdictions using a relevancy
or Daubert standard have had far less trouble admitting DNA evidence, primarily because in relevancy jurisdictions, the debate over subgrouping affects the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility. See Toranzo v. State, 608 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 1992) (per
curiam) (admitting population frequency data); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 46 (N.M.
1994) (admitting DNA with statistical debate going to weight, not admissibility); State v.
Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 115 (Ohio 1992) (holding population frequency data admissible
and stating that questions of reliability go to the weight of the evidence); Kelly v.
State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc) (admitting DNA population
frequency data under relevancy and reliability standard); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d
435, 447-48 (Wyo. 1993) (admitting statistical data because possible existence of population substructuring affects the weight of the evidence and the jury was "free to disregard or disbelieve [the] expert testimony") (citations omitted). For a comprehensive
discussion of Daubert's effect on DNA admissibility from one of the leading opponents
of DNA in the courtroom, see Scheck, supra note 158.
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dence during the height of the subgrouping debate, with the subgrouping
issue affecting DNA's admissibility rather than its weight.
Today, however, in light of the end of the subgrouping debate, there is
no readily apparent reason why California and other Frye jurisdictions
should not admit both RFLP and PCR typing results. Therefore, Leahy's
effect on DNA would have been the same had the court abandoned Kelly-Frye. In addition, California courts should no longer consider the
NRC's ceiling principle"s a viable means to admit population frequency
data. 7 The NRC created the ceiling principle as an interim method for
presenting frequency data to the jury. It was never intended to be a permanent alternative1 " The end of the subgrouping debate is, in reality,
the vanguard of the ceiling principle's passing. Courts should admit DNA
evidence in accordance with Axell, Soto, and Wilds."
If a practitioner seeks to exclude DNA evidence at trial, it would be
wise to focus the attack on the third prong of the Kelly analysis-whether the correct procedures were used in the present case. ' "

166. See supra note 103 (discussing the ceiling principle).
167. See IA U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE, FBI REP., VNTR POPULATION DATA: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY 2 (1993) (concluding that alternative procedures such as the NRC report are
unnecessary).
168. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
169. The final word on the admissibility of DNA evidence ultimately rests with the
California Supreme Court. Fortunately, the Court granted review on several RFLP DNA
cases on March 16, 1995, including People v. Venegas, People v. Wilds and People v.
Soto. See Maura Dolan, State High Court to Rule on DNA Tests, LA. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1995, at A3. Therefore, the contraversy surrounding RFLP will shortly be resolved.
170. See People v. Venegas, 31 Cal. App. 4th 234, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 856 (1995) (reversed and remanded due to failure of FBI to conform to accepted NRC methodology);
State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105 (Wash. 1995) ("[Hjuman error in the forensic laboratory
will continue to be a relevant inquiry."); Nowak, supra note 137 ("[L]ab error is the
most likely place to get a false incrimination of an innocent person or a guilty person
going free."). See generally People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 822-25, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d 731, 745-47 (1992) (discussing the "use of correct scientific procedures" prong of
Kelly).
In the federal courts, however, evidence may be admitted even if improper standards were employed. See, e.g., United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir.
1994) ("[Piotential faults in the DNA sample extraction processes conducted in FBI
laboratories, go to the weight to be accorded the evidence, not to its admissibility. . . "; United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 104 (1992). The Jakobetz court stated:
The district court should focus on whether accepted protocol was adequately followed in a specific case, but the court, in exercising its discretion,
should be mindful that this issue should go more to the weight than to the
admissibility of the evidence. Rarely should such a factual determination be
excluded from jury consideration. With adequate cautionary instructions from
the trial judge, vigorous cross-examination of the government's experts, and
challenging testimony from defense experts, the jury should be allowed to
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Human error and misapplication of procedures will always be factors in
any scientific technique, and in any given case, courts may exclude DNA
on those grounds. Nevertheless, California courts should more fully embrace DNA evidence, despite Leahy's adhesion to the more conservative
general acceptance standard of admissibility.

PAUL B. TYLER 17 '

make its own factual determination as to whether the evidence is reliable.
Id.
171. The author was introduced to the issue of DNA admissibility through his work
as a law clerk for Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Lance A. Ito where he
assisted Judge Ito on the O.J. Simpson double-murder case. People v. Orenthal James
Simpson, BA 097211 (LA. Super. Ct. 1995).
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VIII. HEALING ARTS AND INSTITUTIONS
The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), limiting recovery of noneconomic damages
against a health care providerfor professional negligence to $250,000, applies to an actionfor partial
equitable indemnification by a concurrent
tortfeasor;furthermore, an indemnitee's reasonable
settlement in good faith, without notice or opportunity to defend, cannot bind an indemnitor:
Western S.S. Lines v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Western S.S. Lines v. San Pedro PeninsulaHospital,' the California
Supreme Court examined the issue of whether provisions in the Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000 should apply to partial equitable indemnification against
health care providers.2 The court of appeal affirmed the lower court's
ruling, holding that MICRA did not apply because Western sought economic damages from the hospital.3 The appellate court further found
that no MICRA provision would prohibit an indemnitee from seeking an
allocation of liability involving the negligence of a health care provider.4

1. 8 Cal. 4th 100, 876 P.2d 1062, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d 263 (1994). Justice Arabian
authored the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Baxter, George and Cottle concurred. Id. ai 104, 876 P.2d at 1063, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
264; see infra notes 2-28 and accompanying text. Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 119, 876 P.2d at 1073, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion).
2. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 100, 876 P.2d at 1063, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264.
3. Id. at 105-06, 876 P.2d at 1064, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265-66.
4. Id. at 106, 876 P.2d at 1065, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d at 266. On October 28, 1993, Ann
Lennon became seriously ill while working as an assistant purser for Western Steamship Lines, Inc. Id. at 104, 876 P.2d at 1063, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264. She was taken to
San Pedro Peninsula Hospital where she was treated by Dr. Samuel Wirtschafter. Id. at
104-05, 876 P.2d at 1063-64, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. The hospital staff improperly intubated Lennon, causing her to suffer cardiac arrest and oxygen deprivation. Id. at 105,
876 P.2d at 1064, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. She never regained consciousness. Id.
Lennon's guardian sued Western based on "negligence and unseaworthiness" and sought
damages for "maintenance and cure and unearned wages." Id. The jury awarded
Lennon $7.75 million. Id. Western appealed, but finally settled with Lennon's guardian
for $6 million, including "maintenance and cure." Id. Western then sought indemnification from the hospital and the doctor to the extent of their proportionate share of liability, which the jury found to be 50 percent and 30 percent, respectively. Id. Dr.
Wirtschafter settled with Western for $1 million. Id. The trial court determined that
MICRA did not apply and entered judgment against the hospital for $1.8 million. Id. at
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HI. TREATMENT
A.

Majority Opinion

In determining the appropriateness of equitable, indemnification for
concurrent tortfeasors, the California Supreme Court analyzed the
"unique context"5 of Western's recovery rather than relying solely on the
statutory construction of section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code.' In
determining whether equitable indemnification is available to a negligent
healthcare provider from a concurrent tortfeasor, the supreme court
began with a historical overview of the doctrine of equitable indemnification.7 Courts often limit the application of equitable indemnification in
circumstances where countervailing considerations may require limited
recovery, such as immunity for good-faith settlements and exclusivity for
workers' compensation.8 In these situations, the strong public policies of
encouraging settlement negotiations and shielding employers paying
workers' compensation from third-party liability to concurrent

106, 876 P.2d at 1064, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. The court of appeal affirmed. Id.
5. Id. at 107, 876 P.2d at 1065, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266 (stating that a broad examination of all the relevant circumstances is required to determine whether Western's recovery is appropriate).
6. See CA. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1994). Section 2333.2 reads in pertinent part:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on
professional negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover
noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses
exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
Id. See generally 70 CJ.S. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 101-107 (1987 & Supp. 1994); 6
B.E. WrITN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 778 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing MICRA's provisions); 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions § 185
(Supp. 1994) (discussing MICRA provisions).
7. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 107, 876 P.2d at 1065, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. Indemnity,
which originated from common law, at one time permitted a tortfeasor to shift the
entire burden of loss to another tortfeasor. However, the doctrine has been modified to
permit partial indemnity, which is apportioned among multiple tortfeasors based upon
each tortfeasor's relative degree of fault. American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). Nevertheless, the court found
specific instances in which the application of partial equitable indemnity is prohibited.
Id. at 607 n.9, 578 P.2d at 918 n.9, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201 n.9. See generally 5 B.E.
WrriN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 89 (9th ed. 1988); 14 CAL JUR. 3D Contribution § 81 (1974 & Supp. 1994).
8. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 109, 876 P.2d at 1067, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
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tortfeasors, respectively, have superceded application of the doctrine."
Analyzing the statutory language of section 3333.2 is ineffectual because
such analysis "fails to account for such countervailing policy considerations" that prohibit the application of indemnity." Therefore, the court
should not assess the noneconomic damages of a claim for partial indemnity, but rather, examine the legal principles upon which MICRA is
based."
Having established the proper analysis, the supreme court then examined the public policy of MICRA to determine if such countervailing policy considerations exist. 2 The legislature enacted the provisions of MICRA to control the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance and,
more specifically, to minimize the possibility that many doctors would
practice without insurance, "leaving patients who might be injured by
such doctors with the prospect of uncollectible judgments." 3 The availability of adequate medical care is a function of affordable insurance
coverage, which, in large part, depends on the costs associated with
medical malpractice litigation.' Accordingly, MICRA attempts to reduce
the cost of medical malpractice insurance by limiting noneconomic damages." By limiting noneconomic damages, MICRA is designed to create a
more stable base upon which to set insurance rates and obviate the unpredictability of large settlements." To exempt indemnification actions
from the limits set forth in MICRA would only serve to regenerate the
instability and unpredictability of noneconomic awards that were present
before the enactment of MICRA.'7
Justice Arabian analogized the present case to the indemnification
exception in workers' compensation. 8 Prior to the enactment of Labor
Code section 3864, employers who were liable for workers' compensation found themselves also liable to third parties through partial equitable indemnity, despite the "exclusive remedy theory of workmen's compensation statutes."9 The legislature enacted Labor Code section 3864

9. Id. at 110, 876 P.2d at 1067, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
10. Id. at 110-11, 876 P.2d at 1067-68, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269.
11. Id. at 111, 876 P.2d at 1068, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 158, 695 P.2d
665, 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 383, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985)).
14. Id. (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 372,
683 P.2d 670, 678, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 679 (1984)).
15. Id. at 112, 876 P.2d at 1068, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269.
16. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d at 163, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
17. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 112, 876 P.2d at 1068-69, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270.
18. Id. at 113-14, 876 P.2d at 1069-70, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270-71.
19. Id. at 113, 876 P.2d at 1069, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270 (quoting City of Sacramento
v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. App. 2d 398, 404-05, 23 Cal. Rptr. 43, 47 (1962)).
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not only to protect employers from the double liability arising from both
the injured employee's workers' compensation and additional damage
awards to third parties,' but also to reduce employer insurance costs.2
The court concluded that the relevant provisions of MICRA, like its counterparts in the Labor Code, seek to contain insurance costs. Therefore, to
allow equitable indemnity against health care providers in excess of
$250,000 would undoubtedly contravene the express intent of the statute.n
In addition to its consideration of legislative intent, the court noted the
fact that indemnification does not always follow fault.' Because indemnification only arises where a legal obligation exists, it is subject to ordinary limitations.' The court drew an analogy between the present case
and the case of Colich & Sons v. Pacific BeU.Y In a negligence action
for interrupted phone service, Colich, an excavation subcontractor who
damaged phone lines belonging to United Airlines, could not seek comparative indemnity from Pacific Bell because a liability tariff filed with
the Public Utilities Commission precluded direct and derivative claims
against the phone company.' Similarly, the statutory scheme of MICRA
limits liability of health care providers to those who bring an action directly as well as to those concurrent tortfeasors who bring an action
derivatively. 7
Having determined that a right to indemnification exists only when a
legal obligation exists, the court held that because MICRA limits health
care providers' legal obligation, the providers are not unjustly enriched at

20. California Labor Code § 3864 reads:
If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the
employer, or both jointly against the third person results in judgment against
such third person, or settlement by such third person, the employer shall
have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such
judgment or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed

prior to the injury.
CAL LAB. CODE § 3864 (West 1989).
21. Id.
22. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 116, 876 P.2d at 1071, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272-73.
23. Id. at 115, 876 P.2d at 1070, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272 (citing Colich & Sons v.
Pacific Bell, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 1236, 244 Cal. Rptr. 714, 719 (1988)).
24. Id. at 114-15, 876 P.2d at 1070, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 271.
25. 198 Cal. App. 3d 1225, 244 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1988).
26. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 115, 876 P.2d at 1071, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
27. Id. at 116, 876 P.2d at 1071, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272.
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the expense of concurrent tortfeasors.' This case is like any other in
which one tortfeasor is immunized or insolvent and the remaining
tortfeasor has to pay more than his or her fair share.' To achieve the
goal of reducing insurance costs, MICRA shifts the burden from health
care providers to injured plaintiffs, and, in this case, to negligent nonMICRA defendants.'
In addressing the question of whether a health care provider is bound
by the good faith settlement of an indemnitee, the court concluded that
the indemnitor cannot be bound by the indemnitee without due process
and notice."
B.

JusticeMosk's Dissenting Opinion

Justice Mosk agreed with the court of appeal's "dispassionate reading"32 and examination of the provisions of MICRA, namely, that if the
legislature intended the statute to govern in cases of equitable indemnification, it would have stated this intention in "word or context. "' Furthermore, Justice Mosk agreed that Western sought economic damages
from the hospital and, therefore, MICRA should not apply.'
More importantly, Justice Mosk reviewed the brief, unproductive history of MICRA. Instead of containing the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance, MICRA forces the innocent victim to bear the burden of
the health care provider's wrongdoing.' Justice Mosk expressed doubt
as to the constitutionality of these provisions, and refused to risk extending the scope of these provisions to indemnification actions, especially in
light of MICRA's pronounced failure to fulfill its goal.37

28. Id. at 116-17, 876 P.2d at 1072, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 272-73.
29. Colich & Sons v. Pacific Bell, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 1237, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 720
(1988).
30. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 117, 876 P.2d at 1072, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 273.
31. Id. at 118, 876 P.2d at 1073, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 274; see also Jennings v. United
States, 374 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1967) (stating that in order to satisfy due process
requirements, notice and opportunity to be heard are required before an indemnitor
can be bound by an indemnitee's unilateral acts, even if the acts are "reasonable and
undertaken in good faith").
32. Western, 8 Cal. 4th at 119, 876 P.2d at 1074, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 275 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
33. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting)
35. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting)
36. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 387, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 688, 683 P.2d 670, 689 (1984) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
37. Id. at 120, 876 P.2d at 1074, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 275 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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III.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

Critics of MICRA have voiced concerns over the potential constitutional problems which arise in medical malpractice cases.' Many states
have responded to these criticisms by finding such provisions
unconstitutional.' Furthermore, many argue that statutory caps obstruct
the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial because statutory
caps substitute a jury's findings of fact with predetermined legislative
findings.' Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of MICRA despite its effect of shifting the burden to
injured plaintiffs.
It is obvious that the California Supreme Court will continue to interpret MICRA in a manner that fulfills its express purpose even though it
has the effect of subjecting medical malpractice victims to a greater burden. Allowing concurrent non-MICRA tortfeasors to bear part of the
burden in indemnification actions is a natural extension of the court's
overall goal to reduce medical malpractice insurance costs, which, in
turn, will theoretically lead to more affordable care for the populous at
large. The court clearly felt that the importance of maintaining adequate
health care for the state outweighs the possible inequitable allocation of
damages. The supreme court will undoubtedly continue to pursue its goal
of shifting liability away from health care providers in accordance with
MICRA provisions. However, with growing concern over such statutory

38. See Stephen K Meyer, Comment, The California Statutory Cap on Noneconomic
Damages in Medical Malpractice Claims: Implications on the Right to a Trial By
Jury, 32 SANTA CLARA L REV. 1197, 1200 (1992). There is no evidence to support the
premise that statutory caps on the amount recoverable in cases involving health care
provider negligence reduce insurance costs. Id. Furthermore, opponents contend that
such caps treat plaintiffs with differing levels of pain and suffering the same and that
its goal of affing a price on a plaintiffs life is objectionable. See Jane C. Arancibia,
Note, Statutory Caps on Damage Awards in Medical Malpractice Cases, 13 OKI.. CITY
U. L REV. 135, 151 (1988).
39. Todd M. Kossow, Note, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group: Future Trends in
Damage Limitation Adjudication, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1643, 1653 (1986); see also Carson
v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (stating that implementing statutory caps
on the amount recoverable in a medical malpractice case was an insubstantial method
for reducing insurance rates).
40. Meyer, supra note 38, at 1210.
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caps, it remains to be seen how far the court can go in order to achieve
this aim.

STEVEN HORNBERGER
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X. JUVENILE LAW
When a juvenile is arrested without a warrant, the
Constitution requires a prompt hearing to determine probable cause; however, such a hearing need
not be held within forty-eight hours:
Alfredo A. v. Superior Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Atfredo A. v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court considered Alfredo A.'s contention that a juvenile is entitled to a prompt
hearing within forty-eight hours following a warrantless arrest.' The

1. 6 Cal. 4th 1212, 865 P.2d 56, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 86
(1994). Chief Justice Lucas authored the plurality opinion, with Justices Panelli and
Baxter concurring. Id. at 1215-32, 865 P.2d at 57-69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624-36. Justice
Arabian filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 1232-36, 865 P.2d at
69-71, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636-39 (Arabian, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk
filed a dissenting opinion, with Justices George and Kennard concurring. Id. at 1236-58,
865 P.2d at 71-85, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639-53 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice George also
wrote a separate dissent. Id. at 1258-59, 865 P.2d at 85-86, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653-54
(George, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1215-16, 865 P.2d at 58, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625. On July 24, 1991, Alfredo
A., a 16 year old minor, was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of possession of
cocaine base for sale. Id. at 1216-17, 865 P.2d at 59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626. The following day, Alfredo A. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that:
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, petitioner is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for his continued detention within 48 hours of his arrest No such judicial determination
has been made, and no determination will be made within the 48-hour period. This is because the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Juvenile Court,
has adopted as its 'official position" that a juvenile is not entitled to such a
prompt probable cause determination.
Id. at 1217, 865 P.2d at 59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626 (quoting petition for habeas corpus).
Although petitioner's claim was moot because he was released after five days in
custody, the court of appeal decided to hear the case because the claim was "'capable
of repetition, yet evading review.'" Id. at 1219, 865 P.2d at 60, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627
(quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n.3 (1984) (where the Court heard
juveniles' constitutional due process argument concerning their pre-trial detention hearings)). The court of appeal rejected the petitioner's claim and found that California's
statutory scheme passed constitutional muster, thereby rendering the 48-hour rule inapplicable to juveniles. Afredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1218, 865 P.2d at 60, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
627. The California Supreme Court granted review. Id. at 1215-16, 865 P.2d at 58, 26
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United States Supreme Court in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
held that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable
cause within 48 hours of arrest" satisfies the Fourth Amendment's
promptness requirement.4 The California Supreme Court granted review
to determine the constitutionality of the Los Angeles County Juvenile
Court's policy in refusing to apply McLaughlin's forty-eight hour rule in
juvenile detention proceedings.' On rehearing, the supreme court held.
that the Constitution does not require that a juvenile be given a probable
cause hearing within forty-eight hours following a warrantless arrest.'
H.
A.

TREATMENT

The Lead Opinion

The determinative question in Afredo A. was what constitutes a
prompt hearing following a warrantless arrest of a juvenile.7 The petitioner contended that promptness, as defined under McLaughlin, required that a court make a probable cause determination within fortyeight hours of arrest.8 The respondent argued that the forty-eight hour

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625.
3. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
4. Id. at 56. In McLaughlin, the Supreme Court considered whether persons arrested without a warrant are entitled to receive a probable cause determination within 48
hours after arrest even if such probable cause determinations are combined with other
pre-trial proceedings. Id. at 47-50. The Court held that a prompt determination of probable cause must be made within 48 hours of arrest. Id. at 56. The Court reasoned that
when a probable cause determination is made within 48 hours, the burden is on the
arrested person to show unreasonable delay, whereas, when a probable cause determination is not made within 48 hours, the burden is on the government to show that no
unreasonable delay existed. Id. at 56-57. For a discussion of County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, see Victoria W. Chavey, Comment, The Forty-Eight Hour Rule and County
of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 72 B.U. L REV. 403 (1992), and Elizabeth J. Morahan, Comment, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin: The "Promptness"of a Probable Cause Determination, 27 NEw ENG. L REV. 411 (1992).
5. A/fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1215-16, 865 P.2d at 58, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625. The
Los Angeles County Juvenile Court adopted this policy in July of 1991. Id.
6. Id. at 1231-32, 865 P.2d at 68, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
7. Id. at 1222, 865 P.2d at 62, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629; see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 114, 120 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment mandates a prompt determination of probable cause following a warrantless arrest). For a discussion of
Gerstein, see Wendy L. Brandes, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth Amendment:
Refining the Standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 445 (1989),
which argues that the Gerstein standard is too vague to adequately protect Fourth
Amendment rights.
8. A(fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1217, 865 P.2d at 59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626; see
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
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time limitation following a warrantless arrest is inapplicable to juveniles
because the rights of juveniles are distinguishable from those of adults.'
The supreme court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution requires a prompt determination of the existence of probable cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the
crime." Nevertheless, the court observed that while there is precedent
requiring a hearing to take place within forty-eight hours of a warrantless
arrest of an adult, the instant case was factually distinguishable because
it involved a juvenile." The court reasoned that certain differences exist
in the treatment of juveniles and adults because "'juveniles, unlike adults,
are always in some form of custody.'" 2 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment does not compel juvenile
detention hearings to be held within forty-eight hours following a warrantiess arrest." Therefore, the court held that Alfredo A. lacked a valid
claim for unlawful detention because McLaughlin does not apply to
juveniles."'
In accordance with section 632, subdivision a, of the California Welfare
and Institutions Code, a formal juvenile detention hearing must be conducted within seventy-two hours pursuant to a juvenile's warrantless
arrest.' 6 The California Supreme Court noted that courts should include

9. ALfedo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1216, 865 P.2d at 58, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625.
10. Id. at 1230-31, 865 P.2d at 67-68, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635; see U.S. CONST. amend.
IV; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 120.
11. ALfedo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1225, 865 P.2d at 64, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631; see
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
12. Afedo A., 6 Cal. 4th 1228, 865 P.2d at 66, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633 (quoting
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)); see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766
(1982) (holding that juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from adult proceedings because of the state's parens patriae interest in the child); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-50. (1971) (holding that a minor has no right to a jury
trial).
13. Afedo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1231-32, 865 P.2d at 68, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636; see
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1449-51 (1993) (addressing procedural due process claims and implicitly rejecting a rigid 48-hour maximum time limit
detaining juvenile inuigrants following a warrantless arrest).
14. Afredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1231-32, 865 P.2d at 68, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636; see
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56. Although the United States Supreme Court decided
McLaughlin seven years after Schall, the Supreme Court of California construed Schal
to limit the due process rights of juveniles, including the right to a hearing within 48
hours following a warrantless arrest. A(fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1231-32, 865 P.2d at 68,
26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
15. Id. at 1231, 865 P.2d at 68, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635; see CAL WELF. & INST.
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nontudicial days16 when calculating the seventy-two hour period within
which they must hold a detention hearing.17 The court explained that

there is no exception for nonjudicial days in calculating statutory time
limitations on retaining juveniles in custody. 8 Instead, "a separate, timely judicial determination of probable cause for any extended period of
detention beyond the 72 hours following arrest" is required to prevent
9
the unlawful detention of juveniles."
B.

JusticeArabian's Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Justice Arabian concurred in the plurality opinion to the extent that
the Constitution requires a prompt probable cause determination within
seventy-two hours of a juvenile's warrantless arrest.' Justice Arabian
dissented from the lead opinion's due process approach to decide the
issue rather than analyzing Alfredo A.'s contention under the Fourth
Amendment." Justice Arabian emphasized that the court should recognize the need for flexibility when adjudicating juvenile cases.'
Justice Arabian criticized the plurality for addressing issues that went
beyond the scope of the petitioner's claim.' He found McLaughlin distinguishable and that a determination of probable cause within seventytwo hours satisfies the juvenile's constitutional right to a prompt hearing.' Justice Arabian reasoned that permitting the retention of juveniles

CODE § 632(a) (West 1984
CAUFORNIA LAw, Parent &

& Supp. 1994). See generally 10 B.E. WITIUN, SUMMARY OF
Child §§ 737, 743 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1994) (discussing
time and conduct of detention hearings).
16. Nonjudicial days are defined as weekends and holidays in which the court is not
open or in sessioh. See Amfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1232 & n.6, 865 P.2d at 68-69 & n.6,
26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636 & n.6.
17. Id. at 1232, 865 P.2d at 68-69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1232, 865 P.2d at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
20. Atfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1232, 865 P.2d. at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636 (Arabian,
J., concurring and dissenting); see U.S. CONsT. amends. IV, XIV.
21. A0fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1232, 865 P.2d at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636-37 (Arabian, J., concurring and dissenting); see U.S. CONsr. amends. IV, XIV.
22. Afredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1235, 865 P.2d at 71, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Arabian,
J., concurring and dissenting). "[T]he Supreme Court has reiterated that 'probable cause
determinations must be prompt-not immediate' to maintain a necessary measure of
'"flexibility" and "experimentation"' within each state's criminal justice system." Id. at
1236, 865 P.2d at 71, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d at 639 (Arabian, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 54 (1991)); see New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 540 (1975); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
23. A~fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1232-33, 865 P.2d at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636-37 (Arabian, J., concurring and dissenting).
24. Id. at 1233, 865 P.2d at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 637 (Arabian, J., concurring and
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arrested without a warrant in custody for seventy-two hours without
exempting nonjudicial days was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment due to the particularized concerns facing the detention of
juveniles.'
C.

The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Mosk dissented from the majority opinion because he believed
that the United States Supreme Court's definition of promptness under
McLaughlin applied to juveniles and, consequently, entitled Alfredo A. to
a hearing within forty-eight hours of his warrantless arrest.' Justice
Mosk reasoned that the Bill of Rights extends to juveniles, as well as
adults, and that it would be unreasonable to detain a minor longer than
forty-eight hours prior to holding a hearing to establish probable cause.'
Although there are certain situations where adult and juvenile rights
differ, Justice Mosk explained that all persons arrested without a warrant
should be entitled to a hearing within forty-eight hours.' Analogizing to
McLaughlin, Justice Mosk argued that just as adults are released within
forty-eight hours if grounds for probable cause are lacking, juveniles
should also be released within forty-eight hours where no grounds exist
for further detention.'

dissenting); see McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
25. Alfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1236, 865 P.2d at 71, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 (Arabian,
J., concurring and dissenting); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The juvenile justice system,
in accordance with California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 626, 626.5, 628 and
628.1, provides an opportunity for counseling and rehabilitation of youthful offenders.
A(fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1236, 865 P.2d at 71, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 (Arabian, J.,
concurring and dissenting); see CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 626, 626.5, 628, 628.1 (West
1984 & Supp. 1994).
26. Atfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1236-37, 865 P.2d at 71-72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1243-44,, 865 P.2d at 76, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that the Bill of Rights, which includes notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to
confrontation and cross examination, applies to juveniles as well as to adults); In re
William G., 40 Cal. 3d 550, 557, 709 P.2d 1287, 1290, 221 Cal. Rptr. 118, 121 (1985)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to both juveniles and adults).
28. A(fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1244, 865 P.2d at 76-77, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). Justice Mosk reasoned that juveniles should not be unnecessarily detained because "[t]he presence of youth does not make up for the absence of probable
cause." Id. at 1244, 865 P.2d at 77, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1245, 865 P.2d at 77, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see
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The dissent further criticized the majority's reliance on the United
State Supreme Court's holding in Schall v. Martin, which determined
that a juvenile's right to due process may be subordinate to a state's
parens patriae interest.' Justice Mosk reasoned that Schall is inapplicable because the Court based its decision on the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause rather than a Fourth Amendment analysis.3 ' Furthermore, Justice Mosk found Schall factually distinguishable from the instant case because it discussed adversarial, formal probable cause hearings in which there was a court order authorizing the minor's detention.' Contending that the Sctll opinion cannot reasonably be read to
limit the forty-eight hour promptness requirement solely to adults, the
dissenting Justices would have reversed the judgment of the court of
appeal and required the lower courts to apply McLaughlin to juveniles as
well as adults.'
Justice George concurred in Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion and
wrote separately, stating that the Court's decision in McLaughlin should
control and that no persons arrested without a warrant should remain in
custody longer than forty-eight hours prior to a probable cause hearing.' Justice George agreed with Justice Mosk's conclusion that no state
interest justifies detaining a juvenile for a longer period of time than an
adult prior to making a probable cause determination.' He observed
that because of their age, juveniles are more likely to be negatively impacted by a prolonged detention than adults.' As a result, Justice
George would have found all persons entitled to a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest.'

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
30. Alfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1247-48, 865 "P.2d at 78-79, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646-47
(Mosk, J., dissenting); see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
31. A/fredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1249, 865 P.2d at 79, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV, XIV; Schall, 467 U.S. at 258 n.5.
32. Alfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1249, 865 P.2d at 79, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); see Schall, 467 U.S. at 258-59.
33. Alfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1257, 865 P.2d at 85, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); see McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Schal, 467 U.S. at 263.
34. Alfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1258, 865 P.2d at 85, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (George,
J., dissenting); see McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56.
35. Alfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1258, 865 P.2d at 85, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653-54
(George, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1258, 865 P.2d at 85-86, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 654 (George, J., dissenting);
see In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 31 n.25, 473 P.2d 737, 747 n.25, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43
n.25 (1970).
37. Alfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1258, 865 P.2d at 85, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653 (George,
J., dissenting).
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Iml.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court decided that although the Constitution
requires a juvenile detention hearing, it does not mandate one within
forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest.' The supreme court rejected
the McLaughlin decision as it applies to juveniles and found that a juvenile detention hearing held within seventy-two hours of a warrantless
arrest satisfies constitutional due process concerns.' Thus, this court's
decision clarifies the application of Gerstein and McLaughlin in determining when a prompt detention hearing must be held following the
warrantless arrest of a juvenile.'

JEANNE M. MACCALDEN

38. Id. at 1231-32, 865 P.2d at 68, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
39. Id. at 1216, 865 P.2d at 58-59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625-26; see U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV; County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
40. Atfredo A., 6 Cal. 4th at 1216, 865 P.2d at 58-59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625-26; see
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 120 (1975).

X.

LIBEL AND SLANDER
Deposition testimony and other statements taken in
connection with private, contractual arbitration
proceedings are protected from tort liability by the
absolute immunity granted under California's litigation privilege embodied in Civil Code section
47(b): Moore v. Conliffe.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Moore v. Conliffe,' the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether statements made by an expert witness at a deposition
held in connection with a private, contractual arbitration proceeding fall
within the litigation privilege2 embodied in Civil Code section 47, subdi-

1. 7 Cal. 4th 634, 871 P.2d 204, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152 (1994). Justice George
authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas, Justice Arabian and Justice
Sills concurred. Id. at 637-58, 871 P.2d at 205-19, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153-67; see infra
notes 7-26 and accompanying text. Justice Baxter wrote a separate dissenting opinion
in which Justices Mosk and Kennard concurred. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 658-72, 871 P.2d
at 219-28, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167-76 (Baxter, J., dissenting); see inra notes 27-41 and
accompanying text.
2. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 637-38, 871 P.2d at 205, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153. DeWanda
Atkinson died of hepatitis in 1984, allegedly as a result of taking the drug Isoniazid,
prescribed by her physicians at Kaiser (DeWanda's health insurance company) to treat
her tuberculosis. Id. at 638-39, 871 P.2d at 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154. DeWanda's
mother and siblings, along with her estate, filed a wrongful death action against Kaiser,
asserting that the prescription of Isoniazid amounted to negligence. Id.
The parties stipulated to mandatory arbitration, as was called for by the provisions of the insurance contract. Id. Kaiser retained Dr. Conliffe as a medical expert.
Id. During a break in the arbitration proceedings, the plaintiffs deposed Dr. Conliffe.
Id. at 638-39, 871 P.2d at 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154. At the deposition, Dr. Conliffe
failed to produce copies of documents he reviewed before giving his testimony and he
also stated that he was unaware of any medical literature supporting the plaintiffs
contention that the decedent could have contracted hepatitis through the use of Isonazid. Id.
The arbitrators found in favor of Kaiser. Id. Although they found negligence, the
majority of arbitrators found that the plaintiffs had not proven death by Isoniazid-induced hepatitis. Id. The plaintiffs attorney later discovered an article, published only
three months prior to Dr. Conliffe's deposition, containing information that Dr. Conliffe
submitted to the author and using DeWanda's case "as an example of Isoniazic-induced
death." Id.
The plaintiffs filed a petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award. Id. at 640,
871 P.2d at 207, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155. In addition, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to recover damages for misconduct against Kaiser, their attorneys, and the arbitrator. Id.
The plaintiffs added Dr. Conliffe to the lawsuit and alleged, in part, intentional and
negligent misrepresentation and suppression of fact. Id. The trial court sustained a
demurrer by Dr. Conliffe, stating that Dr. Conliffe's statements fell within the litigation
privilege, and dismissed the action with prejudice. Id. The court of appeal reversed,
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vision (b).' The court carefully considered the purpose and history of
the litigation privilege in addition to several California decisions interpreting and applying section 47(b). 4
After noting that the purpose of the litigation privilege is to encourage
witnesses to testify completely, truthfully, and without fear of potential
liability, the court found that this purpose strongly supported applying
the litigation privilege to arbitration.5 Accordingly, the court held that

stating that the § 47(b) litigation privilege does not apply to statements taken as part
of a private contractual arbitration proceeding. Id.
3. California Civil Code § 47(b) states in relevant part- "A privileged publication or
broadcast is one made: . . . (b) In any . . . (2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other
official proceeding authorized by law .. . ." CAL CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982 & Supp.
1994). All remaining statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
See also 5 B.E. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 504-505 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1994) (stating that witnesses enjoy absolute privilege for statements made
in relation to judicial proceedings, which includes arbitration proceedings because of
their similarity to judicial 'proceedings). See generally Douglas R. Richmond, The
Emerging Theory of Expert Witness Malpractice, 22 CAP. U. L REv. 693 (1993) (surveying the current state of the law and advancing a theory that courts should move
away from absolute immunity for expert witnesses); Douglas Pahl, Note, Absolute Immunity for the Negligent Expert Witness: Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens, 26 WILLAMErrE L.
REV. 1051 (1990) (analyzing the rule of witness immunity as applied to the expert witness and explaining the problems in applying the rule in Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens, 113
Wash. 2d 123, 776 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1989)).
4. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 640-56, 871 P.2d at 207-18, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-166; see
Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1990) (ruling
that the privilege accorded to defamatory statements made during judicial proceedings
is now applicable to any communication and all torts except malicious prosecution);
Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985) (holding that arbitration hearings are within the scope of § 47(b) because they are analogous to judicial proceedings); Hackethal v. Weissbein, 24 Cal. 3d 55, 592 P.2d 1175, 154 Cal. Rptr.
423 (1979) (finding that a peer review proceeding held before a private medical society
"judicial commission" was not an official proceeding entitled to absolute privilege under
§ 47(b)); Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 211 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1983) (recognizing that arbitrators are immune from civil liability for statements and actions made in
their quasi-judicial capacity, but finding a qualified immunity as opposed to an absolute
immunity). But see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994) (effectively overruling Barr by enacting a provision which gives arbitrators absolute immunity).
See generally 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Wilful Torts § 214 (1988 & Supp.
1994) (delineating the scope and history of the privilege in judicial proceedings).
5. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 643, 871 P.2d at 209, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tors § 588 cmt a (1965) (witness testimony is fundamentally important to the justice system and must not be hindered by fear of defamation lawsuits); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 71 (1987) (public policy dictates the need for an
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the litigation privilege encompassed and absolutely protected statements
made in the context of private, contractual arbitration proceedings.'
II.
A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion

Justice George, writing for the majority, first considered the previous
supreme court case of Silberg v. Anderson7 in which the court undertook an extensive examination of the scope, nature and purpose of the
litigation privilege embodied in section 47(b).' The majority stated that
the purpose of the litigation privilege, as described in Silberg, supported
applying the privilege to witnesses who testify in connection with private, contractual arbitration proceedings."

absolute privilege to allow the parties to speak freely and to protect them from defamation lawsuits); J.H. Crabb, Annotation, Testimony of Witness as Basis of Civil Action for Damages, 54 A.L.R.2D 1298, 1310 (1957) (witnesses in noNjudicial hearings
have traditionally been accorded the same privileges of immunity from libel and slander as witnesses in judicial proceedings when the hearing is similar in nature).
6. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 658, 871 P.2d at 219, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167; see also ADR
Immunity Holds, NAT'L LJ., May 9, 1994, at AB (the California Supreme Court brings
California "back in line with national policy" by holding that witnesses cannot be sued
for statements made during private arbitration proceedings).
7. 50 Cal. 3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1990). In Silberg, the court defined the litigation privilege as applying "to any communication (1) made in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3)
to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical
relation to the action." Id. at 212, 786 P.2d at 369, 266 Cal. Rptr. 642; see generally 6
CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Wilful Torts § 214 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (delineating
the scope and history of the privilege).
8. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 641, 871 P.2d at 207, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155; CAL Civ.
CODE § 47 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
9. 50 Cal. 3d at 213-14, 786 P.2d at 369-70, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43. The purposes
include: (1) allowing witnesses and litigants to testify without fear of legal reprisals;
(2) encouraging "open channels of communication" and the effective introduction of
evidence in judicial proceedings; (3) assuring open communications between citizens
and public authorities who investigate wrongdoings; and (4) ensuring the integrity and
finality of the ultimate outcome reached through the litigation process. Id.; see also
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (examining the same policy considerations for
an absolute .privilege accorded to witnesses at common law); Eugene Scalla, Comment,
Police Witness Immunity Under § 1983, 56 U. CHI. L REV. 1433 (1989) (discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)).
10. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 643-44, 871 P.2d at 209, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (stating that
the privilege was broad enough to include all statements, not just those made in a
deposition proceeding); see also 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel & Slander § 237 (1970) (stating
that the rule granting absolute privilege to judicial proceedings also extends to arbitration proceedings, pre-trial depositions, and discovery proceedings); M. Schneiderman,
Annotation, Libel & Slander: Application of Privilege Attending Statements Made in
Course of Judicial Proceedings to Pretrial Deposition and Discovery Procedures, 23
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The court's analysis hinged on its finding that arbitration is designed to
serve a function similar to that of a trial court hearing.1" The majority
thought it inherently unfair to deny the privilege to a witness compelled
to testify in a private arbitration proceeding while granting that privilege
to a witness compelled to testify in a judicial proceeding. 2 Accordingly,
the majority considered the "big picture" and determined that an absolute privilege of protection for arbitration witnesses was necessary to
protect the integrity and finality of the arbitrator's decision and to prevent unending litigation. 3
The court next addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the language of
section 47(b) precluded application of the statute to arbitration. 4 Relying on two previous supreme court decisions, 5 the majority pronounced
that section 47(b) was clearly broad enough to encompass arbitration
proceedings within the litigation privilege. 6 First, it was noted that the

A.LR.3D 1172, 1176 (1969 & Supp. 1994) (the privilege applies to depositions and discovery procedures "so long as the statements have some relevance to the proceeding
in which they are uttered").
11. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 643-44, 871 P.2d at 209, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157; see
Sturdivant v. Seaboard Serv. Sys., Ltd., 459 A.2d 1058 (D.C. 1983); 5 B.E. WrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 504-505 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (stating that
witnesses enjoy absolute privilege for statements made in arbitration proceedings because of their similarity to judicial proceedings); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 586 cml. d (1977); William J. Andrle, Jr., Extension of Absolute Privilege to Defamation in Arbitration Proceedings-Sturdivant v. Seaboard Service System, Ltd., 33 CATH.
U. L REV. 1073, 1079-84 (1984) (arbitration proceedings are "quasi-judicial" proceedings
which require the same protections afforded witnesses and parties in judicial proceedings); Paul T. Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator's Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54
Omo ST. L.J. 985, 994 (1993) (courts that have followed the Restatement's position that
the term "judicial proceedings" may include arbitration proceedings have applied the
immunity privilege to statements made in connection with arbitration).
12. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 643-44, 871 P.2d at 209, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
13. Id. at 644, 871 P.2d at 209, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157; see generally S. Gale Dick,
ADR at the Crossroads, 49 DISP. RESOL J. 47 (1994) (contemplating the current trends
in court decisions regarding the dispute resolution process, including the application of
privileges); Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, Arbitral Immunity, 11 INDUS. REL LJ.
228 (1989) (discussing the origin, theory and legal status of arbitral immunity).
14. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 644-45, 871 P.2d at 210, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158; CAL Cir.
CODE § 47 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994) ("A privileged publication or broadcast is one
made . . . (b) [in any (1) legislative or (2).judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other
official proceeding authorized by law . . .).
15. Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 (1990);
Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985).
16. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 645, 871 P.2d at 210, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158.
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Silberg court found that the term "judicial proceeding" also applied to
"quasi-judicial" proceedings. 7 Second, the majority pointed out that the
Ribas v. Clark decision specifically stated that arbitration hearings fall

within the scope of the section 47(b) privilege because of their similarity
to judicial proceedings." In addition to these two cases, the court cited
section 588 of the Restatement Second of Torts as further support of its
position."9
In an effort to establish that the legislature did not intend the section
47(b) privilege to extend to non-governmental proceedings,' the plaintiffs relied on Hackethal v. Weissbein.2' Hackethal involved a peer review proceeding by a private medical society in which the court held that
the litigation privilege did not apply.' The majority distinguished
Hackethal from the instant case by stating that peer review hearings are
clearly different from private contractual arbitration.' The court further
reasoned that the litigation privilege was intended by the legislature to
encompass both governmental and non-governmental proceedings and
that Hackethal was effectively overruled by the legislature when it enacted a new subsection to section 47(b) which extended the privilege to

17. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 212, 786 P.2d at 369, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642; see supra note
7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the privilege as defined in Silberg.
18. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 645, 871 P.2d at 210, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158 (the majority
states that a review of Ribas indicates that the stated principle that arbitration hearings fall within the scope of section 47(b) was an essential element of the holding in
Ribas, and not dictum as the plaintiff claimed); Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 364, 696 P.2d at
643, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 148 ("[p]laintiff concedes, as he must, that an arbitration hearing
falls within the scope of this (section 47(b)] privilege because of its analogy to a judicial proceeding."); see 5 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAMFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 504-505
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (stating that witnesses enjoy absolute privilege for statements made in arbitration proceedings because of their similarity to judicial proceedings); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 586 cmt. d (1977)(stating that arbitration
proceedings are included in the term "judicial proceedings").
19. "A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as a part of
a judicial proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the proceeding .. . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 (1965). "Judicial proceedings include
all proceedings in which an officer or tribunal exercises judicial functions, as to which
see § 585, Comments c and f. As indicated there, an arbitration proceeding may be
included." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 & cmt. d (1965).
20. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 651, 871 P.2d at 214-15, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-63.
21. 24 Cal. 3d 55, 592 P.2d 1175, 154 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979).
22. Id.
23. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 651, 871 P.2d at 214-15, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-63. Distinguishing characteristics include: (1) the peer review procedure is a private
organization's internal procedure which is not a substitute for a court proceeding as is
arbitration; and (2) the decision makers in a peer review proceeding were not, at that
time, protected by the absolute privilege as arbitrators have been for many years. Id.
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"any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable [by writ of mandate]."IA
In sum, the Moore v. Conliffe majority recognized that witnesses testifying in connection with private contractual arbitration proceedings are
protected by the statutory privilege, effectively making them immune
from tort liability for their statements.' Accordingly, the court reversed
and remanded to the court of appeal to affirm the trial court's dismissal
of the complaint against Conliffe on the grounds of privilege.'
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Writing for the dissent, Justice Baxter attacked the majority's reasoning on two grounds.' First, Baxter proffered that the legislature created
the privilege in section 47(b) solely for the protection of communications
made in a judicial proceeding and that the scope of the privilege could
not be enlarged by the court.' Second, Baxter argued that the legislature has already addressed the arbitration setting by creating immunity
for arbitrators, but significantly has not created immunity for any other
party in arbitration.'
The dissent further attacked the majority's reliance on a single sentence in Ribas to declare that the court has already extended the litigation privilege to arbitration.' The dissent asserted that the sentence was
only a concession mentioned in "dictum" and certainly not sound prece-

24. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 652, 871 P.2d at 163, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215; CAL Civ.
§ 47 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
25. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 658, 871 P.2d at 219, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167.
26. Id.
27. Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Mosk and Kennard).
28. Id. The dissent quoted the Code of Civil Procedure § 1858 to support the
proposition that the majority's view is incorrect. The majority sought to insert into the
statute that which was omitted rather than simply ascertaining and declaring the substance of the statute.
29. Id; see CAL Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1280.1.
30. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 661, 871 P.2d at 221, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169; see supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
CODE
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dent." Therefore, the dissent concluded that the majority's reliance on
the asserted precedent value of Ribas was misplaced.'
Additionally, Baxter's dissent set forth a list of the factors taken into
account by the California legislature in its decision to create the litigation
privilege for judicial proceedings.' Baxter then contrasted private arbitration with judicial proceedings, concluding that private arbitration lacks
the protections afforded by the judicial process.' Ultimately, the dissent
found that the legislature has not overlooked the possible need to extend
the communication privileges as evidenced by both its granting of immunity to arbitrators and its creation of privileges in numerous other instances.'
Finally, the dissent asserted that a private contractual arbitration proceeding is not an official proceeding within the design of section 47(b).3
Baxter cited Hacketha3 7 in support of this position,' arguing that the
basis for the Hackethat' decision "was that the [ilegislature did not intend section 47, subdivision (b)(2) to apply to non-governmental proceedings [and therefore] [wihether or not the proceeding resembled a judicial
proceeding was not dispositive."' Accordingly, the dissent favored af-

31. Id. The dissent continued on to quote the Constitution of California, Article VI,
section 14, which mandates: "[decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal
that determine causes shall be in writing with the reasons stated." CAL. CONsT. art. VI,
§ 14.
32. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 661, 871 P.2d at 221, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169.
33. Id. at 663, 871 P.2d at 222, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
34. Id. at 663-65, 871 P.2d at 222-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170-72. Factors relevant to
judicial proceedings include: (1) a judicial proceeding is a public proceeding; (2) the
judge and jury are not dependent upon the parties to the litigation for their income;
(3) witnesses must take an oath to tell the truth; (4) discovery is obtainable by all the
parties; and (5) the trier of fact is bound by the law and his/their decision is reviewable by the appellate process for errors, including insufficiency of credible evidence.
Id. Contrast the factors relevant to arbitration proceedings: (1) arbitration proceedings
are private; (2) the arbitrator is dependent upon the parties for his or her income; (3)
the party must request that a witness be sworn or an oath is not administered; (4)
discovery is not guaranteed; (5) there is no requirement that a record be kept of the
proceedings; and (6) appellate review is not available for claims of insufficiency of evidence. Id.
35. Id. at 666, 871 P.2d at 224, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172 (the dissent listed several instances where the legislature has created communication privileges).
.36. Id. at 669, 871 P.2d at 226, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174 (the dissent considered the
statutory history of the term "official proceeding" within the purview of section 47(b));
CAL CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
37. 24 Cal. 3d 55, 592 P.2d 1175, 154 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979); see supra notes 19-23
and accompanying text.
38. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 671, 871 P.2d at 227, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175.
39. 24 Cal. 3d 55, 60-61, 592 P.2d 1175, 1178-79, 154 Cal. Rptr 423, 426-27.
40. Moore, 7 Cal. 4th at 672, 871 P.2d at 228, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176.
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firming the judgment of the court of appeal on the basis that Hackethat
is dispositive of the defendant's claim that arbitration falls within the
scope of the judicial proceeding privilege."'
m.

IMPACT

The supreme court's decision in Moore has already had an impact on
at least two subsequent court decisions. In Ryan v. Garcia,' a California court of appeal labelled the Moore decision as encouraging broad
application of the litigation privilege in situations that further the public
policies underlying section 47.'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also had occasion to consider
Moore' in Preiserv. Rosenzweig.' That court cited the California Supreme Court case in support of the proposition that defamatory statements made in the course of arbitration are protected by a litigation
privilege.' The Pennsylvania court decided the issue consistent with
Moore but went on to find that the unique facts of the case did not warrant an application of the litigation privilege.47
In conclusion, the California Supreme Court's decision in Moore limited a plaintiffs right to seek redress when he or she has been defamed or
subjected to some misconduct during the course of arbitration. This
holding will clearly have a broad impact on future lawsuits claiming the
privilege in various arbitration and mediation proceedings. It seems inevitable that the California legislature must eventually more clearly define

41. Id.
42. 27 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (1994).
43. Ryan, 27 Cal. App. 4th at 1011, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161; CAL Cir. CODE § 47
(West 1982 & Supp. 1994).
44. 7 Cal. 4th 634, 871 P.2d 204, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152 (1994).
45. 646 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 1994).
46. Id.
47. Id. (the court found that the plaintiff did not consent to the arbitration proceeding and therefore, he was libelled without the proper safeguards to protect his interests).
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the term "official proceeding" and also clarify under what circumstances
the litigation privilege may be used.

SHERI L. MARVIN
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XI. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
In the context of a medical malpractice action, a
third-partyphysician does not violate the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act by disclosing the
patient-plaintiffs medical records to the insurer
responsible for defending the case as long as the
third-party physician runs the risk of being sued
himseV"further, there was no claim statedfor invasion of privacy under the California Constitution:
Heller v. Norcal Mutual Insurance Co.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 25, 1994, the California Supreme Court, in Heller v. Norcal
Mutual Insurance Co.,' addressed the applicability of both the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act' (the Act) and the constitutional right

1. 8 Cal. 4th 30, 876 P.2d 999, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (1994). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the majority opinion, in which Justices Arabian, Baxter, George, and Peterson
concurred. Id. at 34-46, 876 P.2d at 1000-08, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 201-09; see infra notes
26-39 and accompanying text. Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion, concurring and
dissenting. Id. at 46-55, 876 P.2d at 1008-14, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209-16; see infra notes
40-53 and accompanying text. Justice Kennard also wrote separately, concurring and
dissenting. Id. at 55-67, 876 P.2d at 1014-22, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215-23; see infra notes
54-65 and accompanying text.
2. CA CIV. CODE §§ 56 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); see also 2 B.E. WrrE3N, CAuFORNiA EVIDENCE, Witnesses § 1102, (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1994).
The revised act regulates the disclosure of identifiable information regarding
a patient's medical history, mental or physical condition, or treatment by a
provider of health care and the use or disclosure of such information by an
employer, or third party administrator, by providing specific requirements,
exemptions, and sanctions concerning the dissemination of these medical
records.
Id.; see Review of Selected 1979 California Legislation: Consumer Protection, 11 PAC.
LJ. 259, 381 (1980) (discussing the original legislative purpose behind the Act and presenting an overview of the Act's components); Review of Selected 1981 California
Legislation: Health and We(fare, 13 PAC. L.J. 513, 713 (1981) (discussing the revised
Act, the reasons behind the revisions, and briefly surveying the components of the revised Act); see also Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d
669, 678, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 60 (1979) ("A person's medical profile is an area of privacy
infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already
judicially recognized and protected."); cf. 7 B.E. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 473, (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (listing other types of "privacy
statutes" in California).
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to privacy' to an unauthorized disclosure of medical records. The case
arose from a prior medical malpractice action against a doctor whose
alleged negligence resulted in the amputation of one of the plaintiffs
fingers. The defendant in the present case released the plaintiffs medical
records to the insurer responsible for defending the prior action. After
settlement of the initial suit, the plaintiff brought the instant case alleging
that the defendant's disclosure of her medical records to the insurer
violated both the Act and the plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy.'
The court held that there was no violation of the Act' because the ex
parte discussions with the doctor were for the purpose of assisting
Norcal in the defense of the malpractice action, a legitimate purpose
under California Civil Code section 56.10(c)(4).' Further, under the standard set forth in Hill v. NCAA, 7 it must be established that there was "a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that was disclosed,"
and here the plaintiff failed to meet this burden.8 As a result, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals judgment.'
The impact of HeUer should be welcomed by professional malpractice
defense teams, although the decision is not entirely unexpected. The
purpose behind the 1981 revisions of the Act was "to provide for the
confidentiality of individually identifiable medical information, while
permitting certain limited and reasonable uses of that information."0
Heller exemplifies this purpose by allowing the unauthorized disclosure
to an insurer responsible for defending professional liability, a use justified under California Civil Code section 56.10." As a result, malpractice
defense teams are now standing on firm ground when they need the
plaintiff's medical records in similar cases.

3. See CAL CONST. art I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.").
4. Heuer, 8 Cal. 4th at 34-35, 876 P.2d at 1001-02, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 201-02.
5. See infra note 29 (quoting this section in full).
6. Heuer, 8 Cal. 4th at 35, 876 P.2d at 1001, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 202; see CAL. CIV.
CODE § 56.10(c)(4) (West Supp. 1994) ("The [medical] information may be disclosed . . . to persons or organizations insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability which a provider may incur.").
7. 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (1994).
8. Heuer, 8 Cal 4th at 35, 876 P.2d at 1001, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202.
9. Id.
10. HeUer, 8 Cal. 4th at 46, 876 P.2d at 1008, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); see Review of Selected 1981 California Legislationw Health &
Welfare, supra note 2, at 713.
11. Heuer, 8 Cal. 4th at 35, 876 P.2d at 1001, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202.
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On the other hand, the factual scenario in HeUer is rather unusual: a
third-party physician turning over medical records to an insurance company involved in defending another doctor. Therefore, it is unclear
whether HeUer will have an adverse impact on the plaintiffs bar. If, as
seems likely, the rule only applies to this unusual factual scenario,
HeUer's impact will not be greatly felt. Regardless, HeUer's most significant contribution may prove to be its holding on the collateral issue of
whether or not ex parte interviews are an acceptable means of discovery.
The court's holding seems to indicate that ex parte interviews are acceptable, despite prior case law which forbids such interviews in medical
malpractice actions.
The purpose of this article is to briefly survey the decision in HeUer
and address its possible impact. Part II of this note restates the factual
setting of HeUer,2 while part III briefs the opinion, exposing a slight
deviation in view between the majority and the dissenters on both the
issue of the Act's applicability as well as the privacy issue.13 Lastly, part
IV focuses on HeUer's possible impact on future cases.14
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1987, the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital to have a bone spur
removed from her left hand. 5 Dr. Geis performed the surgery, and Dr.
Yamaguchi assisted.'" Shortly after the surgery, the plaintiff developed a
post-operative staphylococcal infection which Dr. Geis diagnosed and
treated.'7 As a result of this infection, Dr. Geis had to amputate
plaintiffs third finger on her left hand, assisted once again by Dr.
Yamaguchi.'8 Plaintiff, feeling she received negligent treatment from Dr.
Geis, dismissed him as her physician. Dr. Yamaguchi, however, continued to treat the plaintiff following the second operation.'
Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action
against Dr. Geis. Dr. Yamaguchi agreed to appear as an expert witness

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See inf"a notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 26-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
HeUer, 8 Cal. 4th at 36, 876 P.2d at 1001, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202.
Id.
Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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on behalf of Dr. Geis." During the discovery stage of the trial, however,
Norcal, the insurance company responsible for Dr. Geis' defense, conducted several ex parte interviews' with Dr. Yamaguchi concerning the
plaintiffs medical condition. During these interviews, Dr. Yamaguchi disclosed the plaintiffs medical records to Norcal.' This disclosure lead to
the instant action, wherein the plaintiff claimed that the disclosure of her
medical information violated the Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act as well as her constitutional right to privacy.' Plaintiff settled the
original suit against Dr. Geis for $400,000 prior to the filing of the present action.'

21. Id.

22. The majority allowed ex parte interviews in this case, id. at 42, 876 P.2d at
1005, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207, despite a substantial split of authority as to the propriety
of doing so. See Daniel P. Jones, Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex Parte Interview
With IAjured Party's Treating Physician, 50 A.LR. 4th 714 (1986) (summarizing the
state and federal cases dealing with whether counsel for civil litigants may contact an
injured party's treating physician ex parte, or whether counsel is limited to depositions
and other formal discovery methods); see also Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 63-67, 876 P.2d at
1019-22, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220-23 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that the majority mistakenly passed over this issue despite the wide divergence of
opinion in the courts). The majority disregarded the plaintiffs claim that the common
law prohibits ex parte interview for discovery purposes. See, e.g., Torres v. Superior
Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 181, 188, 270 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1990) (holding that the physician could testify subject to a protective order prohibiting ex parte interviews). The
court stated that to the extent Torres and other similar cases "prohibit all ex parte
contacts between a physician and his attorneys or insurers, ... those cases are disapproved." HeUer, 8 Cal. 4th at 41, 876 P.2d at 1005, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206. Therefore,
an important collateral result of this case is that it appears to give "unqualified approval to ex parte interviews of a medical malpractice plaintiffs doctor." Id. at 56, 876
P.2d at 1014, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Kennard's treatment of this
issue).
23. HeUer, 8 Cal. 4th at 56, 876 P.2d at 1014, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
24. Id. at 36, 876 P.2d at 1001-02, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202-03.
25. Id. at 36, 876 P.2d at 1001, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. The trial court sustained
defendants' demurrers on all but a negligence count on the ground that defendants'
conduct were immunized by the litigation privilege of .California Civil Code § 47,
"which immunizes from liability all communications that occur" during the course of a
judicial proceeding. Id. at 36, 876 P.2d at 1002, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203. The court of
appeal reversed the trial court decision on several counts and concluded that
Yamaguchi violated the Act and the plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 37,
876 P.2d at 1002, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 203. The court of appeal concluded that "although the medical information obtained by Norcal from Yamaguchi may have been
legally discoverable," the method used by Norcal, i.e., an ex parte interview, violated
the Act. Id. The supreme court granted review on these two issues. Id.
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m.
A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion
1. Yamaguchi's Disclosure to Norcal Was Lawful Because it Fell
Within One of the Exemptions of the Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act

In addressing whether the Act had been violated by Dr. Yamaguchi, the
court began by briefly reviewing the history of the Act and outlining its
provisions. When read together, the court noted that numerous statutory
provisions of the Act "require a health care provider to hold confidential
a patient's medical information unless the information falls under one of
several exceptions."'M Therefore, "in order to violate the Act, a provider
of health care must make an unauthorized, unexcused disclosure of privileged medical information."' However, disclosure of this information by
a health care provider may be excused if "the disclosure is excepted
either by the mandatory or permissive provisions of the Act."'
The court's opinion mainly focuses on section 56.10(c)(4) of the Act,
the "permissive" provision, which allows disclosure in certain circumstances.' Specifically, California Civil Code section 56.10(c)(4) provides
that medical information may be disclosed "to persons or organizations
which insure or are responsible for defending professional liability. " '
Surprisingly, the court had little difficulty applying this section to the

26.
27.
28.
1991),
1991).

Id. at 38, 876 P.2d at 1003, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204.
Id.
Id. The "mandatory" provision is found in CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(b) (West
and the "permissive" provision is found in CAL. Civ. CODE § 56.10(c)(4) (West

29. The section reads in its entiretyThe information may be disclosed to organized committees and agents of professional societies or of medical staffs of licensed hospitals, or to licensed
health care service plans, or to professional standards review organizations,
or to utilization and quality control peer review organizations as established
by Congress in Public Law 97-248 in 1982, or to persons or organizations
insuring, responsible for, or defending professional liability which a provider may incur, if the committees, agents, plans, organizations, or persons
are engaged in reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care professionals or in reviewing health care services with respect to medical necessity, level of care, quality of care, or justification of charges.
CAL CIV. CODE § 56.10(c)(4) (West 1991) (emphasis added).
30. Heler, 8 Cal. 4th at 39, 876 P.2d at 1003, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204 (citing CAL
CIv. CODE § 56.10(c)(4) (West 1991)).
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facts of Heller, noting that clear and unambiguous statutory language is

given its plain meaning, without looking to legislative intent.3 Since the
court found the language of section 56.10 to be clear and unambiguous,
the court held that "Yamaguchi, as a health care 'provider,' and Norcal,
as an organization 'responsible for defending professional liability,' were

specifically exempted from the act. "' Therefore, Dr. Yamaguchi did not
violate the Act by making the unauthorized disclosure of the plaintiffs
medical records to Norcal.'
2.

Plaintiff Failed to Show a Violation of Her Constitutional Right to
Privacy Under Hill v. NCAA'

The court next addressed whether Dr. Yamaguchi violated the
plaintiffs constitutional right to privacy' by making the disclosure to

31. Id. (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 45 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 765 P.2d 299, 303-04, 248
Cal. Rptr. 115, 120 (1988); see also J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.
App. 4th 1568, 1578, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 210 (1994) (stating that when interpreting a
statute, the court must first view the actual language of legislation, and the court need
go no further if legislative text is clear as applied to given case).
32. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 39, 876 P.2d at 1003, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204.
33. Having plainly applied the language of the Act to the factual setting, the Chief
Justice then went to great lengths to justify the opinion, stating that "[o]ther provisions
of the act support our interpretation." Id. at 40, 876 P.2d at 1004, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
205. First the court looked at California Civil Code § 56.105 and found that the legislative history behind the Act demonstrates that prior to its enactment, the legislature
contemplated a situation much like Heller, wherein a health care provider lawfully
discloses medical information to those involved in the defense of a pending malpractice
claim. Id. Second, the court examined California Civil Code § 56.16, also finding support for their position. Id. Finally, the court dismissed plaintiff's assertion that the
common law prohibits ex parte contacts between physicians and their insurers. Id. at
40, 876 P.2d at 1004, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205-06. See generally Torres v. Superior Court,
221 Cal. App. 3d 181, 270 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1990); Province v. Center for Women's Health
& Family Birth, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1673, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667 (1993). The court found
the cases cited by plaintiff "inapposite," partly because the Act was not at issue in
those cases. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 41, 876 P.2d at 1005, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206. This collateral holding on ex parte interviews may be the most significant part of the decision.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
34. 7 Cal 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (1994). See generally Jennifer
Spaziano, California Supreme Court Survey, 22 PEPP. L REv. 794 (1994) (analyzing
holding and impact of Hill' v. NCAA).
35. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of the constitutional right to privacy in California, see generally J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 327 (1992) (providing analysis of the legislative history of the privacy clause, critically reviewing cases arising under the clause,
and discussing privacy protections apart from the privacy clause); see also Cutter v.
Brownbridge, 183 Cal. App. 3d 836, 842, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (1986) (stating that the
.zones of privacy" created by the constitution's privacy clause "extend to the details of
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Norcal. Although the court of appeals found that such a violation had occurred, the supreme court nevertheless reversed this decision.' Basing
its analysis on Hill v. NCAA, 7 the court found that as a matter of law
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for invasion of her state
constitutional right to privacy since she "did not adequately plead facts
supporting a conclusion that any expectation of privacy as to her medical condition would be reasonable under the circumstances of this

one's medical history"); Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 549, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 148, 157 (1981) (stating that one's medical history is an "area of privacy infinitely
more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially
recognized").
36. The court of appeal relied on Urbaniak v. Newton, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 277
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1991), "which held that an alleged unauthorized disclosure of plaintiffs
HIV status gave rise to an action for a violation [of] plaintiffs constitutional right to
privacy." Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 42, 876 P.2d at 1005, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206. However,
the supreme court found Hill v. NCAA controlling. Id. Evidently the court viewed the
disclosure of a patient's HIV status as distinguishable from ordinary medical records:
in the context of a
"Although the Urbaniak decision may have been correct ...
patient's HIV status, we view the present [case] in a different light." Id. For more
information on disclosure of HIV status and the constitutional right to privacy, see generally Roger Daughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to
the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82
CAL L REV. 111 (1994) (suggesting ways to increase protections against future potential breaches of confidentiality in the context of AIDS and HIV); Bruce A. McDonald,
Ethical Problems for Physicians raised by AIDS and HIV Infection: Conflicting Legal
Obligations of Confidentiality and Disclosure, 22 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 557 (1989) (arguing that AIDS-related ethical problems are not unprecedented but are part of the larger
context of medical ethics). Many states have enacted statutes to govern the dissemination of the fact that an individual has AIDS or HIV. See.Annotation, State Statutes or
Regulations Expressly Governing Disclosure of Fact that Person Has Tested Positive
for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), 12 A.LR.5TH 149 (1993).
37. The court in Hill held that "a plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish each of the following:
(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy."
Hill v. NCAA, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 39-40, 865 P.2d 633, 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 859 (1994).
The court also noted that "[a] defendant may prevail in a state constitutional privacy
case by negating any of the three elements just discussed or by pleading and proving,
as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests." Id. at 40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 859.
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case."'
Therefore, plaintiff was unable to recover under this legal theo9
3

ry.

B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and DissentingOpinion
1. Unlimited Ex Parte Disclosure on the Part of a Doctor Who Fears
Malpractice Liability is Unnecessary and Inconsistent with the
Purposes of the Act
Justice Mosk diverged from the majority's interpretation of the Act.
Specifically, Justice Mosk asserted that the exception permitting lawful
disclosure of medical records found in California Civil Code section
56.10(c)(4) was inappropriate to the present case.' Under Justice
Mosk's interpretation, the statute does not allow a doctor to disclose
medical records just because the physician feared malpractice liability."
Rather, Justice Mosk argued that the correct interpretation hinged on the
term "quality of care" found in the statute, stating that the majority
wrongly interpreted this phrase to include the question of malpractice
liability.' In the context of the entire Act, however, Justice Mosk interpreted the phrase to mean that the physician may disclose records to a
insurer only to assist in deciding whether or not to offer to continue providing medical malpractice insurance to the physician.4'

38. HeUer, 8 Cal. 4th at 43, 876 P.2d at 1006, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d at 207. In Heller, the
plaintiffs case was problematic in that she was unable to show a reasonable expectation of privacy. By placing her physical condition at issue in the underlying litigation,
she effectively lowered any expectation of privacy she might have had. Id. Further, any
invasion that might have occurred was not serious enough to constitute a cause of action. Id. at 44, 876 P.2d at 1007, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 208.
39. For other medical malpractice actions in which the plaintiff has attempted to
recover for tortious invasion of privacy, see generally Judy E. Zelin, Annotation,
Physician's Tort Liability for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information
About Patient, 48 A.LR.4TH 668 (1986) (collecting the state and federal cases in which
the courts have considered whether tort liability exists when a physician or other medical practitioner makes an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information about his
patient).
40. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 48, 876 P.2d at 1009, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210 (Mosk, J., concun-ing and dissenting).
41. Id. at 52, 876 P.2d at 1009-10, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212 (Mosk, J., concurring and

dissenting).
42. Id. at 49-50, 876 P.2d at 1011, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211 (Mosk, J., concurring and

dissenting).
43. Id. at 50, 876 P.2d at 1011, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211 (Moek, J., concurring and

dissenting).
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2.

The Litigation Privilege of California Civil Code Section 47(b)
Immunized Dr. Yamaguchi From Liability Because His Disclosures
Occurred in Connection with the Ongoing Litigation Against
Dr. Geis

Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment, finding that the litigation
privilege of California Civil Code section 47 permitted disclosure by Dr.
Yamaguchi." Noting that the litigation privilege was "absolute" and absolved the litigant of all tort liability except for an action for malicious

prosecution, Justice Mosk concluded that the communications between
Dr. Yamaguchi and the insurer clearly related to the litigation, thereby
rendering the litigation privilege applicable. '
In so finding, Justice Mosk saw the true issue as not whether Dr.
Yamaguchi violated the Act, but rather "whether [he] injured plaintiff
through conduct or through communication."' If the disclosure was
communicative it would then fall under the litigation privilege of California Civil Code section 47(b). Citing to several prior cases that made
this distinction,4 7 Justice Mosk concluded that Dr. Yamaguchi's disclosure of the medical records was communicative since Dr. Yamaguchi
made it with the intent to aid the insurer in its defense of the ongoing

44. "Section 47(b) immunizes publications '(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the
objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the
action.'" Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 52, 876 P.2d at 1012, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 786 P.2d
365, 369, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 642 (1990)).
45. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk noted that the appellate
court held otherwise on this issue and found that conduct, not communication, was at
issue. Id.
46. Id. at 53, 876 P.2d at 1012-13, 32 CaL Rptr. 2d at 214 (Mosk, J., concurring and

dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th 1187, 1202-04, 847 P.2d 1044, 1053-54, 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 837-38 (1993) (holding that an attorney's solicitation of business in
violation of the Business Code was communicative and therefore privileged under
§ 47(b) of the Civil Code); Kimmel v. Goland, 51 Cal. 3d 202, 213-14, 793 P.2d 524,
530-31, 271 Cal. Rptr. 191, 197-98 (1990) (distinguishing immunized communicative acts
related to the litigation from illegal conduct not related to the judicial proceeding);
Ribas v. Clark, 38 CaL 3d 355, 365, 696 P.2d 637, 643, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143, 149 (1985)
(holding that when it is noncommunicative conduct, such as eavesdropping, rather than
communication that causes injury, the litigation privilege does not apply).
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litigation.' Therefore, the litigation privilege immunized the communication.'
3.

The Plaintiff Cannot State a Claim for Invasion of Privacy Under
the California Constitution

Like the majority, Justice Mosk concluded that the plaintiff "failed to
make out a claim for violation of the constitutional right to privacy.""
Applying Hill v. NCAA, Justice Mosk also found that: (1) the plaintiff had
a "relatively limited" privacy interest in her medical records from Dr.
Geis' treatment since a medical malpractice action obviously required
disclosure of such information;5' and (2) the disclosures did not "represent the serious invasion of privacy that we said should be actionable in
Hill."" As a result, the plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy failed.
C.

Justice Kennard's Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Although she agreed with the majority on the issue of the Act's applicability, and with Justice Mosk on the applicability of the litigation privilege, Justice Kennard nevertheless disagreed on the constitutional right
to privacy issue.' Justice Kennard restated much of what the other justices had already stated: the facts of the case," the argument for the
Act's applicability,' and also briefly reiterated Justice Mosk's sentiments
regarding the litigation privilege.' The heart of Justice Kennard's opinion, however, dealt with the state constitution.

48. HeUer, 8 Cal. 4th at 54, 876 P.2d at 1013, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
49. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
50. Id. at 55, 876 P.2d at 1013, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
51. Id. at 54-55, 876 P.2d at 1013, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
52. Id. at 55, 876 P.2d at 1013, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (Mask, J., concurring and
dissenting). Further, Justice Mosk felt that the disclosure of the records may have
.served another right of constitutional magnitude,. .. the right to free access to the
courts." Id.
53. Id. at 55, 876 P.2d at 1014, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
54. Id. at 56-57, 876 P.2d 1014-15, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215-16 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
55. Id. at 57-58, 876 P.2d at 1015-16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 216-17 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
56. Id. at 59, 876 P.2d at 1016, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217 (Kennard, J., concurring and

dissenting).
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1.

The Plaintiff has Stated a Claim for Violation of Her Constitutional
Right to Privacy

Justice Kennard agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs claim for
invasion of privacy was "defective" on the grounds that the plaintiff did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the medical information
relating to the malpractice action.57 In Justice Kennard's view, however,
this did not defeat the cause of action.' In short, Justice Kennard believed that under the Hill analysis, any medical information Yamaguchi
disclosed directly concerning the issue of Dr. Geis's negligence or resulting damages "would be directly relevant to the issues in the [prior] litigation" and therefore carry no reasonable expectation of privacy.' However, the plaintiff would retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in all
other information she "imparted" to Yamaguchi in confidence, such as
information regarding her financial and emotional state.' It is this collateral information upon which the plaintiffs cause of action should have
been successful.'

57. Id. at 59-60, 876 P.2d at 1016, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).

58. Id. at 60, 876 P.2d at 1016, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
59. Id. at 60, 876 P.2d at 1016-17, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217-18 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
60. Id. at 60, 876 P.2d at 1017, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
61. Justice Kennard's opinion on this issue is not without merit. For example, although the filing of a malpractice lawsuit certainly lowers one's expectation of privacy
in those medical records at issue, thereby constituting a waiver of privacy rights, "the
scope of this waiver 'must be narrowly . . . construed.'" Id. at 60, 876 P.2d at 1017, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Britt v. Superior

Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 859, 574 P.2d 766, 775, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 704 (1978)). Further,
matters protected by the right to privacy are only discoverable if they are "directly
relevant to the plaintiffs claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit." Id.
(citing Vinson v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 833, 842, 740 P.2d 404, 440, 239 Cal Rptr.
292, 298 (1987). But see id. at 43 n.4, 876 P.2d at 1006 n.4, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207 rL4
("Plaintiffs allegations concerning Yamaguchi's disclosure to Norcal of her financial and
emotional state do not fall within the protection of either section 56 et seq. or the
constitutional right to privacy, for the information is unrelated to her medical condition."). Justice Kennard's stance is also clearly in line with the rules of evidence. For
example, all evidence codes recognize that only relevant evidence is admissible. See,
e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible ....
Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible."). As Justice Kennard suggested, there seems to be no
reason why a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot be maintained in those items
that are irrelevant to the issues in the lawsuit. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 62-63, 876 P.2d at

2.

The Majority Erred by Giving Unqualified Approval to Ex Parte
Interviews of a Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs Doctor

Justice Kennard's final point was that the court erred when it held that
ex parte interviews of a medical malpractice plaintiffs doctor are acceptable. Interestingly, Justice Kennard does not appear to either support or

condone this practice. Rather, Justice Kennard merely recognizes that
both state and federal courts are highly divided on the propriety of this
practice.' In her view, the majority's "offhand" discussion of this issue

made "further discussion necessary. "63
Justice Kennard's discussion merely focused on the split of authority
that exists. Some courts allow the practice, some do not, and at least

one, New Jersey, has articulated a middle ground in the debate." Given
what she called the majority's "limited holding"-if "an ex parte interview
does occur without the plaintiffs knowledge or consent, the physician
does not ... violate the [Act],"-Justice Kennard argued that the issue is
likely to return, at which time she hopes the "court gives [it] the thorough consideration ... [it] deserve[s]."'
IV.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

It is unclear if HeUer will have a significant impact on future medical
malpractice actions. Certainly, HeUer should be welcomed by profession-

al malpractice defense teams in similar cases since the case provides
firm ground upon which to stand when the plaintiffs medical records are
needed as evidence. Now there can be no question that the records are
obtainable. On the other hand, the factual scenario in HeUer is rather
unusual: a third-party physician turning over medical records to an insur-

1018-19, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219-20 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. Id. at 63, 876 P.2d at 1019, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy, Ex Parte Contacts Between Plaintiffs Physician
and Defense Attorneys: Protecting the Patient-Litigant'sRight to a Fair Trial, 21 LoY.
U. Cin. LJ. 1001 (1990). See generally David L Woodard, Shielding the Plaintiff and
Physician: The Prohibition of Ex Parte Contacts with a Plaintiffs Treating Physician,
13 CAMPBELL L. REv. 233 (1991); Daniel P. Jones, Annotation, Discovery: Right to Ex
Parte Interview With Injured Party's Treating Physician, 50 A.LR.4TH 714 (1986) (collecting and discussing the state and federal cases addressing whether opposing counsel
conducting discovery in civil litigation may interview the injured party's treating physician ex parte or is limited to formal discovery methods such as by deposition).
63. Heller, 8 Cal. 4th at 63, 876 P.2d at 1019, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
64. Id. at 64-66, 876 P.2d at 1020-21, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 221-22 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). See generally Stempler v. Speidel, 49 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985).
65. Id. at 67, 876 P.2d at 1021-22, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222-23 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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ance company involved in defending another doctor.' Therefore, it remains to be seen whether Heller will indeed have an adverse impact on
the plaintiffs bar.
The most significant ground covered by Heller seems to be the collateral holding by the court on the issue of ex parte interviews. If this holding is taken at face value, arguably the court has shifted away from the
common law rule prohibiting ex parte interviews between physicians and
their insurers.' This is significant since it will likely result in a step
away from a patient's right to confidentiality in the physician-patient
relationship.'

PAUL B. TYLER

66. The number of California cases in which the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act has been at issue are few. See In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 901, 263
Cal. Rptr. 869, 875 (1989) (holding there was no violation of the Confidentiality of
Medical Information Act by a hospital social worker's discretionary decision to report
positive test results and for those results to be introduced at a juvenile court hearing);
Inabnit v. Berkson, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1231-32, 245 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526 (1988)
(holding that a licensed physician may release his records pertaining to psychiatric
treatment furnished to a patient without that patient's authorization when the production of those records is compelled by a subpoena duces tecum issued in a judicial
proceeding in which the physician is not a party).
67. See, e.g., Province v. Center for Women's Health & Family Birth, 20 Cal. App.
4th 1673, 1685, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 667, 674 (1993) (stating that counsel must "avoid ex
parte communications with physicians" until after discovery is completed); Torres v.
Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 181, 187-88, 270 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1990) (holding
that the physician could testify subject to a protective order prohibiting ex parte interviews). The court stated that "to the extent [they] could be read to prohibit all ex parte contacts those cases are disapproved." Helier, 8 Cal. 4th at 41, 876 P.2d at 1005, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206.
68. Although ex parte interviews may save time and money when compared to formal discovery, Justice Kennard correctly noted that it is possible that "defense counsel
may use an ex parte interview with the plaintiffs doctor to solicit sympathy for the
defendant, and thereby compromise the doctor's loyalty to the patient." Id. at 66, 876
P.2d at 1021, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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XII.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A manufacturermay not be held liablefor failing to
label a nonprescription drug with warnings in a
language other than English:
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.,' the court considered "whether a manufacturer of nonprescription drugs may incur tort liability for distributing
its products with warnings [written] in English only."' Reasoning that
"uniformity and predictability" are critical, the court determined that "the
rule for tort liability should conform to state and federal statutory and
administrative law."3 The court concluded that a manufacturer is not
liable for omitting warnings in languages other than English from nonprescription drug labels because state and federal law only require warnings
in English.'
In 1986, the plaintiff, who was less than four months old, was given St.
Joseph Aspirin for Children (SJAC) by his mother, despite the label's
direction that dosage for a child under two years of age was "as directed
by doctor."5 While the plaintiff's mother was only literate in Spanish, she
failed to ask any of the English-speaking members of her household to
translate the label or package insert for her.' Two days later, after a to-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 539, 863 P.2d 167, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (1993). Justice Kennard
authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Panelli,
Baxter, and George concurring. Justice Mosk delivered a separate concurring opinion
emphasizing that the decision does not preclude "the possibility of tort liability presumed upon the content of foreign-language advertising," such as when it is "materially
misleading" and the consumer relied upon it to his detriment. Id. at 556-57, 863 P.2d at
178, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk determined that a
foreign-language advertisement is materially misleading if it promotes the product's
health benefits without warning a "non-english-literate consumer" against the risks of
misuse. Id. at 557, 863 P.2d at 179, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk suggested that a "[niotice on a drug's product label in the foreign languages
in which the drug is advertised, not to take or apply the drug before reading a
package insert's detailed warning" may offer reasonable notice to a non-English-literate
consumer of the risks of misuse. Id. at 557-58, 863 P.2d at 179, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 109
(Mosk, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 542, 863 P.2d at 168, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 543, 863 P.2d at 169, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
6. Id. at 544, 863 P.2d at 169, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99. She purchased SJAC without
seeing or relying on any advertising for SJAC in either English-or Spanish. Id. at 544,
863 P.2d at 169, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99-100. She had, however, taken aspirin herself in
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tal of three aspirin had been given to the plaintiff, the child's mother
took him to the hospital.7 Disregarding the doctor's advice to treat her

son with nonprescription medication containing no aspirin, the plaintiffs
mother continued to treat her son with SJAC.' Consequently, the boy
developed Reye's syndrome, resulting in "cortical blindness, spastic quad-

riplegia, and mental retardation."'
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
stating, "there was 'no duty to warn in a foreign language' and no causal
relationship between plaintiffs injury and the defendant's activities.""

The court of appeal reversed, concluding that the issue of whether the
defendant was reasonable in not labeling SJAC with a Spanish language
warning was a triable issue of fact. 1 The court supported its conclusion
by noting that although evidence demonstrated that the defendant knew
that non-English-literate Hispanics were using SJAC, there was insufficient evidence presented as to the expenses of labeling in Spanish. The
supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and affirmed
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 2

the past and a friend had recommended SJAC. Id. at 544, 863 P.2d at 169, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 100. The lawsuit filed was "premised on the theory of failure to warn
about the dangers of Reye's syndrome." Id. The plaintiff alleged that defendant was
negligent in failing to warn, failed to adequately warn under a products liability theory,
and committed fraud by falsely representing that SJAC was safe under the circumstances. Id.
7. Id. at 543, 863 P.2d at 168, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
8. Id.
9. Id. "Reye's syndrome occurs in children and teenagers during or while recovering from a mild respiratory tract infection, flu, chickenpox, or other viral illness." Id.
The disease has a 20-30% fatality rate, and many of the survivors sustain permanent
brain damage. Id. Although the cause of Reye's syndrome is unknown, studies in the
early 1980's showed a correlation "between ingestion of aspirin during a viral illness ... and the subsequent development of Reye's syndrome." Id. A permanent FDA
regulation requiring aspirin products to warn that "Reye's syndrome is reported to be
associated with aspirin use" took effect in 1988. Id. (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 21,633 (proposed June 9, 1988)).
Prior to the federal regulation becoming mandatory, SJAC displayed a Reye syndrome warning on its packages and in its package inserts. Id. at 543-44, 863 P.2d at
169, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99. "These warnings were printed in English on the label of
the SJAC that plaintiff's mother purchased in March of 1986." Id. at 544, 863 P.2d at
169, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
10. Id. at 545, 863 P.2d at 170, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100.
11. Id. at 545, 863 P.2d at 170-71, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100-101.
12. Id. at 556, 863 P.2d at 178, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108. Review was granted on Dec.
31, 1992, in Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 843 P.2d 624, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (1992).
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II.

TREATMENT

Recognizing SJAC's duty to warn purchasers about the correlation
between aspirin use and Reye's syndrome, the majority narrowed its
focus to the scope of this duty and whether it required the defendant "to
provide label or package warnings in Spanish." 3 Although the standard
of care for tort liability is generally framed as a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances, the standard of care may be prescribed
by statute or "settled" by the court.' The defendant argued "that the
standard of care for packaging and labeling nonprescription drugs...
has been appropriately fixed by the dense layer of state and federal statutes and regulations that control virtually all aspects of the marketing of
its products." 6

13. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 546, 863 P.2d at 171, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 B cmt. f (1965) (noting it is the court's function
to "formulate the standard of conduct to which the duty requires the defendant to
conform").
14. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 546-47, 863 P.2d at 171, 25 Cal Rptr. 2d at 101 (citing
Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 26-27, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914,
919 (1969)). While it is a question of law for the court to frame the standard of care
once a duty is found, it is the fact-finder's responsibility to determine whether the defendant has complied with the standard. Id. at 546, 863 P.2d at 171, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 101 (citing Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 525, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595
(1966)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328 B subd. (c), 328 C subd. (b)
(1965) (stating the court shall determine the standard of conduct required by the defendant by his legal duty that the jury determines whether the defendant's conduct is a
legal cause of the harm to the plaintiff).
15. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 548, 863 P.2d at 172-73, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102-103. The
court noted that in negligence actions, plaintiffs frequently advance "[s]tatutory standards of conduct to establish a breach of duty by the defendant." Id. at 547, 863 P.2d
at 172, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102. This "raises a presumption of negligence that may be
rebutted only by evidence establishing a justification or excuse for the statutory violation." Id. at 547-48, 863 P.2d at 172, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102. Defendants rarely invoke
a defense of statutory compliance because it does not preclude the application of a
higher standard. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, providing:
Where a statute, ordinance or regulation is found to define a standard of
conduct for the purposes of negligence actions, . . . the standard defined is
normally a minimum standard, applicable to the ordinary situations contemplated by the legislation. This legislative or administrative minimum does not
prevent a finding that a reasonable [person] would have taken additional precautions where the situation is such as to call for them.
Id. at 548, 863 P.2d at 172, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288 C cmt. a (1965)). Compare Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 37 Cal. 3d
540, 552, 691 P.2d 630, 637, 208 Cal. Rptr. 874, 881 (1984) (concluding manufacture's
compliance with federal aircraft safety regulations did not preclude liability for defective design), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1110 (1985), with Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App.
2d 837, 842-43, 314 P.2d 130, 134 (1957) (finding jury entitled to consider compliance
with federal labeling requirements for hair dye as factor in determining negligence).
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Section 502 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 8 regulates the labeling of nonprescription drugs, including warning labels on aspirin. 7 Although the FDA encourages labeling "to meet the needs of non-English
speaking or special user populations so long as such labeling fully com-

plies with agency regulations,"" the controlling regulation requires only
English labeling unless the drug is "'distributed solely in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or in a Territory where the predominant language
is one other than English.... .,"" California law is patterned after the
federal law and only requires English language warnings.'
The court cited numerous examples of legislation imposing a duty on

government agencies to provide foreign language materials.2 The court

16. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1988).
17. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 548-49, 863 P.2d at 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. Aspirin
products carry warnings regarding use during pregnancy and nursing (21 C.F.R.

§ 201.63(a) (1993)), the need to keep the product out of the hands of children (21
C.F.R. § 201.314(a) (1993)), and a warning about Reye's syndrome (21 C.F.R.
§ 201.314(h) (1993)). Id. at 549, 863 P.2d at 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. "The pharmaceutical industry believes that []state-mandated warnings are not necessary because the
field of drug labeling is adequately covered by provisions of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and regulations promulgated by the FDA under the Act." Mark B.
Gelbert, State Statutes Affecting the Labeling of OTC Drugs: Constitutionality Based
on Commerce Clause and Federal Preemption Theories, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. W. 629,
630-31 (1991).
18. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 549-50, 863 P.2d at 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (quoting
53 Fed. Reg. 21, 633, 21, 636 (proposed June 9, 1988)).
19. Id. at 550, 863 P.2d at 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

103 (citing

21 C.F.R.

§ 201.15(c)(1) (1993)). However, once a manufacturer chooses to make a "'representation in a foreign language,' then all required words, statements, and other foreign
information' must appear in the foreign language as well as in English." Id. at 550, 863
P.2d at 173-74, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.15(c)(2)-(3) (1993)). The
court suggested that if "representation" goes to the "uses or effectiveness of the product, then some abbreviated warnings (such as, 'If you do not read English, ask someone to translate this label for you before using this product') in a foreign language
might not violate the regulation." Id. at 550 n.4, 863 P.2d at 173 n.4, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 104 n.4; see supra note 1 for Justice Mosk's concurrence emphasizing this point.
20. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 550, 863 P.2d at 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 104. Section 25900
of the California Health and Safety Code provides: "Cautionary statements which are
required by law, or regulations adopted pursuant to law, to be printed upon the labels
of containers in which dangerous drugs . .. are packaged shall be printed in the English language .... " CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25900 (West 1984).
21. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 7290-7299.8
ployees and written materials at state agencies);
(West 1991) (providing special language assistance
individuals participating in the state department's

(West 1980) (requiring bilingual emCAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 19013.5
to non-English speaking handicapped
public or private rehabilitation pro-
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noted that legislative and administrative bodies are best suited for defining situations in which information should be provided in a language
other than English.' Acknowledging that the legislature clearly mandates when foreign language communications must be included,' the
court further reasoned that if the legislature sought to require foreign
language warnings, it would have done so expressly.. The court found
further significance in the fact that, given the FDA's sensitivity to the
benefits of multilingual package warnings, failure to require such labeling
would suggest that the FDA determined the costs and burdens of such
warnings did not warrant their use.'
The court considered and rejected applicable statutes and regulations
for determining the proper standard of care.' The court concluded that
adopting a "reasonable person" standard of care would require multilingual package inserts because "it is foreseeable that eventually each nonprescription drug will be purchased by a non-English-speaking resident
or foreign tourist." 7 Such packaging requirements would be costly, burdensome, and counterproductive, requiring an unwieldy accommodation
to many languages.'
Furthermore, the court decided that the issue was unsuitable for a
judicial declaration of a standard of care.' Reasoning that the determination of labeling requirements would entail considerable investigation
and evaluation of "empirical data," the court concluded that a legislative
body is better suited for this type of determination.' Hence, the court
grams); CAL ELEC. CODE § 10012 (West 1977) (requiring clerks provide Spanish translations for candidate's statements). Parties involved in private commercial transactions
are sometimes charged with the duty to furnish information in a foreign language. See
CAL CIV. CODE § 1632 (West 1985) (requiring those engaged in negotiating business or
trade primarily in Spanish to provide Spanish language translation of contracts, etc.);
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9998.2 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring employment service
contracts engaging foreign workers be in the foreign worker's language).
22. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 550-51, 863 P.2d at 174, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104.
23. Id. "Often, the Legislature has used a numerical threshold of affected or potentially affected persons speaking a given language to define the scope of the relevant
duty to provide information in that language." Id. at 551, 863 P.2d at 175, 25 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 105; see, e.g., CAL ELEC. CODE § 14203 (West 1977) (requiring the posting of the
ballot in Spanish, "if a significant and substantial need is found by the clerk').
24. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 552, 863 P.2d at 175, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
25. Id. The court noted that "the FDA for a time required manufacturers... to
provide Spanish language translations of their patient package inserts on request to
doctors and pharmacists." Id. However, this requirement was eventually abandoned due
to the difficulties of obtaining adequate translations. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 552-53, 863 P.2d at 175-76, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105.
28. Id. at 553, 863 P.2d at 175-76, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06.
29. Id. at 553, 863 P.2d at 176, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106.
30. Id. Examples of such considerations would include space limitations in
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decided "to adopt for tort purposes the existing legislative and admin-

istrative standard of care on this issue."3"

Amici curiae submitted on behalf of the plaintiff contended "that the

right of persons accused of crime to the services of an interpreter demonstrates the existence of a general legal obligation to accommodate...
persons not proficient in English."' The court rejected this argument,
emphasizing that the due process requirements of a criminal proceeding
were inapplicable in this case.' The court observed that an interpreter

was required in the courtroom because the accused was restricted from
normal channels of language assistance, such as family and friends.'
Further, the court noted that courts can ascertain the need for an interpreter "without engaging in the complex balance of advantages and costs
required to set an industry-wide standard to meet the diverse linguistic
needs of the large, heterogeneous population .... "I

In addition, plaintiff's amici curiae proposed that a judicially declared
rule could limit the breadth of a nonprescription drug manufacturer's
duty to warn by requiring foreign-language warnings in only those languages in which the manufacturer chose to advertise.' The court acknowledged that in some situations, the legislature has required "that one
who advertises, negotiates, or makes an oral sales presentation in a for-

eign language must also provide a written contract or make other disclosure in the same language."' The court noted that this argument further

packaging, the costs of translation, the impact of cost spreading on a product's availability to the consumer, the risks of misuse, and the extent of foreign-language advertising used to promote the products, among others. Id.
31. Id.
32. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 554, 863 P.2d at 176, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106. Lawyers
for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Mexican American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, the Public Citizens Health Research Group, and Trial Lawyers
for Public Justice called the case "'a potential landmark in terms of language discrimination.'" Pamela Warrick, When a Warning May Not Be Enough, LA. TIMES, May 25,
1993, at 1.
33. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 554, 863 P.2d at 176, 25 cal. Rptr. 2d at 106.
34. Id.
35. Id.

36. Id. The amici argued that "defendant's use of foreign-language advertising demonstrateld] its knowledge that persons understanding only that language are likely to buy
its products, and because it is morally blameworthy to advertise a product in a foreign
language without also conveying necessary warnings in that same language." Id. at 554,
863 P.2d at 176-77, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106-07.
37. Id. at 554, 863 P.2d at 177, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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supports the conclusion that multilingual warnings are more suitable for
the legislature's consideration. '
The majority emphasized that its decision does not preclude the "possibility of tort liability premised upon the content of foreign-language
advertising," particularly as to a "consumer who detrimentally relied
upon foreign-language advertising that was materially misleading as to
product risks."' However, this case did not involve the content of the
Spanish advertising since the plaintiffs mother acknowledged that she
did not see or hear the advertising, and thus did not rely upon it.4
Accordingly, the court espoused the "legislative/regulatory standard of
care that mandates nonprescription drug package warnings in English
only."" It based its decision upon two rationales. First, legislative and
administrative bodies have the "superior technical and procedural lawmaking resources" needed to evaluate the complex issues involved in
determining a standard of care.' Second, the court chose to conform
with the FDA's emphasis on the need for uniformity and clarity of the
warnings provided with nonprescription drugs.'
Lastly, the supreme court declined the alternative grounds for liability
proposed by the plaintiff.' The court rejected liability premised on a
defect in the English language labeling because the plaintiffs mother
neither read nor obtained translation of the product labeling.' Therefore, no causal relationship could be shown between the label's language
and the plaintiffs injury.'
The plaintiff argued that SJAC should not have been marketed at all
"because the risks of Reye's syndrome clearly outweighed any benefit to
be derived from the product.""7 The court rejected this argument, deferring to the FDA's conclusion in 1986, that pending further studies, product warnings were sufficient.' Therefore, the court held that manufac-

38. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 554, 863 P.2d at 177, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
39. Id. at 555, 863 P.2d at 177, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107; see supra note 1 for Justice
Mosk's development of this point in his concurrence.
40. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 555, 863 P.2d at 177, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id.; see 50 Fed. Reg. 51400, 51402 (1985); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 16258, 16260
(1986).
44. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 555-56, 863 P.2d at 177-78, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107-08.
45. Id. at 555, 863 P.2d at 177, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
46. Id. For a drug manufacturer's negligence liability, see 6 B.E. WruN, SUMMARY OF
CALFORNIA LAW, Torts § 957 (9th ed. 1988).

47. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 556, 863 P.2d at 177, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107. For a discussion on the unavoidably unsafe products theory, see 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1310, 1313 (9th ed. 1988).

48. Ramirez, 6 Cal. 4th at 556, 863 P.2d at 178, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 108. SJAC was
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turers of nonprescription drugs currently have no "legal duty, within the
tort law system, to include foreign-language warnings with their packaging materials."49
III.

CONCLUSION

In Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., the California Supreme Court adhered to
the rule established by the Food and Drug Administration in holding that
any duty a drug manufacturer has to warn of dangers of administering its
product extends to English-language warnings only.W
It is likely that the legislature will examine this issue in the future."'
As the population of Spanish-speaking consumers expands in California,
foreign-language media will grow. Latino groups may boycott drug manufacturers who choose to target the Latino community for sales without
providing corresponding protection through labeling in Spanish.' The
decision was decried for meaning "'that if you don't speak English, you
have less protection as a consumer. ' '

LORI ELLEN AUSTEIN

no longer distributed after December 31, 1986. Id. The court stated that the plaintiff
failed to submit any evidence that would prompt the court to doubt the FDA's opinion
in early 1986 that when distributed with warnings, aspirin could be a reasonably safe
product for children. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 542, 863 P.2d at 168, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
51. The court suggested that the California Legislature may be prompted by this
decision to review the issue of foreign-language labeling for nonprescription drugs and
that "further study might persuade the Legislature, the FDA, or any other concerned
agency to revise the controlling statutes or regulations for nonprescription drugs." Id.
at 553, 863 P.2d at 176, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 106.
52. This case has been closely followed by Latino groups because Scheiring Plough
directly advertised its products on Spanish-speaking television and radio stations in Los
Angeles and New York. Harriet Chiang, Drug Label Warnings Need Not be Multilingual, Court Rules, S. F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 1993, at Al.
63. Id. (quoting Irma Rodriguez, an attorney with the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund in Los Angeles).

XIII.

RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
A public entity does not have absolute immunity
against damage caused to downstream riparian
property, but is subject to a test of reasonableness
for both tort and inverse condemnation actions:
Locklin v. City of Lafayette.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Locklin v. City of Lafayette,' the California Supreme Court addressed the standard for determining the liability of a public entity for
damage caused to downstream riparian property by the discharge of
surface water into a natural watercourse.' The court first determined
that a rule of reasonableness should be applied to the standard used to
establish the liability of a public or private landowner for a tort claim for
damage to downstream property.3 In addition, the court pronounced that
a government could be liable for inverse condemnation for damage
caused to downstream property.' Lastly, the court determined that a
landowner is only proportionately liable for his part of the damage done
to downstream property.'
The plaintiffs own property along Reliez Creek, a natural watercourse
in which the runoff has increased considerably due to the recent developments in the area surrounding Contra Costa County.' The increase in
runoff caused erosion and a widening of the creek, prompting the plaintiffs to file an action to recover for "extensive landslide" to their prop-

1. 7 Cal. 4th 327, 867 P.2d 724, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (1994). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion for the court, joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Arabian, George, and Panelli. Id. at 337-78, 867 P.2d at 728-56, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
617-45. Justice Mosk concurred in a separate opinion. Id. at 378-79, 867 P.2d at 756-57,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45-46 (Mosk, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 337, 867 P.2d at 728, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
3. Id. at 337, 867 P.2d at 729, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618. The factors to take into
account are: "consideration of the purpose for which the improvements were undertaken, the amount of surface water runoff added to the streamiflow by the defendant's improvements in relation to that from development of other parts of the watershed, and
the cost of mitigating measures available to both upper and downstream owners." Id.
4. Id. Liability exists when the governmental entity fails to use other, less injurious
alternatives to improve property or converts a watercourse into a public work which
causes damage. Id,
5. Id. at 338, 867 P.2d at 729, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
6. Id. at 338-39, 867 P.2d at 729-30, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618-19. The increase in
runoff is due to the discharge of surface water into Reliez Creek. Id. at 339, 867 P.2d
at 730, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619. Surface waters are those waters arising from rain or
snow that flow over the ground and that are not confined to a watercourse. See 63
CAL. JUR. 3D Water § 705 (1981 & Supp. 1994).
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erty.7 The defendants included: the City of Lafayette, the County of Contra Costa, the Contra Costa County Flood Control District, the California
Department of Transportation (CalTrans), and the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART). 8
The trial court ruled for the defendants on the inverse condemnation
and tort causes of actions and granted the defendants absolute immunity
for damages under the natural watercourse rule.' The plaintiffs appealed
the decision arguing that the trial court erred in giving defendants absolute immunity. The court of appeal, however, affirmed the trial court's
decision."
II.
A.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

Majority Opinion

The court first addressed the court of appeal ruling which granted the
defendants absolute immunity from liability under the natural watercourse rule." The two principal aspects of the natural watercourse rule

7. Locklin; 7 Cal. 4th at 339, 867 P.2d at 730, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and recovery on inverse condemnation, nuisance, dangerous
condition of public property, and trespass to real property. Id.
8. Id. at 340, 867 P.2d 730, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619.
9. Id. at 342, 867 P.2d 732, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 622. For a discussion on the natural
watercourse rule see infra notes 12 and 13 and accompanying text. The trial court
found that Reliez Creek was not a public improvement and the "natural watercourse
rule" shielded the defendants from liability. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 342-43, 867 P.2d at
732-33, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-22; see Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 2425, 119 P.2d 1, 5 (1941) (establishing immunity to upper riparian landowners for damage to lower riparian land caused by the discharge of surface water into a natural
watercourse).
10. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th 344, 867 P.2d at 733, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622. The court of
appeal relied on Archer, but did not look to San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los
Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554 (1920), the case relied upon by the court in
Archer. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 344-48, 867 P.2d at 733-36, 27 Cal Rptr. 2d at 622-25.
San Gabriel Valley Country Club implied a standard of reasonableness by stating that
the improvements to a natural watercourse must be reasonable and not burdensome on
lower riparian landowners. San Gabriel Valley Country Club, 182 Cal. at 399400, 188
P. at 557.
11. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 348-61, 867 P.2d at 736-45, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625-34. The
court focused on the rule applied to private parties who alter the flow of surface water into natural watercourses and analyzed the issue as it relates to governmental entities. Id. For a discussion on tort liability with regard to riparian rights, see 4 B.E.
WrrxIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFoRNIA LAW, Real Property § 798 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1994).
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are: (1) the riparian landowner has the right to gather and discharge
surface water into a natural watercourse, and (2) improvements in the
natural watercourse to increase drainage and avoid erosion are permitted

even if it would damage lower riparian land. 2 Upperstream development
of property benefits from the natural watercourse rule because it limits
liability for damage to lower riparian property.'
The court implemented a rule of reasonableness in the natural watercourse rule by analogizing that rule to the rule utilized for natural runoff
between upper and lower properties. 4 Since the court declined to distinguish between downstream and downslope property, the rule of reasonableness would apply equally to natural watercourse damage. 5 Even
though the court has never before applied the rule of reasonableness to
the natural watercourse rule, many court of appeal cases used the rule in
natural watercourse or flood control improvement cases."Accordingly, a
court must now look at all circumstances 7 to determine if both the upper and lower riparian landowners acted reasonably. 8 If both parties
acted reasonably, then the civil law rule' immunizes the upper riparian
12. Locldin, 7 Cal 4th at 350, 867 P.2d at 737, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626.
13. See San Gabriel Valley Country Club, 182 Cal. at 401, 188 P. at 558.
14. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 350, 867 P.2d at 738, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627. A court will
apply a test of reasonableness to a landowner's conduct affecting the runoff of water
onto adjacent land. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 409, 412 P.2d 529, 536, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 273, 280 (1966) (stating that "[n]o party, whether an upper or a lower landowner,
may act arbitrarily and unreasonably in his relations with other landowners and still be
immunized from all liability"). For a discussion on the discharge of surface water, see
2 CAL. JUR. 3D Adjoining Landoumers § 5 (1973 & Supp. 1994).
15. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 352, 867 P.2d at 739, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628.
16. Id. at 354-55, 867 P.2d 740-41, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 629-30; see Ektelon v. City of
San Diego, 200 Cal. App. 3d 804, 808, 246 Cal. Rptr. 483, 486 (1988) (stating that the
decision in Keys should be applied broadly to all factual situations involving water
law); Martinson v. Hughey, 199 Cal. App. 3d 318, 328, 244 Cal. Rptr. 795, 801 (1988)
(noting that an "upper owner has a right to discharge reasonable and nonijurious
amounts of irrigation water through natural areas of flow onto lower [land]"); Weaver
v. Bishop, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1351, 254 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1988) (noting the use of the reasonableness test in determining liability for damage to lower riparian property caused
by improvements in a natural watercourse to protect upper riparian property). The
trend of most jurisdictions is to apply the rule of reasonableness. See A. DAN TARLOCK,
LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3.05[1] (1992). The rule of reasonableness
adopted in Keys was first implemented by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956), a watercourse case, giving
further support to the court's decision. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 356-57, 867 P.2d at
742-43, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631-32.
17. The relevant factors include "the amount of harm caused, the foreseeability of
the harm . . . , [and] the purpose or motive [of the actions]." Id. at 359, 867 P.2d at
744, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633 (quoting Keys, 64 Cal. 2d at 410, 412 P.2d at 537, 50 Cal.
Rptr. at 281).
18. Id.
19. The civil law rule for natural watercourses "immunizes the upper riparian owner
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property owner from liability.' By maintaining a certain level of immunity, society benefits because developers do not fear liability for damage
to lower riparian property."'
The court concluded that the court of appeal erred in giving the defendants absolute immunity, but declined to overrule the decision based
on insufficient evidence to establish unreasonable behavior by the defendants."
Based on the court's decision regarding the natural watercourse rule, a
governmental entity may be liable for its unreasonable actions which
result in damages to lower riparian property caused by the discharge of
surface water into a natural watercourse.'
Under Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, the taking or
damaging of private property for public use may only be accomplished
where the government provides just compensation.' A private person
may bring an inverse condemnation action if the government does not
compensate the taking of or damage to private property.a
In water law, however, a government may assert immunity from an
inverse condemnation action if a private party receives immunity for the
same action.' The government does not have an absolute privilege, but
a conditional privilege, and will be held proportionately liable in an inverse condemnation action for unreasonable conduct in improving or
altering a natural watercourse that substantially causes damage to ripar-

for damage caused by the alteration of the natural discharge of surface water into a
watercourse and by improvements in the stream bed." Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 360, 867
P.2d at 744, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 367, 867 P.2d at 745, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 361-62, 867 P.2d at 745, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634.

24. CAL CONST. art I, § 19 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994). This article of the constitution
was formerly Article I, Section 14.
25. For a general overview of inverse condemnation, see 29 CAL Ju&. 3D Eminent
Domain §§ 302-340 (1986 & Supp. 1994).

26. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th 362, 867 P.2d at 746, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635. The party in an
inverse condemnation does not have to prove any negligence or tort by the government. Reardon v. City of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 505, 6 P. 317, 325 (1885).
27. Lockdin, 7 Cal. 4th at 362-63, 867 P.2d at 746, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635 (citing San
Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 406, 188 P. 559, 560
(1920) (stating that an injury damnum absque injuria (harm without injury] occurring

between private persons will be treated the same as an injury occurring between a
private party and a governmental entity)).
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ian property.' To recover for damages the plaintiff must show the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct with regard to the potential
for downstream damage, the cost to avoid downstream damage, and the

reasonable means available to protect the plaintiffs property.'
The court held that Reliez Creek was not converted to a public
work,' that the City's, CalTrans', and BART's conduct were not a substantial cause of the property damage," and that the County and District
did not contribute to the increased runoff.' Therefore, the court ruled
in favor of the defendants, noting that the plaintiffs failed to provide
sufficient evidence of unreasonable conduct, or that the plaintiffs took
reasonable steps to prevent the damage.'
The court concluded by holding that an unsuccessful plaintiff in an
inverse condemnation action may be liable for costs.' A defendant

property owner receives compensation for costs in defending an eminent
domain action because an actual taking occurs, but in an unsuccessful

28. Id. at 366, 867 P.2d at 749, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638. The court looked to a history of cases, and to the policy behind Article I, § 19, to form its decision on inverse
condemnation. See Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist, 47 Cal. 3d 550, 56465, 764 P.2d 1070, 1078-79, 253 Cal. Rptr. 693, 701-02 (1988) (establishing the difference
in treatment between private and public owners with regard to immunity for riparian
property damage); Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 306-07, 475 P.2d 441, 447-48,
90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 351-52 (1970) (noting that the Archer rule would consume the policy
behind the right to inverse condemnation); Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d
250, 263, 398 P.2d 129, 137, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89, 97 (1965) (recognizing that the policy
behind Article I section 19 was to make no one person contribute more than his fair
share to any public project); Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 24, 119 P.2d
1, 4 (1941) (supporting immunity by stating that the California Constitution does not
create a cause of action, but only provides for remedies for existing causes of action).
29. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 366-67, 867 P.2d at 749, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638.
30. Id. at 370, 867 P.2d at 751, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640. To convert a natural watercourse into a public work, the governmental entity must exert control and maintain the
watercourse. Id,
31. Id. at 371-72, 867 P.2d at 751-52, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640. The plaintiffs argued
for joint and several liability, but the court noted that liability is proportional. Id. at
372, 867 P.2d at 752-53, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641-42; see Mehi v. People, 13 Cal. 3d 710,
718, 532 P.2d 489, 494, 119 Cal. Rptr. 625, 630 (1975) (noting that in an inverse condemnation action the plaintiff must prove proportionate liability to recover).
32. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 373-74, 867 P.2d at 753-54, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642-43.
33. Id, at 372-74, 867 P.2d at 752-54, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 641-43.
34. Id. at 375-77, 867 P.2d at 754-56, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64345. The defendants to
this action attempted to recover costs under §§ 1032 and 1038 of the California Civil
Procedure Code. Id. at 375, 867 P.2d at 754, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643. A prevailing party
may recover costs for any action or proceeding, unless an exception exists. See CAL
CIv. PROC. CODE § 1032 (West 1994). The trial court denied the award of costs, ruling
that under Blau v. City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. App. 3d 77, 107 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1973),
no award of costs are allowed in inverse condemnation actions. Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at
375, 867 P.2d at 754, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643.
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inverse condemnation action no taking or damage award arises.' Therefore, a plaintiff, while bringing an action in good faith, must prove a
taking or damage before being protected from liability for costs in an
inverse condemnation action.'
B.

Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion

In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Mosk offered a clarification
on the issue of inverse condemnation liability. 7 Because of the
cost-spreading rationale of inverse condemnation, the holding by the
majority signifies that public entities are responsible for "monitoring and
mitigating the effects of cumulative development of streets and highways
on downstream owners."' Justice Mosk noted that the term "reasonable
mitigation" should be decided on a case by case basis.'
I.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court concluded that the natural watercourse
rule and inverse condemnation actions involving water rights are both
subject to a rule of reasonableness. The old law of absolute immunity,
even though rationally based, gave too much latitude to upper riparian
owners. The added rule of reasonableness to both tort and inverse condemnation actions does not inhibit those persons wishing to develop
their property, but only promotes conscious development. Therefore, a
balance between development and riparian rights for both upper and
lower riparian landowners has developed.

ERIC MASAKI TOKUYAMA

35. Id. at 375, 867 P.2d at 755, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644.
36. Id at 377, 867 P.2d at 756, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645.
37. Id. at 378-79, 867 P.2d at 756-57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645-46 (Mosk, J., concur-

ring).
38. Id. at 378, 867 P.2d at 756, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645 (Mosk, J., concurring).
39. Id.
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XIV.

WORKERS COMPENSATION
Labor Code sections 3600 and 3602 of the Worker's
Compensation Act do not bar an employee from
maintaininga civil action against his employerfor
false imprisonment when the employer's intentional
misconduct exceeds the proper role of the employment relationship:Fermino v. Fedco.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Fermino v. Fedco,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether Labor Code sections 3600 and 3602, the exclusivity provisions of the
Worker's Compensation Act, barred Julie Fernino from maintaining a
civil action against her employer, Fedco, when she was accused of theft
and falsely imprisoned by Fedco's security agents.2 The supreme court
reversed both the court of appeal and the trial court's decisions and
clarified the treatment of an employer's intentional misconduct under the
workers' compensation system." In a unanimous opinion, the California

1. 7 Cal. 4th 701, 872 P.2d 559, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18 (1994). Justice Mosk delivered
the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, George, and Klein joined.
2. California Labor Code § 3600(a) provides, in relevant part:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other
liability whatsoever... shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an
employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and
in the course of the employment ...

in those cases where the .

.

. condi-

tions of compensation concur ....
CAL LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
Labor Code § 3602(a) provides, in pertinent part- "Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation
the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee .... " CAL. LAB. CODE
is ...
§ 3602(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
3. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 706, 872 P.2d at 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20. Julie
Fermino was a jewelry salesclerk at a Fedco department store. During Ms. Fermino's
shift, the store's personnel manager requested that she accompany him to a windowless room where he and two other store security agents kept her for over an hour.
They demanded that she confess to an alleged theft of $4.95, and did not release her,
despite her repeated denials of guilt, until she broke down into tears. Id at 706-07,
872 P.2d at 561, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20. Following this incident, Ms. Fermino filed a
civil suit against Fedco for false imprisonment, claiming that Fedco's policy of employee interrogation exceeded the scope of a normal employment relationship. Id. at
707-08, 872 P.2d at 561, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20.
4. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 708-09, 872 P.2d at 560, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21. The court
recognized that the workers' compensation system should not provide the sole remedy
to employees for certain types of employer misconduct. Id.; see also Shoemaker v.
Myers, 52 Cal. 3d 1, 16, 801 P.2d 1054, 1063, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303, 312 (1990) (stating
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Supreme Court held that an employee may maintain a civil action for
false imprisonment against her employer since this intentional misconduct is beyond the scope of the workers' compensation system.5
II.
A.

TREATMENT

The Scope of the Workers' CompensationExclusivity Statute

At issue was whether an employer's act of falsely imprisoning an employee constitutes an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the
Workers' Compensation Act.6 The court began its analysis by interpreting
the "compensation bargain" embodied within the workers' compensation
exclusivity statutes as a compromise requiring employers to assume liability for an employee's injuries sustained in the course of employment,
in exchange for the employee's relinquishment of other remedial rights
available in tort law.' The court acknowledged the ambiguity in both the
relevant statutes and case law regarding whether the workers' compensation system excludes an employer's tortious acts against its employees as
an exception to the exclusivity rules.' The court concluded that when an

that the exclusive remedy provisions do not apply where the employer steps outside of
a proper role in the business relationship); Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43
Cal. 3d 148, 161, 729 P.2d 743, 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 316 (1987) (noting that recovery in tort is permissible for an employer's intentional misconduct). See generally 2
B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAIFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation § 53 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1994) (discussing conduct normal in employment); 65 CAL JUR. 3D Work Injury
Compensation § 27 (1981 & Supp. 1994) (explaining rights to bring action for intentional injury exclusive of the Worker's Compensation Act); Stuart E. Frank, California
Supreme Court Survey, 19 PEPP. L REV. 310 (1991) (analyzing the treatment of wrongful termination claims under the exclusivity provisions); Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employer's Workers' Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55
TENN. L REV. 405 (1988) (analyzing the exclusiveness rule and its exceptions).
5. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 723, 872 P.2d at 572, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31; see CAL
LAB. CODE §§ 3600, 3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
6. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 706, 872 P.2d at 560-61, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19.
7. Id. at 708, 872 P.2d at 561-62, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20; see Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at
158, 729 P.2d at 749, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314 (defining the compensation bargain as employers assuming limited no fault liability in exchange for employees receiving compensation without the availability of additional tort damages).
8. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 709-10, 872 P.2d at 562-63, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 21-22; see
Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 473-74, 612 P.2d 948,
953-54, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980) (holding that injuries resulting from an
employer's intentional misconduct are compensable under Labor Code § 4553 because
allowing employees to sue outside the workers' compensation system to recover for
intentional torts frustrates the purpose of the system). But see Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1
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employer's conduct toward an employee steps out of the "proper role" of
the employment relationship, the workers' compensation exclusivity
statutes do not preclude an employee from maintaining a civil action

against the employer.' The court indicated that restricting employees to
recovering under the Workers' Compensation Act for an employer's misconduct exceeding the scope of the compensation bargain will not further the state's interest in eliminating employer conduct that violates
public policy."0
B.

False Imprisonment and the ProperRole Exception to the Worker's
Compensation Act
1. Fedco's False Imprisonment of Fermino Exceeded the Conditions
of the Compensation Bargain

The court interpreted the crime of false imprisonment as a violation of
an individual's liberty and characterized the tort as the "intentional confmement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appreciable length
of time."" Examining the pleadings, the court found that Fermino stated
a cause of action for false imprisonment because she pled that Fedco
held her against her will and exceeded any privilege to briefly detain
individuals suspected of theft. 2 In addition, the court noted that while
an employer's intentional behavior alone may not be actionable outside
the exclusivity provisions, an employer's intentional misconduct beyond
the scope of a normal employment relationship provides an exception to
the limited remedies available under the workers' compensation system.13 Fedco not only exhibited malevolent behavior but also criminally

Cal. 4th 1083, 1097, 824 P.2d 680, 692, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 886 (1992) (permitting an
employee to maintain a civil action outside workers' compensation system for employer
misconduct).
9. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 714-15, 872 P.2d at 566, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25. See generaUy 2 B.E. WmrN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation § 40 (9th
ed. & Supp. 1994) (discussing exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions).
10. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 715, 872 P.2d at 566, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25; see Gantt, 1
Cal. 4th at 1095, 824 P.2d at 688, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (stating that employees are protected against employer actions that contravene fundamental state policy).
11. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 715, 872 P.2d at 567, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26; see Molko v.
Holy Spirit Ass'n., 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1123, 762 P.2d 46, 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 134
(1988) (stating the elements necessary to establish the tort of false imprisonment). See
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 236 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (discussing criminal false
imprisonment).
12. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 723, 872 P.2d at 572, 30 Cal. Rptr. ,2d at 31. See genera//y CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5 (codifying the common law merchant's privilege to detain individuals suspected of theft).
13. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 717-18, 872 P.2d at 568, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
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deprived Ferm-ino of her personal liberty."' Such employer conduct is
outside the scope of the compensation bargain. 5
2.

Labor Code Section 3602 Does Not Constitute a Complete List of
Exceptions to the Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Provisions

The court examined section 3602 and determined its relevancy within
the workers' compensation exclusivity provisions.'" The court discussed
the legislative intent of section 3602, concluding that it only stated judicial expansions of specific types of employer conduct outside the compensation bargain, and did not act as a principal source for resolving
ambiguities within the exclusivity provisions. 7 Although section 3602
describes judicially recognized exceptions to the exclusivity provisions,
the 1982 amendments did not explicitly exclude employment-related false
imprisonment claims. 8 The court reasoned that false imprisonment in
the employment relationship had not been fully adjudicated, and that the
amended statute could not anticipate future judicial developments.
Therefore, the court found that section 3602 did not explicitly address
the treatment of false imprisonment in employment relationships.'
3.

Legitimate Employer Objectives Do Not Justify an Employmentrelated False Imprisonment

Finally, the court dismissed Fedco's argument that the alleged false
imprisonment served legitimate employer objectives, rejecting Fedco's
implication that there may be certain "reasonable" false imprison-

14. Id. at 718, 872 P.2d at 568, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27; see CAL PENAL CODE § 236
(West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
15. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 718, 872 P.2d at 568, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
16. Id. at 719-21, 872 P.2d at 569-70, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28-29.
17. Id. at 719-20, 872 P.2d at 569, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28-29. See CAL LAB. CODE
§ 3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
18. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 721, 872 P.2d at 570, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29.
19. Id. at 720-21, 872 P.2d at 570, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29. The 1982 amendments to
California Labor Code § 3602 were intended to clarify court decisions involving the
"dual capacity doctrine." The amendments expand the exceptions to the exclusivity
provisions and recite other exceptions recognized by court decisions. Id. See generally
2 B.E. WmaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation § 50 (9th ed. 1987
& Supp. 1994) (discussing legislative curtailment of dual capacity doctrine); 65 CAL
Jun. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 25 (1981 & Supp. 1994) (discussing employer tort
liability under the dual capacity doctrine).
20. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 721, 872 P.2d at 570, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29.
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ments.2' The court explained that employers who falsely imprison employees exceed the reasonable limits of the employment relationship,
despite an employer's initial legitimate purpose for employee detention.' The court concluded that for a claim to be actionable outside the
workers' compensation system, an employee must demonstrate that her
employer's conduct was a deliberate act anomalous to the employment
relationship.'
Ill.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court held that an employee may maintain a
civil action for false imprisonment against her employer, despite the fact
that the exclusivity statute of the Worker's Compensation Act does not
specifically address the issue.' In cases where an employer's intentional
misconduct criminally deprives an employee of her liberty, courts will
likely find that the employee has a right to additional remedies outside
the scope of the Worker's Compensation Act.' The Fermino court clarified the treatment of employers' intentional torts within the workers'
compensation system by ruling that such conduct falls outside the compensation bargain.2" In doing so, the court further defined the proper
role exception of the exclusivity statute, thereby allowing employees to
pursue additional remedies in civil actions when an employer's behavior
exceeds the reasonable limitations of the employment relationship.'

APRIL LORRAINE ANSTETr

21. Id. at 721, 872 P.2d at 570-71, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29-30. The court stated, "[A)
'reasonable' false imprisonment is oxymoronic. False imprisonment is, by definition an
unreasonable and indeed criminal confinement" Id.
22. Id. See generaUy CAL PENAL CODE § 490.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994) (codifying
common law merchant's privilege to detain individuals suspected of theft).
23. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 721-22, 872 P.2d at 571, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30. However,
the court has held that certain employer actions, such as demotions, promotions, criticisms of work practices, and frictions in negotiations over grievances are all within the
compensation bargain. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729
P.2d 743, 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987).
24. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 723, 872 P.2d at 572, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31; see CAL
LAB. CODE §§ 3600, 3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
25. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 723, 872 P.2d at 572, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31; see CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 3600, 3602 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
26. Fermino, 7 Cal. 4th at 723, 872 P.2d at 572, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31.
27. Id. See CAL LAB. CODE §§ 3600, 3602 (West 1989 and Supp. 1994).
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